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Abstract 
 
John R. Hipp:  Social Distance and Social Change:  How Neighborhoods Change over Time 
(Under the direction of Kenneth A. Bollen) 
 
Two key theoretical themes guided my exploration of neighborhood change.  First, I 
utilized the classic sociological notion of social distance in testing its determinants and 
viewing its effect on neighborhood change over time.  I measured social distance in various 
manners:  1) racial/ethnic differences, 2) a composite of several characteristics (including 
racial/ethnic, socio-economic, and demographic), or 3) the consolidated inequality created by 
difference along both racial/ethnic and socio-economic differences simultaneously.  Second, 
I built an explicit micro-level theory of household residential mobility decisions to explain 
the generation of the structural characteristics that theories posit cause neighborhood crime.   
I found that social distance had important implications for neighborhoods.  Using a 
multi-level, longitudinal sample of the American Housing Survey (AHS) I found that 
individual-level social distance along multiple characteristics helps explain neighborhood 
satisfaction: this suggests the importance of focusing on the fit of the household with the 
neighborhood.  Dynamic analyses using this same sample showed that racial/ethnic 
heterogeneity explains crime rates four years later.  Fixed effects analyses using a sample of 
census tracts in eleven cities found that changing ethnic heterogeneity over the decade is 
positively related to changing crime rates.  These same fixed effects analyses showed that 
increasing inequality between African-Americans and whites is positively related to the 
change in various official crime rates.   
 iv
My theoretical model helped explain the change in neighborhood structural 
characteristics.  Using the AHS sample, I found that perceived crime in a block increases 
general residential mobility.  This theoretical model also predicted and found that the 
presence of more homeowners on a block reduces perceived crime four years later in 
dynamic models.  While residential instability had no effect on crime four years later in 
cross-lagged models, more vacant units in the block are positively related to perceived crime 
four years later.  This suggests a possible manner in which residential mobility may affect 
neighborhood crime rates.  I also found using the AHS sample that higher levels of block 
perceived crime creates racial/ethnic residential transformation by increasing the likelihood 
that African-Americans and Latinos will move into the block, and reducing the likelihood 
that whites will move in. 
 v
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In memory of my father, and to my mother.   
The spirit I inherited from him and the sisu I inherited from her helped me through this 
process
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I. Introduction 
 
Social scientists have long been confronted by the empirical puzzle of why some 
neighborhoods undergo a period of disorder and decline while others seemingly avoid this 
fate.  Given that neighborhoods are such important parts of people’s lives, this is no trivial 
question.  The quality of neighborhoods are important for the social relations they provide 
adults, for the environment and education they provide children growing up, and for the 
investment they represent to many home owners for whom the value of their home represents 
much of their net worth.  As neighborhoods worsen, all of these dimensions are negatively 
impacted.  I explore this question here by both measuring the quality of neighborhoods 
through reported satisfaction and by using crime rates as an objective measure of 
neighborhoods to trace how neighborhoods change over time.   
Two key theoretical themes guide my exploration of neighborhood change.  First, I 
utilize the classic sociological notion of social distance in testing its determinants and 
utilizing it to view its effect on neighborhood change over time.  While early theoretical 
models viewed social distance along a single characteristic—economic class—that would 
eventually lead to a full-scale revolt (Marx 1978), later formulations included other socio-
economic dimensions (Weber 1968).  In the twentieth century, race/ethnicity difference has 
sometimes been viewed synonymously with social distance (Bogardus 1947).  Common to 
all of these formulations is the hypothesis that social distance inhibits interaction among 
individuals and can affect social cohesion (Durkheim 1952 [1897]).  I therefore take into 
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account in my theoretical model how this social distance may affect household decisions in 
neighborhoods, and how these decisions may affect changes in neighborhoods over time.   
Second, I build an explicit micro-level theory of household decisions and incorporate 
this into theories positing that neighborhood change occurs due to structural characteristics of 
neighborhoods.  While sociological scholarship often posits that neighborhood change occurs 
due to structural characteristics of neighborhoods, less attention is given to the generation of 
these structural characteristics.  My household level model attempts to explain the existence 
of neighborhood structural characteristics through household residential mobility decisions.  
That is, household decisions to leave a neighborhood will affect the aggregated measure of 
residential stability; similarly, to the extent that certain types of households are more likely to 
leave a neighborhood with increasing crime (based on economic resources or racial/ethnic 
background) aggregated economic and racial/ethnic measures of the neighborhood will be 
affected by such activity.  Additionally, I use the construct of social distance to explain some 
household decisions.   
My approach nesting a household-level model within theories positing that structural 
characteristics of neighborhoods such as social distance affect neighborhood change is 
inherently a two-level problem requiring two-level data: information on both households and 
their neighborhoods.  While national surveys provide information on individual attitudes, 
they infrequently provide information on the neighborhood in which these individuals are 
embedded.  Conversely, aggregate-level data for communities allow us to view the change in 
neighborhoods over time but do not provide information on the decision-making processes of 
the individuals within those neighborhoods.  However, the restricted-use version American 
Housing Survey (AHS) provides me a unique opportunity to address these questions since it 
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allows me to link household level respondents with the census tract in which the household 
resides.  In addition, the AHS allows me to follow housing units over a period of time, 
allowing for longitudinal tests.   
This research question is also an inherently longitudinal one as I wish to view how 
neighborhoods change over time.  While panel studies occasionally provide access to the 
neighborhood characteristics of the respondents (i.e., the Panel Study of Income Dynamics), 
these studies usually follow individuals over time.  In such studies, once the household leaves 
a neighborhood there is no longer information on the neighborhood:  not only has the 
respondent abandoned the neighborhood, but the researcher effectively has as well.  In 
contrast, the AHS allows me to view individuals before they leave the neighborhood, as well 
as the individuals who replace them in the event that they choose to leave.  Understanding 
these new people in the neighborhood and the attitudes they hold provides a new insight not 
available from studies following individuals over time.   
 
Chapter two 
In chapter two I use a national data set of 660 blocks to explore the determinants of 
neighborhood satisfaction.  I build on the residential mobility literature to suggest that, 
broadly speaking, there are two key components of neighborhood satisfaction:  the degree to 
which the neighborhood is desirable in general, and 2) the degree of fit of the household with 
the neighborhood (that is, the extent to which the neighborhood fits the household’s lifestyle 
at their particular point in the life course).  By using multilevel data, I aim to disentangle 
neighborhood-level effects from household-level effects.  In this sense, neighborhood-level 
effects tend to capture differences across neighborhoods (their overall desirability), whereas 
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individual-level effects capture the degree to which the household fits with the neighborhood.  
While some studies have used multilevel data to explore the determinants of neighborhood 
satisfaction, nearly all of these studies only have data for respondents in neighborhoods 
within a single city (or in some instances, only a subset of the neighborhoods in a city) 
(Bolan 1997; Sampson 1991; Woldoff 2002).  This raises the question of whether such 
findings can be generalized from a particular city to all cities.   
Second, whereas past studies have suggested that certain aggregate demographic 
characteristics of neighborhoods are related to overall satisfaction, less studied is why such 
characteristics would lead to more satisfaction.  I build on the insights of the social 
disorganization model (Shaw and McKay 1942)to test whether the crime and disorder of a 
neighborhood mediate the effect of these demographic characteristics on neighborhood 
satisfaction.  While it is certainly plausible that aggregate levels of crime and disorder reduce 
aggregate neighborhood satisfaction, studies have generally been limited to testing whether 
an individual who perceives more crime and disorder reports less individual neighborhood 
satisfaction (Adams 1992; Davis and Fine-Davis 1981; Parkes, Kearns, and Atkinson 2002; 
Woldoff 2002).  Taylor (2001) provided a strong critique of such an approach, suggesting 
that while in his study of Baltimore those who perceived more crime or disorder were less 
satisfied, there were few aggregate level effects for neighborhoods.   
A third key feature of this chapter is that in focusing on the degree of fit of the 
household with the neighborhood, this naturally introduces the possibility that households 
prefer to move to neighborhoods in which there is minimal social distance between 
themselves and their neighbors.  Whereas studies have tested the effect of individual-level 
racial/ethnic social distance on neighborhood satisfaction (Harris 2001; Stipak and Hensler 
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1983), generally finding little effect, virtually none have viewed the effects of social distance 
along a number of categories simultaneously.  I do so here by employing a unique sample 
that allows me to view the demographic composition of a block of eleven households.  Thus, 
we might expect that an individual household more socially distant from their neighbors will 
experience less ‘fit’ with the neighborhood, and hence express less satisfaction.  I am also 
able to test whether the average social distance on the block has an aggregate effect on 
neighborhood satisfaction.    
 
Chapter three 
In chapter three I test for possible reciprocal effects between three structural 
characteristics (residential instability, ethnic composition, and poverty) and crime rates.  Past 
studies using the social disorganization perspective have discovered cross-sectional 
relationships between these neighborhood structural characteristics and higher rates of crime, 
and have posited that these structural neighborhood characteristics cause higher crime.  
However, I test here whether causal direction is reversed due to the mobility decisions of 
households giving rise to these neighborhood structural characteristics.   
A key feature of this chapter is that I build on the work of Lyons and Lowery (1986) 
who elaborated the view of Hirschman (1970) to build a household level model in which 
households respond to neighborhood problems either with: 1) voice (by getting involved in 
either formal or informal means to affect the neighborhood); 2) exit (by moving out of the 
neighborhood); 3) loyalty (by failing to acknowledge these as problems); or 4) neglect (by 
withdrawing from social life).  While research in the social disorganization perspective often 
assumes that neglect is the only option available to households, I build a theoretical model in 
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which households may respond to higher crime rates by choosing to move out of the 
neighborhood.  Thus, I explicitly focus on the problem of crime, as fear for one’s own safety 
is a very salient concern that may influence decisions to leave an area (Cullen and Levitt 
1996; Dugan 1999).  I employ the notion of social distance in this model to predict when 
households will respond to crime through voice rather than exit.   
I perform three key tests in this chapter using longitudinal data.  First, I test whether 
the household level model I construct explains household decisions to leave an area in 
response to higher rates of crime.  The model attempts to explain which households are more 
likely to leave in such an instance, and tests whether social distance moderates these effects 
by increasing the likelihood of choosing exit instead of voice.  Second, a key implication of 
the model that I test here is that households choosing exit give rise to these structural 
neighborhood characteristics that the social disorganization model suggests cause crime.  
Thus, household decisions to leave a neighborhood that is struggling can change various 
structural characteristics of a neighborhood:  a) moving out will increase the residential 
instability in a neighborhood (by definition, since this is a mathematical relationship); b) if 
those with higher income are more likely to leave, this will change the economic structure if 
they are replaced by households with lower income levels; and c) if those who leave are 
replaced by households of a different racial background this will change the ethnic 
composition of the neighborhood.  Third, I test the social disorganization hypothesis that 
these neighborhood structural characteristics will cause changes in crime rates.  This 
hypothesis has generally been tested using cross-sectional data despite the causal nature of 
the proposed relationship.  Thus, I develop and test various hypotheses for a household-level 
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model that can undergird the aggregate-level hypotheses of the social disorganization model 
using multi-level longitudinal data.   
 
Chapter four 
In chapter four I test whether two key dimensions of social distance—income 
inequality and ethnic heterogeneity—increase crime rates in neighborhoods.  While several 
different theoretical models postulate that crime will be increased by inequality and/or ethnic 
heterogeneity (or a combination of the two leading to inequality within ethnicity or inequality 
across ethnicities), virtually no studies have simultaneously tested these constructs using 
neighborhood-level data.  Since inequality and ethnic heterogeneity are fundamentally 
aggregate level constructs, they can have different manifestations at different levels of 
analysis.  I explore the mechanisms posited by six theoretical models, and point out that these 
differing theories suggest mechanisms working at differing levels of aggregation.   
Thus, past studies of this general question are limited in one or more of the following 
ways:  1) several studies in the 1980’s measured these constructs at large levels of 
aggregation, such as metropolitan areas or counties.  I point out below that since the posited 
mechanisms generally work at smaller levels of aggregation, this is rarely an appropriate 
strategy.  2) Studies have generally failed to consider the geographic level at which the 
mechanisms of inequality or heterogeneity should work for the particular theory being tested.  
I adopt a strategy of carefully considering the mechanisms of each theory, and show how this 
suggests constructing measures at particular levels of aggregation.  I also show that past 
studies failing to take this approach often do not construct appropriate measures for capturing 
the proposed theoretical mechanisms.  3) Studies often fail to take into account more than 
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one theory at a time.  Since more than one theory posits some of these relationships, finding a 
particular relationship does not adjudicate between these competing theories.  4) Related to 
#3, studies often fail to take into account more than one of these inequality/ethnic 
heterogeneity constructs in their studies.  Since these constructs are highly related both 
conceptually and empirically as I discuss below, this leaves open the possibility that the 
empirical relationship observed contains omitted confounding effects.  5) Studies using data 
for small units of analysis often only have data for neighborhoods in a single city.  Such an 
approach has a) limited ability to generalize its findings, since it requires the assumption that 
the city being studied is representative of all U.S. cities, b) limited power to find effects due 
to the relatively small sample size, and c) possibly limited variability due to using 
neighborhoods from a single city.  6) Studies rarely utilize longitudinal data.  As a result, 
causal claims are more difficult to establish.   
I address all of these issues by testing these relationships using neighborhood level 
data for eleven cities over several decade periods.  Thus, I not only measure these effects at 
the more theoretically appropriate level of small neighborhoods, but by using a fixed effects 
design, I test whether the change in these inequality and heterogeneity measures affect the 
change in crime within a neighborhood.  By taking into account unchanging characteristics of 
neighborhoods, fixed effects models utilize longitudinal data to provide a more stringent test 
of the hypotheses under study (Halaby 2004).   
 
 The overarching theme throughout this dissertation is the role of social distance in 
fostering neighborhood change.  The following chapters measure this social distance in 
various manners:  either simply as racial/ethnic differences in a block or tract, as a composite 
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of several characteristics (including racial/ethnic, socio-economic, and demographic 
characteristics) measured both at the individual- and block-level, or as the consolidated 
inequality created by difference along both racial/ethnic and socio-economic characteristics 
simultaneously (Blau 1977) measured at the tract level.  In these chapters I explore the role 
of social distance for fostering neighborhood satisfaction, as well as neighborhood crime and 
disorder.  In the concluding chapter I synthesize the findings, point out policy implications, 
and suggest future directions for research.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.  Neighborhood Networks of Social Distance:  Do they Explain Neighborhood 
Satisfaction? 
  
  
Even in an era of increasing globalization, neighborhoods have important 
implications for their residents.  They are the sites for many of the daily activities of their 
residents:  whether shopping, engaging in recreational activities with family and friends, 
chatting with neighbors, experiencing crime and disorder, or sending their children to nearby 
schools.  For these and other reasons, neighborhoods are important to households, and while 
a particular household may simply abandon an undesirable neighborhood, there is reason to 
suspect that many households lack the resources to move away from such a neighborhood, or 
feel a strong emotional tie that precludes simply moving away (Massey and Denton 1993; 
Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1994).  As a result, considerable scholarship has focused on the 
determinants of greater reported neighborhood satisfaction by residents (Adams 1992; Bolan 
1997; Connerly and Marans 1985; Hartnagel 1979; Lee, Campbell, and Miller 1991; 
McHugh, Gober, and Reid 1990; Woldoff 2002).  However, not always acknowledged by 
these studies is the complication that the neighborhood satisfaction reported by any 
household has two components:  1) the difference in the quality of neighborhoods across 
neighborhoods, and 2) the degree of fit of any household within a neighborhood.  The notion 
of a household’s degree of fit with the neighborhood comes from the residential mobility 
literature in which an individual (or household) desires different types of housing units and 
neighborhoods as they move through the life course.  Thus, young singles generally prefer an 
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area with a vibrant nightlife, while couples with children generally prefer tree-lined suburbs 
perceived to be safe with quality schools.  This complication has important implications for 
the results of prior studies. 
While early neighborhood satisfaction studies adopted the strategy of using 
individual-level data and regressing an individual’s reported neighborhood satisfaction on the 
individual’s report of neighborhood characteristics or their demographic characteristics, such 
an approach suffers from two key limitations.  First, is it reasonable to assume that the 
respondent can provide error-free assessments of various neighborhood characteristics?  
Second, how do we interpret any observed relationship between a particular demographic 
characteristic and reported satisfaction?  As to the first issue, if certain types of respondents 
exhibit systematic bias in how they respond to such queries, we will not get an accurate 
portrayal of the neighborhood.  Additionally we don’t know if any observed relationship is 
simply a psychological one:  that is, an individual who perceives more problems in the 
neighborhood is less satisfied than their neighbors who perceive fewer problems, suggesting 
no neighborhood effects (Taylor 2001).  As to the second issue, what does a positive 
relationship between, say, one’s level of education and neighborhood satisfaction mean in 
such studies?  This finding cannot distinguish between various competing explanations: 1) it 
might measure the degree to which households with high education are better able to move 
into the most desirable neighborhoods, 2) it might measure the degree to which households 
with high education ‘fit’ in the neighborhood and hence are more satisfied, 3) it might simply 
be a psychological effect where those with more education report more satisfaction, 4) it 
might indeed capture a compositional effect where the presence of more highly educated 
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households brings about more overall satisfaction.  Such indeterminacy suggests a need for 
data containing households nested in neighborhoods.   
For these reasons, recent scholarship has employed a multilevel approach by viewing 
respondents nested within neighborhoods (Sampson 1988; Sampson 1991).  An advantage of 
this approach is that it does not assume that residents are infallible evaluators of the 
neighborhood, but rather takes into account that any individual’s responses may contain error 
and systematic bias, and therefore uses the responses of multiple respondents in the 
neighborhood when constructing neighborhood-level measures (Bollen 1989; Raudenbush 
and Bryk 2002; Speizer and Bollen 2000).  While studies using nested data have made 
important advances, there remain unanswered questions.  For instance, nearly all of these 
studies have data for respondents in neighborhoods within a single city (or in some instances, 
only a subset of the neighborhoods in a city) (Bolan 1997; Sampson 1991; Woldoff 2002).  
This raises the question of whether such findings can be generalized from a particular city to 
all cities.  Even more important are two additional key under-explored questions in the 
current literature:  1) while studies have found a relationship between various demographic 
compositions of neighborhoods and satisfaction, few have attempted to explain why such 
relationships exist; 2) studies have paid little attention to whether the social distance between 
residents (as measured by various demographic characteristics) reduces satisfaction.  I 
discuss each of these issues next.   
Given the insights of the social disorganization model (Shaw and McKay 1942), it is 
reasonable to ask whether the crime and disorder of a neighborhood helps explain the 
relationship between neighborhood demographic composition and overall neighborhood 
satisfaction.  The social disorganization model posits that particular neighborhood social 
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structures (poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability) lead to a lack of 
cohesiveness that diminishes guardianship capability, leading to higher levels of crime and 
disorder.  This crime and disorder then likely reduces the desirability of the neighborhood.  
To test such a possible mediating effect of crime/disorder on satisfaction requires three tests:  
1) whether the neighborhood demographic composition affects the level of crime/disorder; 2) 
whether neighborhood-level crime/disorder affects overall satisfaction; 3) whether the effect 
of neighborhood demographics is reduced when including measures of crime/disorder.  
While numerous studies have performed test 1, surprisingly few have performed test 2 and 
none have performed test 3.  Regarding test 2, while it is certainly plausible that aggregate 
levels of crime and disorder reduce aggregate neighborhood satisfaction, studies have 
generally been limited to testing whether an individual who perceives more crime and 
disorder reports less individual neighborhood satisfaction (Adams 1992; Davis and Fine-
Davis 1981; Parkes, Kearns, and Atkinson 2002; Woldoff 2002).  Note that this may simply 
represent a psychological finding, as Taylor (2001) found in his study of Baltimore that while 
those who perceived more crime or disorder were less satisfied, there were few aggregate 
level effects for neighborhoods.  And while studies have occasionally tested whether crime 
victimization in the neighborhood affects satisfaction (Sampson 1991), studies have failed to 
test whether this might mediate the effects of neighborhood demographic composition.  For 
instance, Sampson’s (1991) finding that ethnic heterogeneity led to less reported satisfaction 
leaves unanswered the question why this relationship exists.  Is this because such ethnic 
heterogeneity is inherently undesirable?  Or is it because this ethnic heterogeneity increases 
the amount of crime and disorder in the neighborhood, which then reduces the 
satisfactoriness of the neighborhood?   
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 A second key limitation of past work in the neighborhood satisfaction and attachment 
literature is its focus on the differences across neighborhoods, with subsequently little focus 
on the degree of ‘fit’ of the household with the neighborhood.  While different households 
may prefer different neighborhood amenities, there is also reason to suspect that households 
prefer to move to neighborhoods in which there is minimal social distance between 
themselves and their neighbors.  The notion of social distance is a fundamental concept in 
sociology (Poole 1927), and is based on difference in statuses among individuals.  
Sometimes referred to as “Blau-space” (McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991), it is caused by 
such categories as race/ethnicity, economic resources, life course stage, and social 
background.  For instance, a household with children may well prefer a neighborhood with 
many other children.  Although there is reason to suspect that in the neighborhood-context 
social distance will result in less social interaction, less cohesion, and a subsequent reduction 
in neighborhood satisfaction, few studies have tested these possible effects.  Whereas studies 
have tested the effect of individual-level racial/ethnic social distance on neighborhood 
satisfaction (Harris 2001; Stipak and Hensler 1983), generally finding little effect, virtually 
none have viewed the effects of social distance along a number of categories simultaneously.  
I do so here by employing a unique sample that allows me to view the demographic 
composition of a block of eleven households.  Thus, we might expect that an individual 
household more socially distant from their neighbors will experience less ‘fit’ with the 
neighborhood, and hence express less satisfaction.   
 While the social distance of a particular household from their neighbors may reduce 
the fit with the neighborhood for that household and create dissatisfaction, there may also be 
compositional effects in which greater social distance in a neighborhood affects all of the 
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residents, not just those more socially distant.  This social distance might work through 
various mechanisms:  it might reduce the perceived closeness of the neighborhood in a sort 
of Durkheimian mechanical solidarity fashion; it could reduce social interaction among 
residents, therefore reducing neighborhood satisfaction if social interaction is inherently 
desirable; it might work indirectly by reducing interaction, which then results in increased 
crime and disorder, which then reduces neighborhood satisfaction.  While studies have tested 
whether neighborhood-level social distance based on the category of race/ethnicity impacts 
crime and disorder (Bellair 1997; Roncek and Maier 1991; Rountree and Warner 1999; 
Sampson and Groves 1989; Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000; Warner and Pierce 1993; 
Warner and Rountree 1997), and other studies have tested whether it reduces the satisfaction 
of all residents (Adams 1992; Connerly and Marans 1985; Harris 2001), studies have not 
tested for the effect of social distance along a number of categories beyond race/ethnicity 
upon crime and disorder.  Additionally, they have not tested whether social distance based on 
race/ethnicity has a direct effect on neighborhood satisfaction, or whether its effect is 
mediated by increasing the level of crime and disorder in a neighborhood.   
In this paper, I begin by discussing the mechanisms through which social distance 
should work.  I then discuss four possible determinants of social distance suggested by past 
scholarship.   I then explain how these determinants of social distance can be combined into a 
single measure of social distance between neighbors on a block.  Following that, I develop 
my theoretical model of neighborhood satisfaction by first discussing the determinants of 
quality between neighborhoods, and then discussing the determinants of the degree of fit of 
any household with a neighborhood.  I then introduce the data and methods I will employ, 
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and present the findings of a structural equation model.  I close with conclusions and 
implications.   
 
Theoretical Model of Social Distance 
The notion of social distance is a fundamental concept in sociology (Poole 1927), and 
was expressed by Marx as a dichotomy between two distinct groups based on the single 
determinant of economic class that would eventually lead to a full-scale revolt (Marx 1978).  
That is, there is minimal social distance between any two members within a particular class, 
but considerable social distance between any two members of different classes.  In the 
twentieth century, the importance of racial/ethnic differences has come to dominate and 
define measures of social distance, and is posited to cause such outcomes as racism, group 
conflict, and segregation (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Massey and Denton 1987; 
Sampson 1984; South and Deane 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1986).  Social distance can also be 
created by various other characteristics such as religion, social background, or stage of the 
life course, and Blau (1977; 1987) built on the work of Simmel (1955) to focus on the degree 
of overlap between individuals in these various categories, or cross-cutting circles.  This 
perspective focuses on the distance between individuals in social space, rather than physical 
space.  This general notion of social distance—as measured by the social positions 
individuals occupy—has been key to understanding solidarity, cohesion, and conflict 
(Durkheim 1984 [1933]), under the general assumption that individuals prefer homophily.1  
Homophily is the notion that “birds of a feather flock together,” and posits that social 
                                                 
1 In early broad theories of historical change in cities, Simmel (1908) viewed the impersonality of cities 
increasing social distance and leading to anomie, while Wirth (1956b) focused on the groups based on common 
interests that formed in cities.  More recently, Fischer (1975) pointed out that subcultures existing within the 
city contained minimal social distance within them, and were accompanied by considerable social distance 
between the subcultures.   
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distance is inherently undesirable to individuals, often leading to mistrust and a lack of 
communication (Ross and Jang 2000).   
Mechanisms of Social Distance 
Past theory and research suggests four reasons why social distance might be 
important for fostering neighborhood satisfaction:  1) social distance can decrease the 
similarity in attitudes between two individuals; 2) social distance can decrease the chances of 
creating a shared group identity; 3) social distance can decrease the likelihood of interaction; 
4) social distance as exemplified by social statuses creates role differences.  I consider each 
of these next. 
First, Bourdieu (1984: 476-77) argued that the social position of individuals affects 
their attitudes and cultural preferences.  An individual’s social origin shapes their views and 
attitudes throughout life, what Bourdieu referred to as habitus, creating social distance from 
those with different social origins.  Thus, the awareness of others’ different social 
background will discourage interaction based on the expectation of a lack of common social 
ground.   
Second, a long line of social psychology literature suggests that individuals with even 
superficial similarities can come to categorize themselves and others as members of the same 
group (Friedkin 1999; Hogg 1992; Simon, Hastedt, and Aufderheide 1997; Turner 1987).  
Once an individual self-categorizes into a particular group, self-categorization theory (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986) posits that:  1) individuals will expect to agree with those who are 
functionally identical; 2) failing to agree with similar others will increase subjective 
uncertainty; 3) the views of similar others will be influential as they provide feedback on the 
social validity of one’s own views (Fleming and Petty 2000).  This suggests that groups 
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fostered by similarity on social categories are important for providing self-validation and 
order to the world (Lau 1989).  Again, greater social distance will inhibit this formation of a 
group identity.   
Third, social distance may have an important effect on the likelihood of social 
interaction, due to the principle of homophily, which suggests that people will tend to prefer 
associating with those close in social space (McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991).  The 
principle of homophily dates to Aristotle and Plato, and suggests that individuals will prefer 
to interact with others similar to themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).2  As 
a result, individual networks are homogeneous along many socio-demographic and 
behavioral characteristics.  This is partially due to choosing similar others with whom to 
interact, but also because pairs that are more similar are more likely to remain connected over 
time (Kandel 1978; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).  One viewpoint suggests 
conceptualizing this social distance as a cost to interacting with those more socially distant 
(Mayhew, McPherson, Rotolo, and Smith Lovin 1995).   
Finally, in social status theory (Merton 1968) individuals inhabit social positions (or 
social statuses) that are accompanied by appropriate social roles.  There are then various role 
expectations associated with each position, and we might expect these to lead to differences 
in the actions and attitudes of an individual in one position compared to someone in another 
position.  Many statuses are categorical, bringing about social distance.  For instance, 
consider marital status:  membership in the social position of “married” precludes 
simultaneous membership in the social position of “single.”   
                                                 
2 However, it is interesting to note that they both also suggested that opposites might attract.  This suggests that 
simply looking at a single social position at a time may not capture the entire effect.  In such an instance, 
viewing the overall social distance between two individuals may be important.  For instance, difference on a 
particular social position may be appealing as long as it is accompanied by similarity along other social 
positions.   
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All four of these theories suggest that social distance can limit or enhance social 
interaction.  While the preference for homophily clearly impacts social interaction, 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus suggests that the differing interests of those in different social 
positions will limit the ability and desire to interact.  Tajfel’s self-categorization theory 
suggests that the interaction of group members will foster group identity, leading to even 
more interaction among those closer socially.  And social status theory argues that the roles 
associated with these positions lead to different lifestyles that will sometimes minimize 
interaction between those in different statuses.    
 
Determinants of Social Distance 
Given these mechanisms of social distance, the question then is what social 
characteristics might be particularly important for fostering distance.3  Theoretical models 
have suggested four key determinants of social distance:  1) economic class; 2) racial/ethnic 
differences; 3) life course position; 4) social upbringing.  While gender would also be a key 
determinant for many outcomes, it has less meaning in a neighborhood context given that 
most households are mixed in terms of gender.4  Thus, there is little reason for it to create 
social distance among households in neighborhoods.  Figure 2.1 presents this conceptual 
                                                 
3 Given the amorphous definitions of ‘social distance,’ being able to determine its proper determinants on first 
principles seems unlikely.  That is, social distance is fundamentally based on the social structure of a particular 
society, and hence its determinants will be created by the structure of that society.  Given that, a more 
reasonable goal is to construct a measure of social distance based on modern industrial societies.  While some 
general categories can be drawn from these societies, empirical observation seems most likely to provide 
additional insight.  The question then becomes how general can these measures of social distance be within: 1) 
different outcomes; 2) different contexts; 3) different time periods.   
 
4 Of course, some households have only one head, and therefore it is possible to create some distance based on 
gender.  But consider a neighborhood in which half the units are single parent families headed by women, and 
the other half are married couples.  The single parent households will nonetheless have minimal social distance 
with the wives of the married households.  In addition, the social distance measure I create below likely captures 
any possible difference between such households by measuring distance based on marital status.   
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model, and highlights that these various determinants create social distance.  We can then 
view what effects social distance has:  while I view its effect on neighborhood satisfaction in 
this study, its effect on the formation of ties, marriage patterns, and other outcomes could be 
studied as well.  I consider each of these determinants of social distance next. 
Arguably the most fundamental sociological determinant of social distance is 
economic class.  While Marx (1978) articulated this as a dichotomous measure of differing 
classes, Weber (1968) expanded this to include a broader conception of social class that 
functioned more like a continuous measure.  Weber’s conceptualization included one’s 
education level and the prestige of one’s occupation.  Recent work in this tradition has 
viewed economic inequality as social distance between individuals that leads to strain and 
hostility (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).   
The twentieth century saw the theoretical extension of social distance to include 
racial/ethnic differences as a determinant.  This view has blossomed to the point that many 
social distance measures are synonymous with racial/ethnic difference (Aldrich, Cater, Jones, 
McEvoy, and Velleman 1985; Bogardus 1947; Jargowsky 1996; Jones 1991; Payne, York, 
and Fagan 1974; Rosenbaum 1992).  A large literature has shown how race/ethnicity can lead 
to social distance:  for instance, studies have found that high school students exhibited strong 
tendencies towards selecting same race friends (Mouw and Entwisle 2006).  Another study 
using a survey of teachers for the 1992-3 school year found that those of the same race, 
gender, and subject field are more likely to be in the same subgroup (Frank 1996).  And a 
range of research has viewed the effects of social distance on ethnic intermarriage (Gray 
1987; Jones 1991; South and Messner 1986). 
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The life course perspective has advanced the view that social positions fundamental 
to most societies—age, marital status, and presence of children—are important for creating 
social distance and reducing interaction (Elder 1985; Elder 1998; La Gory and Pipkin 1981; 
Michelson 1976).  Age is particularly important for creating social distance, as birth cohorts 
experience different life events that create social distance in attitudes and viewpoints (Elder 
1999).  Additionally, children are grouped in classrooms based on age, while “homogamy on 
age in marriage is so taken for granted that it is seldom even studied” in research of the U.S. 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).  Studies of factory workers (Feld 1982) and 
persons aged 60 and over (Ward, LaGory, and Sherman 1985) also found age homophily 
effects.  Besides age, marital status and the presence of children are important determinants 
of social distance.  Marital status leads to lifestyle differences from those who are single 
(Fischer 1982), while the presence of children creates a host of role expectations that result in 
considerable lifestyle differences from those without children (Fischer 1982; Stueve and 
Gerson 1977).   
A fourth possible determinant of social distance comes from Bourdieu (1984), who 
suggested that early life histories imprint individuals into a social class that creates social 
distance throughout life from others without that social background.  As a result, two 
individuals raised in different cultures or sub-cultures will have different attitudes and 
viewpoints.  For instance, growing up in an urban area may lead to a different outlook from 
someone raised in a rural area (Wirth 1956a; Wirth 1956b), or the perception of such 
differences (Simon, Hastedt, and Aufderheide 1997).  Likewise, being raised in a different 
society, or even a particular part of the country, may lead to social distance between 
individuals (Breton 1964; Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002; Quillian 1995).  Bourdieu also 
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argued that obtaining more education will lead to different views from those with less 
education, creating social distance.  As a result, those occupying different social positions 
will have little in common and hence interact infrequently.   
 
Measuring Social Distance between Neighbors 
Utilizing these different determinants of social distance, we can then construct a 
measure of overall social distance between households in a block or neighborhood.  Building 
on the work of Peter Blau (1977; 1987), the overlap in various characteristics among 
individuals will minimize the social distance between them.  For instance, focusing only on 
marital status and the presence of children for expositional purposes, an individual who is 
married with children will have most in common with someone else who is married with 
children.  However, this person will only have a moderate amount in common with someone 
who is married without children:  they will have married life in common, but not the issues 
dealing with children.  Likewise, they would have a moderate amount in common with an 
unmarried person with children:  they would have the commonality of children, but very 
different experiences regarding married life.  Finally, this person will have very little in 
common with someone who is single with no children.  These various social statuses should 
lead to differing attitudes and interests, and work has formalized Blau’s model to take into 
account in-group preferences (Skvoretz 1983).  It is straightforward to generalize the concept 
of social distance to continuous measures.  In such instances, we can talk about the degree of 
difference between two individuals based on a particular status, rather than an absolute 
difference as is the case for categorical determinants.   
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Given this framework, we can determine the amount of overlap in social positions (or 
cross-cutting circles) among individuals in a neighborhood.  For instance, consider a simple 
example with just two determinants (X and Y) that are each characterized by just two 
categories (high and low).  Assume that preference for in-group associations (τ) = 1:  that is, 
individuals will only associate with others that they share at least one social characteristic 
with.  Thus we can construct a 2x2 table of possible cells to place individuals in, as shown in 
Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Hypothetical table for social distance on a block based on two dimensions 
 Y- high Y –low 
X- high A B 
X- low C D 
 
Consider two hypothetical neighborhoods, each containing twelve residents.  In the 
first hypothetical neighborhood there is perfect correlation between X and Y.  Here, there are 
six individuals each in cells A and D, but no individuals in cells B and C.  In this 
neighborhood, there is greater social distance as individuals are split into two distinct groups:  
those who are high on X and Y, and those who are low on X and Y.  Those in cell A have 
nothing in common with other residents in the neighborhood, and thus only associate with 
each other.  Therefore, an individual in this group will associate with 5 of the other 11 
neighborhood residents (5 / 11 = .45).   
In the second hypothetical neighborhood of twelve individuals there is no correlation 
between X and Y.  This neighborhood will contain three individuals in each of the cells.  
Here there will be more overlap in relations:  those in cell A will have a high value of X in 
common with those in cell B, and high values of Y in common with those in cell C.  Thus, 
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they have the commonality to interact with 8 of the other eleven neighborhood members 
(73%).  A similar value can be constructed for each of the other three cells.   
 There are important consequences of the structures of social distance in these two 
neighborhoods.  In the first neighborhood, there is the potential to create two strongly 
interlinked groups that each frequently interact only with fellow group members.  However, 
these two groups will have no interlinkages with each other, therefore creating an overall 
network structure in the neighborhood that is bifurcated.  Thus, we can extract a social 
distance structure of a neighborhood.  On the other hand, the second neighborhood will not 
create any strong small groups, but should lead to an overall network structure creating more 
interlinkages.  Changing the value of the preference for in-group associations (τ) will modify 
these results but not change the broader implications.  This notion of distance naturally 
generalizes to more determinants.  Finally, after measuring the social distance between pairs 
of individuals within a neighborhood, these can be combined into a matrix of neighborhood 
social distances.  I can then test whether the social distance structure of a particular block 
affects overall neighborhood satisfaction.  I next develop a general model of neighborhood 
satisfaction based on both the overall quality of the neighborhood as well as the fit of a 
particular household with that neighborhood, and incorporate the notion of social distance 
into this model.   
 
Neighborhood satisfaction theoretical model 
While studies have viewed many determinants of neighborhood satisfaction, these 
determinants can be grouped into two broad categories:  1) those measuring the overall 
quality of a neighborhood, and 2) those measuring the degree of fit with the neighborhood.  
             25
This suggests viewing the quality differences between neighborhoods, and the degree to 
which the individual household ‘fits’ with the neighborhood.  I incorporate the perspective of 
the burgeoning social disorganization literature to test whether: 1) the difference in 
crime/disorder between neighborhoods impacts overall satisfaction with the neighborhood; 2) 
whether individual perceptions of crime and disorder impact an individual’s reported 
neighborhood satisfaction.  Figure 2.2 presents the theoretical model that I will elaborate 
here.  In this figure, the ovals represent the latent constructs at the neighborhood level (crime, 
disorder, neighborhood satisfaction): these constructs are “latent” since we do not have 
perfect measures of them, and instead must rely on several indicators (or, approximations) to 
tap these variables.  The arrows from these latent constructs point to assessments by 
individuals within the neighborhood:  thus, several residents within the same block are all 
treated as “expert witnesses” in assessing the level of crime or disorder in the neighborhood.  
Note that each of these “expert witnesses” is characterized by particular characteristics that 
may systematically affect their report of neighborhood disorder/crime; thus, these individual 
characteristics have arrows pointing from them to the individual report of crime/disorder to 
take these systematic biases into account.  Finally, the two rectangles at the left represent 
neighborhood-level measures of physical characteristics and demographic composition or 
social distance.  While below I make a distinction between physical and social disorder, here 
I represent them as a single construct simply for clarity purposes.   
 
Differences between neighborhoods in overall quality 
When comparing across neighborhoods to determine more desirable ones, researchers 
primarily have focused on 1) the physical characteristics and 2) the social demographic 
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characteristics.5  The physical features of the neighborhood include such generally desirable 
amenities as the presence of parks, recreational activities, and general economic dynamism as 
measured by the presence of numerous restaurants and shops.  Studies have also frequently 
pointed to the importance of quality schools, showing them to be related to higher home 
values (Clark and Herrin 2000; Kain and Quigley 1975), higher neighborhood attachment 
(Greenberg 1999) and higher neighborhood satisfaction (Harris 2001; Parkes, Kearns, and 
Atkinson 2002).6   These possible effects are represented by path A in Figure 2.2.  The 
physical characteristics also include ostensibly undesirable features such as the presence of 
toxic waste sites, or bars and liquor stores.  High rates of pollution and the nearby placement 
of toxic sites may also pose a health risk, particularly for pregnant mothers and infants (Berry 
and Bove 1997; Croen, Shaw, Sanbonmatsu, Selvin, and Buffler 1997; Knox and Gilman 
1997; Shaw, Schulman, Frisch, Cummins, and Harris 1992).  Bars and liquor stores may 
reduce satisfaction in two ways:  1) they may do so simply because bars and liquor stores are 
inherently undesirable; 2) they may create more crime and disorder (Sampson and 
Raudenbush 2004).  This implies a possible indirect effect on neighborhood satisfaction, and 
is represented by path B in Figure 2.2.   
Besides the physical characteristics of a neighborhood, numerous studies have also 
tested whether the structural demographic characteristics of a neighborhood are related to 
overall satisfaction (Adams 1992; Connerly and Marans 1985; Harris 2001; Sampson 1991; 
                                                 
5 There are two key methodological strategies in the literature for comparing the quality of neighborhoods qua 
neighborhoods:  1) the community attachment/satisfaction literature relies on respondent assessments of their 
attachment to, or satisfaction with, the neighborhood and then regresses these perceptions on neighborhood 
amenities; 2) the hedonic modeling approach regresses home values on neighborhood and housing amenities 
under the assumption that home values are a measure of more desirable neighborhoods.   
 
6 Of course, this feature is most important to those who have or are planning to have children of school age.  I 
discuss at length below this notion of different preference structures among households for various features of 
neighborhoods.   
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Stipak and Hensler 1983).  This is represented by path F in Figure 2.2.  Note that the source 
of the relationship represented by path F is ambiguous.  In part, such a relationship may 
simply represent a selection effect in which those with the most resources are able to move 
into the most desirable neighborhoods.  If this is the case, areas with a greater concentration 
of higher socio-economic status households (i.e., higher levels of income or education) will 
have greater neighborhood satisfaction.  And if certain racial/ethnic groups in the U.S. have 
limited options when choosing neighborhoods (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Kain and 
Quigley 1975; Rosenbaum 1994; South and Crowder 1997a; South and Deane 1993), 
neighborhoods with a larger concentration of minorities will report less satisfaction.  Thus 
suggests that these positive relationships would disappear if we could appropriately model all 
the determinants of a desirable neighborhood.  Failing a perfectly specified model, this 
relationship would persist to capture these unmeasured neighborhood characteristics.  
A second possibility is that certain demographic characteristics have a direct causal 
effect on the overall neighborhood satisfaction.  For instance, the systemic model suggests 
that neighborhoods with a greater level of residential stability create a greater level of 
attachment and satisfaction among their residents (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974).  Thus, 
greater stability increases satisfaction by increasing social interaction among residents 
(Connerly and Marans 1985; Logan and Spitze 1994; Ross and Jang 2000; Rountree and 
Warner 1999; Sampson 1988; Sampson 1991; Warner and Rountree 1997).  Of course, the 
reverse may be true, as lack of residential satisfaction may cause residential stability given 
that Speare (1974; 1982) argued that neighborhood satisfaction plays a key role in mobility 
decisions.   
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A third possibility is that the demographic characteristics of a neighborhood affect 
neighborhood satisfaction indirectly through their effect on neighborhood crime and disorder.  
This naturally suggests a mediating relationship, though studies have failed to explore this 
possibility.  The social disorganization model comes from the pioneering work of Shaw and 
McKay (1942), and argues that particular social structures of neighborhoods (poverty, 
racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability) lead to a lack of cohesiveness that 
diminishes guardianship capability, leading to higher levels of crime and disorder.  Disorder 
can be characterized by both physical disorder (e.g., the presence of litter, abandoned cars, 
and broken windows), and social disorder (the presence of undesirable persons and/or 
engaging in undesirable activities).  Recent work by Sampson and colleagues (Sampson 
1991; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999) has tested the 
mechanisms linking such neighborhood structures to crime/disorder using cross-sectional 
data.  Paths C1 and C2 in Figure 2.2 represent these possible effects.   
While researchers have frequently explored this relationship between neighborhood 
demographic characteristics and crime/disorder, there is less evidence that this 
neighborhood-level crime/disorder then reduces overall neighborhood satisfaction.  Despite 
the plausibility of such a relationship, few studies have tested this as a neighborhood-level 
construct, as represented by paths D1 and D2 in Figure 2.2.  Instead, studies have tested 
whether an individual’s perception of crime/disorder leads to less individual satisfaction with 
the neighborhood (Adams 1992; Harris 2001; Lu 1999a).  Note that in the context of my 
theoretical model, these studies are testing paths E1 and E2 in Figure 2.2.  For instance, Lu 
(1999a) found a relationship between the perceived level of disorder on the part of 
individuals and neighborhood satisfaction.  In a series of studies surveying 3,500 people in 
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mostly upper-middle-income neighborhoods, Greenberg (1999) found that perceived crime 
and physical deterioration were the most critical factors associated with individual 
assessment of poor neighborhood quality.7  Numerous studies in the community attachment 
literature have probed the relationship between perceived physical disorder—measured by 
such things as abandoned houses, litter and trash, and rundown buildings–and neighborhood 
attachment or satisfaction (Arguea and Hsiao 2000; Christakopoulou, Dawson, and Gari 
2001; Perkins, Florin, Rich, Wandersman, and Chavis 1990; Sampson and Raudenbush 
1999).  And studies have asked whether perceived social problems in the community such as 
vandalism, graffiti, drug/alcohol use, and gangs/winos hanging out on streets affect 
neighborhood satisfaction (Jang and Johnson 2001; Ross and Mirowsky 1999; Simcha-Fagan 
and Schwartz 1986).  However, an individual-level approach does not tell us whether there 
are any true “neighborhood effects” present.  For instance, Taylor (2001) in a study of 
Baltimore found that there were minimal aggregate level effects of disorder/crime on 
satisfaction, but rather that individuals who perceived more disorder were less satisfied; he 
concluded that the relationship might simply be a psychological one.  This strong critique 
highlights the need to test these possible neighborhood effects with a national dataset.   
If there are indeed neighborhood-level effects of crime and disorder on overall 
neighborhood satisfaction, this suggests an important mechanism through which aggregate 
demographic characteristics may affect neighborhood satisfaction.  For instance, residential 
stability may have an additional indirect effect on neighborhood satisfaction since the social 
disorganization model argues that the increase in interaction due to this stability will decrease 
crime (Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942).  Likewise, studies in the social 
                                                 
7 Besides being limited to the individual respondent’s perception, Greenberg acknowledges that these studies 
are also hampered by the limited variability in the neighborhoods sampled:  all were conducted in upper-
middle-income neighborhoods.  This suggests that even these findings may not generalize to all neighborhoods.    
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disorganization perspective have found a positive relationship between single parent families 
and crime and disorder even controlling for poverty rates (Rountree and Warner 1999; 
Warner and Pierce 1993).  And to the extent that homeowners’ greater investment in the 
community leads them to get more involved in neighborhood associations that then reduce 
the amount of crime, neighborhoods with a higher proportion of owners would have less 
crime and hence be more desirable.   
While the demographic composition of a neighborhood may be important for 
fostering satisfaction, the distribution of demographic characteristics in a neighborhood—
that is, the aggregate level of social distance—may also be important, for the reasons outlined 
above.  Although social distance is created by numerous social categories, studies have 
focused only on the relationship between racial/ethnic distance and neighborhood 
satisfaction, as represented by path F in Figure 2.2.  For instance, studies using such varied 
samples as the 1975 Detroit survey (N=1194) (Connerly and Marans 1985), a sample of 99 
small Iowa towns (Rice and Steele 2001), and a 1984 sample of 11,030 residents of 500 
localities in Great Britain found a negative relationship between neighborhood ethnic 
heterogeneity and reported satisfaction or attachment (Sampson 1991).  Note that, as 
highlighted above, these studies cannot determine why this ethnic heterogeneity reduces 
satisfaction: is it because it is inherently undesirable, or is it because it increases the level of 
crime/disorder in the neighborhood?  Additionally, studies have rarely tested whether other 
determinants of social distance directly affect neighborhood satisfaction.  One study viewed 
the relationship between age homogeneity and neighborhood satisfaction (Ward, LaGory, 
and Sherman 1985), highlighting the possible importance of social distance along 
characteristics other than race/ethnicity.   
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Social distance may instead indirectly affect neighborhood satisfaction by increasing 
the amount of crime/disorder.  If social distance reduces interaction between neighbors, 
which the social disorganization model posits will increase the amount of crime/disorder, 
social distance may impact neighborhood satisfaction through this indirect path (paths C1 
and C2, and then through D1 and D2 in Figure 2.2).  For instance, a study employing the 
1975 Detroit survey (N=1194) that found no significant relationship between ethnic 
heterogeneity and neighborhood satisfaction may suggest an indirect effect on satisfaction 
since they included both perceived crime, and proportion of friends in the area, in the model 
(Adams 1992).  That is, social distance (as measured by racial/ethnic heterogeneity in this 
instance) may simply work through paths C1 and C2, and then through paths D1 and D2 to 
affect neighborhood satisfaction indirectly.  This implies no direct effect for path F.  While 
studies have tested the effect of racial/ethnic heterogeneity for the creation of neighborhood 
ties and hence disorder (Connerly and Marans 1985; Rountree and Warner 1999; Warner and 
Rountree 1997), studies have generally not tested whether social distance as measured by a 
number of determinants affects crime/disorder.   
Furthermore, while nearly all studies have tested a linear relationship between social 
distance and neighborhood satisfaction, there is reason to suspect a nonlinear relationship.  
That is, small amounts of social distance may be acceptable or even desirable, but beyond a 
certain point increasing social distance results in dissatisfaction.  For instance, a study of 
New York City neighborhoods from 1830 to 1875 observed:  
that densely connected networks apparently thrived only in the very poorest of 
neighborhoods suggests that their absence elsewhere may have been socially 
beneficial.  Ironically, the more closed a community was socially, the more it showed 
signs of social pathology rather than of mutual support.  By contrast, the new loosely 
structured community constructed out of weak ties, while rooted in the local area, was 
geographically unbounded and thus better suited to inure New Yorkers to the 
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emerging world of transiency and constant neighborhood change.  (Scherzer 1992: 
204) 
 
Such nonlinear social distance may also have indirect effects through crime and disorder:  for 
instance, Bellair (1997) suggested that weak ties are more effective at reducing crime than 
strong ties.  The logic builds on the ideas of bridging versus bonding social capital (Bellair 
2000; Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Putnam 2000), and posits that the presence of numerous 
weak ties for residents allow time to foster ties with others in the broader community beyond 
their local block.  These broader ties are hypothesized to allow linking in to the broader 
resources of the neighborhood, making crime fighting more effective.  In contrast, blocks 
with numerous strong ties take considerable time, and hence inhibit the formation of broader-
based ties, leading to a bonding social capital that is not as effective in obtaining broader 
community resources.  This suggests a possible curvilinear relationship between the amount 
of social distance in a neighborhood and crime, and hence in overall satisfaction.   
Finally, if networks are indeed important fostering neighborhood satisfaction, the 
structure of social distance in a block—beyond a simple average of social distance—may 
affect satisfaction.  For instance, a neighborhood such as the one in Figure 2.3a in which two 
distinct groups are present with little social distance within them but considerable difference 
between them may have a different impact on neighborhood satisfaction than would a 
neighborhood with similar total social distance but a different overall structure, such as the 
neighborhood in Figure 2.3b.  This latter neighborhood has a small amount of social distance 
between all households, but no groups are present to cause a bifurcated network structure.  
Differing predictions are possible here:  on the one hand, the closeness of the subgroup might 
increase satisfaction for its members, who would then be unconcerned about their large 
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difference from the other subgroup.  On the other hand, it may be that the presence of a very 
different subgroup would be perceived in a very negative fashion.  I test these possibilities 
down below.   
Differences between individuals in fit with the neighborhood 
 While some neighborhoods are inherently more desirable than others as judged by 
nearly all persons, an important component of neighborhood satisfaction is the degree of fit 
between the household and the particular neighborhood.  For instance, whereas some may 
prefer an area with a large number of high-end retail establishments, others may prefer 
“funky” neighborhoods lined with coffee shops and bookstores.  These considerations 
suggest possible differences between individuals within the same neighborhood in their 
degree of neighborhood satisfaction.  There are several reasons why we might see differences 
in neighborhood satisfaction between residents of the same block.   
 First, similar to the previous consideration of differences in quality between 
neighborhoods, there may be a selection effect in which those with the most resources are 
best able to attain residence in a neighborhood that suits them.  Again, the SES of the 
household would be an important determinant of this ability, and race/ethnicity would be 
important if certain groups have more limited residential choices.  This suggests that 
households with higher levels of income or education in a neighborhood would be more 
satisfied.  Similarly, minority racial/ethnic households in the neighborhood would be less 
satisfied than their neighbors.  This is represented by the G3 paths in Figure 2.2:  the 
individual’s characteristics have a direct effect on his or her reported neighborhood 
satisfaction.   
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 In contrast, a social injustice model suggests the opposite effect (Jasso 1980; 
Markovsky 1985).  Building on the reference group theory of Merton (1968), those in the 
block with higher SES might feel relatively deprived.  The logic is as follows:  in the U.S. 
one’s home is a major measure of wealth and hence one’s economic achievement.  Consider 
two households living on the same street, hence having achieved a similar level of locational 
attainment (Alba and Logan 1992; Alba, Logan, and Bellair 1994; Logan, Alba, and Leung 
1996):  the household with greater educational attainment or higher income level would have 
expected to achieve a better neighborhood than the other household, and will therefore be 
less satisfied.  This is analogous to work in the status inconsistency literature suggesting a 
similar outcome (Bauman 1968).  Note that this model assumes that finding a neighborhood 
with a good fit is equally feasible regardless of one’s economic resources.  Likewise, to the 
extent that racial/ethnic minorities are limited to living in more undesirable areas (Cutler, 
Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Kain and Quigley 1975; Rosenbaum 1994; South and Crowder 
1997a; South and Deane 1993), they may have limited expectations for their neighborhood 
and hence express greater satisfaction.  Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) made an analogous 
argument regarding expectations, suggesting that the prior life experiences of racial/ethnic 
minorities explain why they appear less sensitive to perceiving disorder in their 
neighborhoods than whites (this suggests the G1 and G2 paths in Figure 2.2).   
 Another reason why residents in the same neighborhood may differ in degree of 
satisfaction is that some may have a greater psychic attachment to the neighborhood.  Two 
key theories make differing predictions of who will develop this attachment.  The systemic 
model argues that greater length of residence in a neighborhood increases the number of 
informal social ties a resident will have (Adams 1992; Austin and Baba 1990; Bolan 1997; 
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Campbell and Lee 1992; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Logan and Spitze 1994; Sampson 
1988; Sampson 1991).  These additional social ties will then increase the attachment of the 
individual with the neighborhood, and hence their satisfaction (Sampson 1988; Sampson 
1991).  On the other hand, the community of limited liability model (Janowitz 1952) focuses 
on the degree of investment in the neighborhood the resident feels.  This investment can be 
both economic and social.  Thus, an important source of economic investment in the 
neighborhood is homeownership, which should increase attachment and thus satisfaction.  A 
key source of social attachment is the presence of children, who’s activity sphere increases 
the household’s feeling of attachment, and hence satisfaction, with the neighborhood.   
 Finally, beyond the demographic characteristics of the individual household, it may 
be important is how much the individual differs along those characteristics from their 
neighbors.  This is the notion of social distance described above, and may reduce satisfaction 
by reducing social interaction (Connerly and Marans 1985; Rountree and Warner 1999; 
Warner and Rountree 1997), which then may decrease neighborhood satisfaction (Adams 
1992; Connerly and Marans 1985; Lee, Campbell, and Miller 1991).  Alternatively, it may be 
that simple difference from one’s neighbors is undesirable.  That is, a sense of perceived 
closeness to others may be more likely to develop to the extent that the individual perceives 
those others as similar to oneself; indeed, one of the questions used by studies constructing 
neighborhood cohesion scales is the degree to which residents perceive others to have similar 
values (Browning and Cagney 2002; Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004; Morenoff, 
Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999; Sampson and 
Raudenbush 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).  Another possibility is that those 
who are socially distant from their neighbors perceive more crime and disorder:  studies have 
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found racial/ethnic distance to increase perceived crime (Quillian and Pager 2001) and 
disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004).  This might occur because such social differences 
reduce social interaction and hence increase suspicion and mistrust (Ross and Jang 2000).  
To the extent that greater perception of crime and disorder leads to less individual 
satisfaction (Adams 1992; Parkes, Kearns, and Atkinson 2002; Taylor 2001; Woldoff 2002), 
this suggests a possible indirect effect of social distance from one’s neighbors on 
neighborhood satisfaction.   
But while there are numerous determinants of social distance, studies have generally 
focused only on racial/ethnic distance.  Interestingly, studies testing whether those differing 
from their neighbors based on race/ethnicity report less satisfaction with the neighborhood 
have generally found little effect (Harris 2001; Stipak and Hensler 1983).  Instead, these 
studies simply found that an increasing percentage of African-Americans in the 
neighborhood leads to lower overall satisfaction for both whites and African-Americans.  
Thus, it is an open question whether a more broad-based measure of social distance can 
better explain the satisfaction of residents with their neighborhood.   
 
Data and Methodology 
Data for analyses 
 I employ a unique sub-sample of the American Housing Survey (AHS) to address 
these research questions.  In this sub-sample, my units of analysis are 660 blocks across the 
United States, in which approximately eleven residents were sampled in each block in the 
years 1985, 1989, and 1993.  The AHS is a national sample of about 60,000 housing units 
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conducted every other year in odd-numbered years.8  For this special neighborhood sub-
sample, the AHS initially randomly selected about 660 housing units from the full AHS that 
were located in either urban or suburban locations.  They then interviewed the ten closest 
neighbors of the initial respondent.   
A challenge confronting all community/urban studies is that despite the ubiquitous 
use of the term neighborhood, defining it is difficult.  Building on Hunter (1974), Bursik and 
Grasmick (1993) suggested that a neighborhood is characterized by:  1) a small physical area 
embedded within a larger area in which people inhabit dwellings; 2) a collective life that 
emerges from the social networks that have arisen among the residents and the institutional 
arrangements overlapping these networks; 3) some tradition of identity and continuity over 
time.  Nonetheless, various spheres can create a “neighborhood”:  1) the local shopping 
center may foster interaction among individuals in its service area; 2) schools create social 
ties as well as fostering a sense of common interests; 3) the area bounded by larger streets 
                                                 
8 The American Housing Survey sampling strategy uses 401 primary sampling units (PSU’s).  Of these, 177 
were self-representing strata, that is, the PSU is selected with certainty.  The other 224 come from non self-
representing strata, constructed by use of a multivariate clustering algorithm based on race of householder, 
tenure, change in the population from 1970 to 1980, and value of the housing.  Selection within these strata was 
with probability proportionate to the 1985 projected number of housing units within the PSU.  Within PSU’s, 
the national average sampling rate was about 1 in 1,900.  There are two types of enumeration districts (ED’s):  
address and area ED’s.  In the address ED’s of sample PSU’s, systematic sample units were selected from the 
1980 Census Sample Housing Unit Record File.  A Housing Unit Coverage Study was performed to locate units 
missed by the 1980 census, and an additional sample was selected from the units located by this study (such as 
non-residential to residential units, new mobile home parks, etc).  In area ED’s of each sample PSU, four 
housing units were drawn from each sample area segment.  Area ED’s were so classified if the ED did not lie 
within a jurisdiction which issued building permits for new construction, or if more than 4 percent of the 
addresses within the ED were incomplete.  Units receiving the census long form were the sampling frame for 
area ED’s.  Building permits are also sampled to represent newly constructed housing since the 1980 census.  
To construct the frame for building permits:  clusters of four new construction units were formed using 
information from sample building permit offices; one construction unit was subsampled from each cluster.  
They used the 1980 characteristics of the units in these ED’s as stratifiers based on: 1) geographic location 
(central city, urbanized area outside of central city, urban outside of urbanized area, rural); 2) tenure; 3) number 
of rooms; 4) value of unit or gross rent.  The survey design described here is the current one, and was changed 
beginning with the 1985 sample (compared to the 1972-84 samples), leading the AHS to conclude that “with 
respect to variance, the unclustered, stratified, systematic sample of the new design will produce survey 
estimates with lower variances than the clustered sample of the old design” (Hadden and Leger 1995).  For the 
special neighborhood subsample that I use, 566 were located within address ED’s, 63 were located within area 
ED’s, and 51 were located in new construction developments.   
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and containing only small neighborhood streets (tertiary streets) may foster a sense of 
neighborhood (Grannis 1998).9   
 In this study I used blocks as my unit of analysis.  The reasoning is several-fold.  
First, research has suggested that while individuals will interact with neighbors from 
neighboring blocks, most interaction takes place between residents on the same block 
(Caplow and Forman 1950).  Second, all households on a particular block are certainly part 
of the same neighborhood.  Thus, I am able to use household assessments of neighborhood 
satisfaction as measures of the same neighborhood, allowing me to take into account 
individual variability in neighborhood satisfaction.  Third, even if the block only represents a 
subset of the larger neighborhood, the respondents are still all assessing the same 
neighborhood.  Given that the initial household was selected randomly (with the other 
households selected deterministically from the same block), this can be viewed as a block 
selected randomly from the larger neighborhood.  Using these respondents as measures of the 
larger neighborhood would only be problematic if a) the social or physical composition of the 
block is considerably different than the larger area, and b) I do not include various measures 
accounting for the characteristics of the larger area.  In instances where the block is 
considerably different than the larger area, the characteristics of the larger neighborhood 
might affect reported neighborhood satisfaction by respondents on the block.  Therefore, I 
explicitly take this into account by placing these blocks into their respective census tracts 
using special access to data at the Triangle Census Research Data Center.10   
                                                 
9 Grannis found that his measured construct was strongly related to census block groups:  90% of his 
communities were census block groups or exact combinations of them.  Note that this suggests an area smaller 
than a census tract.   
 
10 I estimated models similar to those presented here, but also including these tract-level measures.  The key 
substantive results are unchanged in these additional models.  To retain focus on the theoretical questions posed 
here, I present just the results using the block level measures.    
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 My key outcome measure is a single question asking the respondents their satisfaction 
with the neighborhood (on a 0 to 10 scale).  Thus I have several respondents from each block 
reporting their individual level of satisfaction:  I use these as separate indicators of block 
level neighborhood satisfaction.11  Thus, for each of the neighborhood constructs I am 
estimating the following equation: 
(1)    yik = Λ1ηk + εik 
where yik is the combined ten-point response in the AHS regarding the level of satisfaction 
with the neighborhood reported by the i-th respondent of M respondents in the k-th block, ηk 
is the latent variable of common perception of neighborhood satisfaction in the block, Λ1 
measures the impact of perceived neighborhood satisfaction on the respondent’s report of 
neighborhood satisfaction (since the ordering of respondents in neighborhoods is random, 
these λ’s are constrained equal to unity), and εik is a disturbance term (with the variances of 
the ε’s constrained to be equal).12  I can assess the reliability of these individual reports by 
viewing the R2’s for each of these equations.  
                                                 
11 One of the rare studies to adopt a somewhat similar approach to that taken in this paper was a study that used 
latent variables to estimate market values of amenities (Arguea and Hsiao 2000).  This also allowed taking into 
account measurement errors.  The study used the AHS for four metro areas in the southeast: Tampa, Miami, 
New Orleans, and Atlanta.  While they used a MIMIC model, their unit of analysis was 808 respondents.  Their 
latent variable of neighborhood satisfaction included indicators of 1) junk; 2) crime; 3) noise; 4) litter.  
However, it also included measures of whether the respondent was nonwhite and the level of education.  There 
seems little justification for including these latter two measures. 
 
12 I tested the appropriateness of these constraints on the λ’s and the ε’s separately.  I found no reduction in 
model fit when constraining the λ’s equal, or when constraining the ε’s equal, or both simultaneously.  
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I also included three intervening constructs of crime, physical disorder, and social 
disorder, which are also constructed using equation 1.  For measuring perceived crime, the 
AHS asks respondents a series of three questions:  is crime a problem, is it so much of a 
problem that it’s a bother, and is it such a bother that the respondent wishes to move.  I 
combine these responses into a four point response where the respondent either replies “no” 
to all questions, replies “yes” to one, “yes” to two, or “yes” to all three.  The physical 
disorder concept is a single yes/no question asking whether “litter or housing deterioration is 
bothersome.”  The social disorder concept is a single yes/no question asking whether “people 
in the neighborhood are bothersome.”13   
Determinants Included in the Social Distance Measure 
My key constructs of interest are the various measures of the social distance structure 
in the neighborhood.  These are built on the underlying principle of measuring how different 
the respondent is to his/her neighbors on various demographic measures.  The variables used 
to measure each of the social distance determinants are listed in Table 2.2.14  I log 
transformed income since higher levels of income should create social distance at a 
diminishing rate.  Homeownership places the household in the class of property-owners, 
leading to different economic interests and concerns.  Education is a component of socio-
                                                 
13 To handle the ordinal nature of these measures, I created a polychoric correlation matrix and estimated the 
model using weighted least squares with a mean and variance adjustment for the chi square in the structural 
equation modeling software Mplus 3.0.  This assumes that these ordinal measures have unobserved continuous 
measures underlying them that are normally distributed.  Such an approach is analogous to simultaneously 
estimating each individual yik as a probit or ordered probit equation.   
 
14 Unfortunately, a few other possible important determinants are not available in this data set:  occupation 
(class), membership in voluntary organizations, and religious affiliation (and type of religious tradition), are 
potentially important determinants.  While including occupation as a determinant would be preferable, my 
inclusion of income, education, and home value likely take this determinant into account to some degree.  The 
latter two determinants provide a fruitful direction for future research.   
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economic status, as well as being an important form of social distance in Bourdieu’s model 
(1984), affecting attitudes and values (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).   
Table 2.2.  Variables used to measure each of the social distance determinants 
Social Distance Determinant Measure 
Economic Household Income (log transformed) 
Economic Home ownership 
Economic Home value (log transformed) 
Economic Size of home (sq. ft.) 
  
Economic/Social Origin Education 
  
Race/ethnicity White 
Race/ethnicity African-American 
Race/ethnicity Latino 
Race/ethnicity Other race 
  
Life Course Age 
Life Course Marital status (married/not) 
Life Course Children (under 18 in home) 
  
Social Origin Foreign-born 
Social Origin Raised in south at age 16 
Social Origin Size of community at age 16 
 
Since those born in another country may have different cultural customs creating 
social distance from their neighbors, I included a measure of the birth country of the 
respondent.15  Likewise, the southern region of the U.S. has long been identified for its 
unique culture (Ellison 1991; Reed 1972), and therefore may create social distance between 
someone raised in that region and someone who was not.  Being raised in an urban area 
versus a rural area shapes an individual’s attitudes and preferences; I therefore included a 
                                                 
15 Simply including a measure of immigrant status would not be satisfactory, as we would expect two 
individuals who had emigrated from different countries to have different customs that created social distance.  
Therefore I take into account the country from which the respondent came.   
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measure of the type of community the respondent lived in at age 16.16  I treated this variable 
as ordinal and determined the amount of distance between two individuals along this 
continuum:  this assumes that someone who grew up in a large city will have some social 
distance from someone who grew up in a suburb, but much more social distance from 
someone who grew up on a farm.17   
 
Constructing the Social Distance Measure 
I then combined these determinants of social distance into a single measure of 
distance between dyads on the block.  Past research has sometimes constructed a social 
distance measure based on a particular demographic variable, such as: START HERE 
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where sd is the social distance on this variable for individual i, M is the number of 
individuals in an AHS neighborhood, j represents the other individuals in the neighborhood, 
and i ≠ j.18  This gives a measure of the social distance for the respondent from other 
individuals for a particular construct.  If individual i is exactly like every other individual on 
                                                 
16 This variable includes the following possible categories: 1) a large city; 2) suburb near a large city; 3) a 
medium sized city/suburb; 4) a small city; 5) a town or village; 6) open country but not a farm; 7) farm; 8) 
other.   
 
17 The constructs in this paragraph were only available in the 1985 sample, so I am unable to include this 
determinant of social distance in the two later waves.   
 
18 Various approaches can be taken with continuous variables.  One approach for variables with non-negative 
values is to divide the variable by the maximum value to place it onto a zero-one metric before performing this 
calculation.  Another approach is to standardize the variable by dividing it by its standard deviation.  I adopted 
this latter approach with the additional constraint of providing a ceiling value of 2.  While subsidiary analyses 
without this ceiling showed very similar results, I prefer the ceiling conceptually since: 1) it constrains 
differences to two standard deviations, beyond which difference likely has little effect; 2) this puts the variables 
on the same metric as the race variables (since the race variables all are zero-one, two persons of different race 
will get a value of two for difference:  one for the race of the first respondent, and one for the race of the second 
respondent).  This strategy minimizes the possibility of outliers on any particular determinant of social distance 
unduly influencing the measure.   
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this characteristic, sdi will have a value of zero.  The more people who differ from i on this 
construct, the higher the value of sdi.  In the extreme case where i is different from everyone 
else in the neighborhood, sdi will be equal to one.   
However, of more theoretical interest is comparing individuals on several 
determinants simultaneously.  To compute the distance between two individuals along all 
determinants simultaneously, I used a dyadic social distance measure: 
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where sdij is the social distance between individuals i and j, k represents the K number of 
social determinants being measured, xik and xjk are the values on social characteristic k  for 
individuals i and j respectively, φk is the salience of social characteristic k (a weighting factor 
for its relative importance), and i ≠ j.  The question is then a value to choose for each φk in 
the model.  The simplest assumption is to assign a value of one to each social characteristic, 
thus weighting them equally.19   
 
Social network measures 
Calculating this social distance value for each dyad in the neighborhood yields a 
matrix of social distances between dyads.  By then treating this as a non-directional valued 
                                                 
19 Another approach is to perform a subsidiary dyad-level analysis in which first, a fixed effects regression is 
run in which the outcome is neighborhood satisfaction and the predictors are the various individual-level 
characteristics.  This conditions on these characteristics, and I then use the y-hats from this model in the second 
step in which a regression is run in which the outcome is the absolute value of the difference of these y-hats 
from the first step for the two respondents, and the predictors are their differences along these various social 
characteristics.  The coefficients from this model are then used as the φk weights.  I use the simpler approach 
here, and leave this alternative approach for future studies.   
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network, there are various social network measures that can then be constructed from this 
matrix to statistically characterize these network structures.20   
A measure recommended by Blau (1977) to capture group cohesion and commonly 
used is the density of ties in a network.  Here I measure the average social distance among all 
dyads in the neighborhood (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 181): 
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where all terms are defined as before, i < j (we only need to compute the values below the 
diagonal of this symmetric matrix since the social distance between i and j is the same as that 
between j and i), [M*(M+1)/2] is the number of dyads in the neighborhood and sd is 
measuring the average social distance for the entire block.  Thus the summed social distance 
values are divided by the total dyads; smaller values would indicate neighborhoods with very 
little social distance among the residents and hence more cohesion.   
 In addition to this measure of the central tendency of social distance on the block, the 
variance of these dyad distance measures give an indication of the amount of dispersion in 
the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 182).  This is calculated by computing the variance 
of these distance measures for the block: 
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where all terms are defined as before, and sdik and sd are computed as shown in equations 3 
and 5 respectively.  Low values for this variable indicate a neighborhood in which social 
                                                 
20 To define these network terms:  network ties can be either directional (where we know that A does something 
to B, e.g., provides help), or nondirectional (where we only know an association between A and B, e.g., they are 
friends).  Network ties are often considered “nonvalued” (only a dichotomous measure of the presence or 
absence of a tie); in other instances when they are “valued” the strength of the tie is given (this can be as a count 
variable, as a proportion on a zero to one scale, or even a valence containing both positive and negative values) 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994).   
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distance is relatively equidistant between dyads (such as shown previously in Figure 2.3b), 
while large values indicate a neighborhood with considerable variability in the amount of 
social distance between dyads (such as in Figure 2.3a).  Thus, higher variance suggests the 
possible presence of groups within the neighborhood.   
 While there are various strategies available for directly estimating the members of 
groups within a neighborhood (for a more complete discussion, see Wasserman and Faust 
1994), I took the approach of using exploratory factor analysis of the individual distances of 
the individuals in the block for various numbers of factors, and then performed an oblique 
rotation on these factors using an algorithm developed by Bernaards and Jennrich (2005).  
This clusters individuals into subgroups in the block based on their social distance from each 
of the other households.  While a noted limitation of factor analysis of sociometric data is the 
limitation that individuals are not necessarily assigned to a single group (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994: 290), I address this by assigning a household to the factor in which they have the 
highest loading.  Since I found that for nearly all of the blocks two groups captured the 
degree of clustering in the block, and that only in rare instances were three groups needed, I 
used two-factor solutions for all blocks.  Following this, I constructed measures of: 1) the 
number of individuals in the largest group; 2) the average social distance within each group; 
and 3) the average social distance across the two groups.   
 
Measures of Social and Physical Characteristics of Neighborhoods 
 I also take into account several other characteristics of the neighborhood that may be 
important for fostering satisfaction.  Since the presence of economic vitality is likely 
desirable, I included data from the U.S. economic census on the number of employees per 
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capita working in restaurants or recreation services.  I used the number of employees rather 
than the number of establishments since this likely provides a more accurate measure of the 
possible services available to the resident of a neighborhood.  To maintain temporal 
precedence, I used data from the 1982 economic census for the 1985 AHS sample, data from 
the 1987 economic census for the 1989 AHS sample, and data from the 1992 economic 
census for the 1993 AHS sample.  While this economic census data is reported for zip codes, 
I apportioned this zip code data into its constituent 1980 census tracts based on the 
proportion of the zip code contained within a given tract.  For the 1992 data I additionally 
needed to then apportion the 1990 tracts into 1980 tracts (since the AHS respondents are 
placed into 1980 census tracts).  Since bars and liquor stores are likely disamenities, I 
included a measure from the economic census of the employees per capita for bars and liquor 
stores constructed in a similar fashion.  To capture the quality of local schools, I constructed 
a measure of the completion rate of students in the local school district.  This information is 
taken from the Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey Longitudinal Data 
File: 1986-1997 (Education 2001).  The appendix describes how I placed these data into 
tracts.  Since the presence of a body of water may be desirable, I included a measure of the 
percentage of the tract that is water.  To capture the effect of parks, I include a measure of the 
presence of open area within 300 feet as assessed by the AHS interviewer.   
Finally, since the presence of toxic waste sites is likely undesirable, I included a 
measure of the pounds of toxic waste emitted in an area, weighted by the inhalation toxicity.  
The data for the presence of toxic waste sites was obtained from the Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI), which contains information on the quantity of certain chemicals released into the 
environment (obtained at http://www.rtknet.org/triabout.html).  The U.S. Environmental 
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Protection Agency (EPA) maintains this database.  Facilities are required to file with the 
EPA each year if they exceed a particular threshold in release particulates (this is generally 
25,000 pounds per calendar year for manufacture or processing activities, and 10,000 pounds 
per calendar year for “otherwise used” activities).  For each site, I first geocoded its location 
based on its latitude and longitude.  While it is well-known that the actual distance that such 
toxic waste can impact humans is variable based on the chemical involved and the wind 
patterns in the local area, I drew one-mile buffers around each site as an approximation of the 
geographic dispersion of its impact (for a study using both quarter mile and one mile buffers 
and finding similar results for the two cutoff values, see Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp 2001).  
While the limitations of the TRI database are well-known (i.e., it only captures emitters of 
large amounts of toxic chemicals), it does give a reasonable approximation of the amount of 
such activity in a neighborhood (Agency 2005).  Another limitation is that the simple count 
of releases does not capture actual exposure of households:  of additional importance is the 
actual toxicity of the chemical, as well as prevailing wind patterns.  While I am unable to 
take into account wind patterns, I take into account the toxicity of the particular chemical 
being released by multiplying the pounds of the chemical released by an inhalation toxicity 
score constructed by the Risk Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) study conducted 
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (Agency 2004).21   
   
                                                 
21 This toxicity score information provides an approximation of the degree of toxicity of various chemicals 
based on two types of weights:  either inhalation scores or oral scores.  The oral toxicity weight is used for 
releases or transfers to water, while the inhalation toxicity weight is used for releases or transfers to fugitive air, 
stack air, off-site incineration, and off-site incineration-no fuel value.  While these toxicity scores are an 
approximation, as the toxicity of a chemical can vary based on the length of exposure, and the age and size of 
the individual, they provide an approximation of the degree of toxicity of chemical releases that is arguably 
better than using simple summed amounts of chemical release.   
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Individual Characteristics 
 I included several individual- and household-level demographic measures to 
determine their effect on reported neighborhood satisfaction.  To take into account gender 
differences, I included a dichotomous measure coded one for females.  I captured SES with 
measures of household income (logged) and years of education of the respondent.  To 
account for racial/ethnic differences, I included dichotomous indicators for African-
Americans, Latinos, and other race (with whites as the reference category).  To measure 
community investment I included an indicator of whether the respondent owned their 
residence.  To account for life course, I included a measure of the age of the respondent, 
dichotomous indicators for marital status (married, divorced) with single/widowed as the 
reference category, and an indicator of whether they have children less than 18 years of age 
at home.  I include the length of time in the residence (log transformed), as well as an 
indicator for those who have lived less than a year in the residence (as there is theoretical 
reason to suspect that new residents may have preconceived notions of the neighborhood that 
color their evaluations of the neighborhood crime and disorder).22  Finally, I included a 
measure of the persons per room (log transformed) to capture over-crowding that may color 
the respondent’s assessment of the neighborhood.  Note that these measures take into account 
the differences in individuals reporting on the same neighborhood.  The summary statistics 
for the variables used in the analyses are shown in Table 2.3. 
 
Methodology 
I used structural equation modeling to evaluate the neighborhood assessments 
                                                 
22 Further exploration of the length of residence variable by constructing a series of dummy variables indicating 
years of residence did not indicate any additional nonlinear effects in the model.   
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provided by AHS respondents.  I began by using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Bollen 
1989) to assess whether the evaluations provided by approximately eleven neighbors in each 
of the 660 blocks in this sub-sample are reliable indicators of physical disorder, social 
disorder, crime, and overall neighborhood satisfaction.  This approach assumes that there is 
an unobserved “latent” variable for each of these constructs—for instance, overall 
neighborhood satisfaction—of which we only have imperfect realizations in the form of the 
particular questions asked of each respondent in the block—for instance, “how satisfied are 
you with this neighborhood?”  Recall that this was equation 1.  The model is estimated using 
a maximum likelihood estimator.  This results in an overidentified model in which these 
overidentifying restrictions can be tested by a likelihood ratio test that is chi-square 
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions.  
Speizer and Bollen (2000) adopted a similar approach for a different research question.  This 
model allows me to assess the reliability of these measures:  the R2 for each indicator 
illustrates how much of the variance in each individual response is explained by the latent 
variable of neighborhood satisfaction, and is a measure of reliability.   
Individual Characteristics 
I then test whether various demographic predictors have a direct effect on my four 
key neighborhood constructs reported by respondents (Hipp 2003b; Sampson, Raudenbush, 
and Earls 1997).  I am asking if individuals with a particular characteristic view the same 
neighborhood more or less favorably than someone without that characteristic.  
Conceptually, this is similar to a multilevel model where these individual characteristics are 
at level one and the neighborhood measures are at level two.  For instance, while the percent 
in poverty in the neighborhood can be used as a predictor of overall neighborhood 
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satisfaction (and therefore is a measure of neighborhood quality), an individual’s poverty 
status can be used to predict an individual’s assessment of satisfaction (and therefore is 
measuring the degree to which individuals in poverty are more or less satisfied with the 
neighborhood than individuals not in poverty who are living in the same neighborhood).  
With the addition of these individual-level characteristics, equation 1 is elaborated to: 
(7)     yik = ληk + ΓXik + εik 
where the previous model has been augmented by Xik, a matrix of exogenous predictors with 
values for each individual i in neighborhood k, and Γ which shows the effect of these 
predictors on the subjective assessment.23  Note that here the outcome measure is each 
individual’s assessment of neighborhood satisfaction.  The vector X will be constructed from 
responses to the AHS, and will include the several measures outlined above.  I estimate this 
same equation also for the crime, physical disorder, and social disorder measures.  After 
determining whether these responses can be used as indicators of these neighborhood-level 
constructs, I next model the determinants of neighborhood satisfaction, crime, physical 
disorder, and social disorder. 
Characteristics of Neighborhoods 
I incorporate both subjective and objective indicators of neighborhood characteristics 
as described above.  Adding neighborhood predictors extends the initial model thusly:   
(8)      ηk = βZk + εk 
where ηk represents the overall satisfaction with neighborhood k, Z represents a matrix of 
                                                 
23 Note that by constraining the variances and covariances among the disturbances and the λ’s to be equal, this 
approach is equivalent to a fixed effects model.  By “fixed effects” model, I refer to the approach sometimes 
referred to as a least squares dummy variable model in which the second level units (neighborhoods in this 
instance) can be taken into account by including K-1 dummy variables for the K second level units in the study.  
More commonly such models are estimated by simply centering the variables around the neighborhood means 
and performing OLS estimation.    
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variables measured at the level of neighborhood k, β shows the effect of these measures on 
overall satisfaction, and εk is a disturbance for neighborhood k.  This equation is estimated 
simultaneously with the equation predicting individual satisfaction, as well as individual 
perceived crime, physical disorder, and social disorder.24   
 Finally, I took into account the possibility of correlations between constructs and 
correlations between respondents’ assessments.  To accomplish the first task, I allowed the 
disturbances of neighborhood-level physical disorder, social disorder, and crime to freely 
covary.  Such covariances between these disturbances can be due to omitted variables that 
affect these outcomes similarly—indeed, the correlations between these disturbances ranged 
between .31 and .48.  To accomplish the second task, I freely estimated the covariances 
between the responses to the questions regarding perceived crime, physical disorder, and 
social disorder provided by the same household.  This takes into account the possibility that a 
household reporting more crime also perceives more social and physical disorder—indeed, 
these correlations were significant and generally between .09 and .15.   
 While this model includes indicator variables to distinguish neighborhoods for the 
three waves of data, this assumes that the coefficients are equal over the three years.  I tested 
this assumption by creating a data set where each row represents one block (rather than one 
block year).  I then estimated two models:  one allowing the coefficients to vary over the 
three waves, and one constraining them equal.  The estimated coefficients for the different 
years in the first model tended to be very similar over years.  To assess this more formally, 
the results for each of these multiply imputed data sets showed that constraining these 
coefficients equal did not reduce the fit of the various approximate fit indices; in addition, I 
                                                 
24 For some of the constructs measured I also have an interviewer response that I can use as an additional 
indicator.   
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used the combchi program of Paul Allison (2000) to perform an F-test combining the chi-
square differences of these five datasets and found that constraining the coefficients equal did 
not reduce the model fit (F = .564, df= 204, ddf = .088, p = .816) (this test is discussed on 
page 115 in Schafer 1997).   
 
Results of structural equation models 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of neighborhood constructs   
 I begin by separately assessing the fit of the CFA models of my four key latent 
neighborhood constructs:  neighborhood satisfaction, social disorder, physical disorder, and 
common perception of crime.  As the results in Table 2.4 highlight, these constructs 
generally do a reasonable job of capturing these neighborhood constructs.  On the one hand, 
the fit of these models tends to be excellent.  For all four measures, the chi-square is non-
significant; thus I conclude that I fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the sample covariance matrix and the model implied covariance matrix.  On the 
other hand, while these R2’s are in line with findings from other neighborhood studies 
(Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997), they are 
nonetheless somewhat modest.  For instance, the neighborhood social disorder latent 
construct explains about 17 percent of the variance in the individual assessments of social 
disorder.  Even for crime, only about 30 percent of the variance in individual responses is 
explained by the neighborhood construct of common perception of crime.  Thus, there is still 
considerable variability among residents of the same block in assessing these neighborhood 
constructs.   
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Structural equation model:  disorder and crime as mediators of neighborhood satisfaction
  
 I next turn to the results from the estimation of the full model shown in Figure 2.2, 
and begin by focusing on the results for the individual-level part of the model.  Recall that 
this focuses on the degree of fit for the individual with the neighborhood, rather than the 
overall quality of the neighborhood.  First, note that there is strong evidence here that those 
who perceive more social disorder, physical disorder, or crime in the neighborhood are also 
less satisfied.  A one-unit increase in perceived social disorder results in reporting 1.42 points 
less neighborhood satisfaction, while perceiving one more unit of physical disorder reduces 
satisfaction 0.95 points, as shown in Table 2.5.  A one-unit increase in logged perceived 
crime reduces satisfaction .9 points, where neighborhood satisfaction ranges from 0 to 10.  
Thus, we see evidence that, for instance, individuals who perceive more crime than their 
neighbors are also less satisfied than those neighbors.     
Regarding whether the selection model or the social injustice model better explains 
the neighborhood satisfaction of minority respondents and those with lower SES, we see 
strong support for the social injustice model’s prediction that such residents will have less 
neighborhood satisfaction than their neighbors due to greater expectations of their 
neighborhood.  While income has little effect here, we see that those with higher levels of 
education are in fact less satisfied with their neighborhood than are their neighbors.  There is 
an additional indirect reduction for these respondents since they also perceive more crime 
and disorder in the neighborhood (and greater perceived crime/disorder then reduces 
satisfaction).  The last three columns of Table 2.5 show the indirect effect of each construct 
on neighborhood satisfaction, the total effect (which is simply the sum of the indirect and the 
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direct effect) and the percent of the total effect that is indirect.  This latter value can be 
viewed as an estimate of the percentage of this measure’s impact on neighborhood 
satisfaction that is mediated by crime and disorder.  Thus, whereas an additional year of 
education directly reduces reported neighborhood satisfaction .026 points, it also reduces 
reported satisfaction another .014 points through increased perceived crime and disorder.  
This suggests that crime and disorder mediates about 1/3 of the effect of an individual’s 
education on their reported neighborhood satisfaction.  To give an idea of this metric, 
whereas neighborhood satisfaction ranges from 0 to 10 with a standard deviation of 2.16, a 
college graduate will be about .16 points less satisfied (-.04*4=-.16) than a high school 
graduate.  This is consistent with the social injustice model that such individuals will be less 
satisfied with their neighborhood than their less educated neighbors.  Likewise, we see that 
Latinos and African-Americans report more direct satisfaction with the neighborhood than 
whites, and also perceive less crime and disorder than whites, which subsequently increases 
reported satisfaction.  Again, about 1/3 of the greater satisfaction of nonwhites can be 
explained by their reduced perception of crime and disorder compared to whites.  This is 
consistent with the supposition that such individuals have lower expectations for the quality 
of the neighborhood.   
There are mixed results for the community of limited liability’s argument that social 
and economic investment increases satisfaction.  While the economic investment of 
homeownership leads to less perceived crime, owners perceive more physical disorder.  And 
the social investment of marriage and children shows mixed effects.  There is no support for 
the hypothesized effect that the presence of children heightens social investment and hence 
increases reported satisfaction.  There are only some modest effects for marital status:  those 
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who are married perceive somewhat more social and physical disorder than singles/widows, 
whereas those who are divorced report more crime and less satisfaction.   
There is no support for the systemic model’s hypothesis that households with greater 
length of residence in the neighborhood will be more satisfied:  increasing length of 
residence actually has a negative direct effect on satisfaction and a negative indirect effect 
through increased perceived crime and disorder.  This perceived crime and disorder is 
particularly important, as it accounts for almost 60% of the diminished satisfaction of longer-
term residents.  There is also evidence that those new to the neighborhood in the last year 
perceive less crime than others.  This is consistent with the notion that households will not 
knowingly move into an area with crime if they can avoid it:  the fact that such new residents 
are no less likely to perceive the existence of more tangible characteristics such as physical 
disorder suggests that crime is less readily observable, and only becomes apparent after 
longer residence.   
There is evidence that females perceive more crime and disorder in the neighborhood.  
While the finding for crime is consistent with past research (Austin, Furr, and Spine 2002; 
Ross and Jang 2000), past studies have generally found no such effect by gender for disorder 
(Austin, Furr, and Spine 2002; Geis and Ross 1998; Ross and Mirowsky 2001; Sampson and 
Raudenbush 2004).  But while females perceive more crime and disorder (which indirectly 
reduces their neighborhood satisfaction), they report more direct satisfaction with the 
neighborhood than do males.  Finally, those who are older report more satisfaction with the 
neighborhood, and about 1/3 of this effect is mediated by their reduced perception of crime 
and disorder.25   
                                                 
25 While there may be concern that the effect of age is “soaking up” the effect of length of residence, subsequent 
probing of the model suggests this is not the case.  I ran two additional models:  one excluding individual length 
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Neighborhood-level results of physical characteristics 
While the results presented up to this point have focused on the individual level, I 
next turn to viewing neighborhood-level effects.  We do see evidence that neighborhood-
level perceived crime and disorder reduce overall satisfaction with the neighborhood.  Thus, 
it is not just the case that those who perceive more crime and disorder report less satisfaction 
with the neighborhood, but also that neighborhoods with more reported crime/disorder result 
in less overall reported satisfaction.   
How much of the relationship between crime/disorder and neighborhood satisfaction 
is simply an individual-level effect and how much is a neighborhood-level effect?  Recall 
that in this model perceptions of crime/disorder are not simply an individual-level perception, 
but are in part driven by the latent variables of neighborhood common perception of crime, 
physical disorder, and social disorder.  We can consider this question in a couple ways.  First, 
we can calculate the total effects implied by this model.  For illustration, Figure 2.4 shows a 
subset of the model for one particular construct’s effect on neighborhood satisfaction.  We 
can calculate the effect of a one-unit increase in an individual’s perception of crime on their 
reported neighborhood satisfaction from the coefficient for path E1 in this diagram.  Thus, 
the model in Table 2.5 showed that a one-unit increase in perceived crime resulted in a .9 
reduction in reported neighborhood satisfaction.  What about a one unit increase in the 
neighborhood’s common perception of crime?  This will affect an individual’s reported 
neighborhood satisfaction in two ways:  1) it will work through the H*E1 path, as the one-
unit increase in neighborhood common perception of crime increases the individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
of residence, and a second excluding individual age.  In the model dropping the age measure, individual-level 
length of residence continues to have no significant effect on reported satisfaction and increases perceived 
crime and physical disorder.  In the model dropping length of residence, individual age still reduces perceived 
crime and social disorder, while still having a direct positive effect on reported satisfaction.  Thus, we can 
conclude that the results of this main model are not an artifact of the specification.   
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perceived crime (path H), and then this increase in perceived crime will affect their reported 
neighborhood satisfaction (path E1); 2) it will work through the D1*J path, as the one-unit 
increase in neighborhood common perception of crime increases the overall neighborhood 
satisfaction  (path D1), and then this increased overall neighborhood satisfaction increases 
the individual’s reported satisfaction (path J).  Note that in instance 1, the H path is scaled to 
one, so this reduces to path E1 (the same as the individual effect above), and in instance 2, 
path J is scaled to one, so this reduces to path J.  Thus, the total effect of a neighborhood’s 
common perception of crime on neighborhood satisfaction reported by respondents is –1.444 
(-.9-.554= - 1.444) (the -.554 comes from Table 2.5, which shows the neighborhood-level 
effects, estimated simultaneously with the individual-level effects).  Note that the 
neighborhood effect will always be stronger this model if both paths D1 and E1 have the 
same sign.  All of these tested effects are significant at p < .05.   
While calculating the total effects implied by the model provides key information, 
some may feel a sense of dissatisfaction with this outcome since it appears that the deck is 
stacked in favor of neighborhood effects.  So consider a second approach.  Recall that in the 
CFA model nearly 30 percent of the variance in individual perceived crime is due to the 
latent construct of perceived neighborhood crime:  so assume that 30 percent of the variance 
in an individual’s reported perceived crime is due to these neighborhood effects.26  What 
                                                 
26 Note that important assumptions are embedded in this approach.  First, it assumes that there aren’t important 
individual-level characteristics common to the individuals of the block that explain this commonality in 
assessment of neighborhood crime, rather than the actual level of perceived crime.  While it is impossible to 
rule out this possibility, the fact that in separate analyses I estimated similar structural equation models using a 
large sample of metro areas and found that using a measure of the official violent crime in the census tract in 
general explained at least 50% of the variance in the perceived crime latent variable.  This relatively high 
relationship between this perceived crime latent variable and official crime rates suggests that it is less likely 
that the common characteristics of the households are creating the relationship.  Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled 
out that at least some of this commonality is indeed due to individual characteristics.  And no such validity test 
is possible for a measure such as social disorder in these data.  Second, as is the case in analyses using 
hierarchical linear modeling, there is an assumption in this approach that the individual- and neighborhood-level 
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about the other 70 percent of the variance?  This could be due to any number of other 
neighborhood or individual effects, but assume that all 70 percent is due to individual “free 
will.”  Thus, this assumption to some extent might be “stacking the deck” in favor of 
individual effects.  Recall in the previous paragraph we said a one-unit increase in a 
neighborhood’s common perception of crime reduces individual neighborhood satisfaction –
1.444.  What about an individual’s perceived effect?  If 30 percent of the variance in 
individual perceived crime is explained by neighborhood perceived crime and we assume 
that the other 70 percent of the variance is due to individual characteristics independent of 
the neighborhood, this suggests the individual’s perceived crime will change 2.33 units for 
every one unit change induced by the neighborhood (70 % / 30%).  A 2.33 increase in 
perceived crime for the individual decreases their reported neighborhood satisfaction -2.097 
(-.9 * 2.33 = -2.097).  Thus, while individual perceptions are important, the effect of the 
neighborhood is quite strong, as it accounts for about 41 percent of the change in reported 
individual satisfaction due to perceived crime (-1.444 / (-1.444 + -2.097) = .408).  The 
analogous neighborhood proportions for social and physical disorder are 26 and 53 percent 
respectively.27   
                                                                                                                                                       
effects are independent.  This is likely not realistic.  Nonetheless, to the extent that such shared variance 
between individual- and neighborhood-level effects reduces the explained variance of each proportionally, the 
estimated proportions of variance explained at each level estimated here would remain unchanged.  These 
caveats suggest that this is more of a heuristic exercise, given the theoretical interest in making the distinction 
between individual-level and neighborhood-level effects.   
 
27 For social disorder, a one-unit increase in neighborhood perceived social disorder reduces individual 
perceived neighborhood satisfaction –2.585 (-1.42 - 1.165).  Since 83.5% of perceived social disorder is not due 
to the neighborhood effect, this suggests that an individual’s perceived social disorder will have a –1.11 effect 
on neighborhood satisfaction (-1.42 * (.835 / .165)= -7.19).  Thus, the neighborhood accounts for 26 percent of 
the effect of perceived social disorder on satisfaction (-2.585 / (-2.585 – 7.19) = .265).  For physical disorder, a 
one-unit increase in neighborhood perceived physical disorder reduces individual perceived neighborhood 
satisfaction -3.765 (-.95 – 2.815).  Since 78% of perceived physical disorder is not due to the neighborhood 
effect, this suggests that an individual’s perceived physical disorder will have a -.355 effect on neighborhood 
satisfaction (-.95 * (.78/ .22) = -3.37).  Thus, the neighborhood accounts for 53 percent of the effect of 
perceived physical disorder on satisfaction (-3.765 / (-3.765 – 3.37) = .528).   
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The measures of physical characteristics in the neighborhood generally work as 
expected.28  I first estimated a model including the household-level characteristics and these 
physical characteristics and crime and disorder (but not including the aggregate demographic 
measures).  In this model, the presence of higher quality schools (as measured by the 
completion rate of students in local schools) was positively related with neighborhood 
satisfaction.  And the presence of restaurants and recreation sites increases neighborhood 
satisfaction.  On the other hand, the presence of more bars and liquor stores indirectly 
reduces satisfaction since they are positively related to more crime in the neighborhood.  And 
the presence of toxic waste sites was negatively associated with neighborhood satisfaction.  
The measures of percent vacant units and crowded units increase perceived crime and 
disorder, as expected.  These results largely remained unchanged when including the 
aggregate demographic measures; the only change was that the measure of toxic waste sites 
became insignificant in this full model.   
 
Neighborhood-level results of demographic characteristics 
I next ask what effect the neighborhood demographic composition has on 
neighborhood satisfaction, and find evidence consistent with a selection effect in which those 
with the greatest economic resources are able to move into the most desirable neighborhoods.  
Recall that these neighborhood-level effects are estimated simultaneously with the 
household-level effects just discussed.  Thus, neighborhoods with higher average levels of 
education and income report more overall satisfaction, and blocks with higher average levels 
of income also report less social and physical disorder.  In fact, about half of the effect of 
                                                 
28 This paragraph’s results are not shown in the table- TCRDC output subject to review. 
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higher income on increased neighborhood satisfaction is explained by the lower overall crime 
and disorder in such neighborhoods.  Recall that we saw no concomitant individual-level 
effect, as those with higher levels of education actually reported less individual satisfaction 
with the neighborhood than their block neighbors.  We also see that blocks with higher 
percentages of African-American households report less overall satisfaction, and about 40 
percent of this effect is due to the greater level of common perception of crime and social 
disorder in such neighborhoods.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that such households 
have less ability to move into more desirable neighborhoods.   
We again see mixed results for the community of limited liability.  There is evidence 
that neighborhoods with more homeowners perceive less crime, which then increases 
satisfaction, and an additional direct positive effect on satisfaction.  But there is no evidence 
that increasing the number of households with children on the block increases satisfaction: in 
fact, there is a negative relationship with neighborhood satisfaction.  Instead, the story here is 
one of single parent families having particularly strong negative effects on neighborhood 
satisfaction.  This can be seen in the twin results that a higher proportion of married 
households increases satisfaction and reduces crime and disorder, while a higher proportion 
of households with children reduces satisfaction and increases perceived disorder.  For 
married couples with children, these effects largely cancel each other out, so that a greater 
number of such households has a similar effect on the neighborhood as do single individuals 
(whereas higher proportion of married couples without children result in more satisfaction).  
On the other hand, it can be seen that the sum of these negative effects occurs with a greater 
proportion of unmarried households with children.  Such households are associated with 
more crime and disorder, consistent with a long line of literature in the social disorganization 
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literature (Roncek and Maier 1991; Rountree and Warner 1999; Sampson and Groves 1989).  
Indeed, in this model we see that 33 percent of the effect of children and 50 percent of the 
effect of married households on neighborhood satisfaction is due to the increased crime and 
disorder.  Nonetheless, this model suggests that greater numbers of single-parent families in a 
block also have a direct negative effect on neighborhood satisfaction beyond their effect on 
disorder and crime.   
While I found no support for the systemic model hypothesis that an individual living 
a longer period of time on a block will express more neighborhood satisfaction, we do see an 
aggregate effect where residential stability on a block is associated with greater 
neighborhood satisfaction.  This greater stability has an additional positive indirect effect on 
neighborhood satisfaction by reducing neighborhood perceived social disorder.  Nonetheless, 
while consistent with the systemic model hypothesis, it is possible that the causal effect is 
reversed, and suggests an avenue for future research.   
 
Measures of social distance 
I next turn to the question of what effect social distance has on neighborhood 
satisfaction, both directly and indirectly through its effect on perceived crime and disorder.  
As an individual-level measure, there is evidence that greater social distance from one’s 
neighbors will impact one’s perceptions of them, at least as measured by the presence of 
“undesirable persons,” and results in reporting more social disorder, as seen in Table 2.5.  
There is also evidence that social distance at the individual level increases perceived physical 
disorder and modestly increases perceived crime, and this increased disorder and crime then 
indirectly reduces neighborhood satisfaction.  There is also modest evidence of a direct effect 
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of social distance on an individual’s neighborhood satisfaction, though almost half of this 
effect is mediated by the increased perceived disorder and crime.  This contrasts with 
previous studies that have only measured social distance based on race/ethnicity and found 
no individual-level effect.  To match these previous studies, I estimated a subsidiary model in 
which I also included a measure of the distance of the respondent from his/her neighbors 
based on race/ethnicity.29  This measure of racial/ethnic distance had no effect on any of the 
constructs, whereas the effect of total social distance remained unchanged.  This highlights 
the importance of measuring other determinants of social distance beyond race/ethnicity.   
But while measuring social distance along a number of determinants shows a strong 
effect upon neighborhood satisfaction, the story is different for aggregate social distance in a 
block.  When treating aggregate social distance linearly and including a measure of the 
average social distance in the block, it shows no effect on crime, disorder, or neighborhood 
satisfaction.  Instead, at the aggregate level it is social distance along the single characteristic 
of race/ethnicity that is particularly important for affecting neighborhood satisfaction.  
Greater ethnic heterogeneity in the block has an indirect negative effect on neighborhood 
satisfaction by increasing the perceived crime and disorder in the block, as seen in Table 2.5.  
When I estimated a subsidiary model excluding block ethnic heterogeneity, I found that the 
average social distance in the block had a positive effect on crime and physical disorder, and 
a modestly negative direct effect on neighborhood satisfaction (results not shown here).  
Thus, it appears that when testing the linear effect of aggregate social distance on 
neighborhood disorder and crime, race/ethnicity is key.  It is also important to highlight that 
this model also answers the question why ethnic heterogeneity is important for neighborhood 
                                                 
29 This is calculated as the proportion of other block members not in the same racial/ethnic group as the 
respondent.  Thus, this measure has a value of zero when all other block members are the same race/ethnicity, 
and a value of one when all are members of different racial/ethnic groups.   
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satisfaction:  it increases neighborhood crime and disorder.  In fact, crime and disorder 
entirely mediate the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on neighborhood satisfaction.   
I next tested Bellair’s (1997) thesis that the weak ties of a neighborhood are important 
for reducing the amount of crime by including a nonlinear component of total social distance 
in the equation predicting neighborhood perceived crime.  The notion here is that while no 
social distance should foster strong ties and high social distance likely inhibits tie formation, 
a moderate amount of social distance may result in fewer strong ties but a greater number of 
weak ties, creating more bridging social capital that would reduce crime.  We see support for 
this hypothesis in the model predicting neighborhood common perception of crime in Table 
2.5, as social distance in the block has an inverted-U relationship with neighborhood 
perceived crime.  This effect is depicted graphically in Figure 2.5, and illustrates that areas 
with a moderate amount of social distance have the least perceived neighborhood crime.  
This is consistent with the notion of the importance of weak ties for crime reduction, though 
speculative given the lack of network data in this sample. 
 Finally, I further explored whether the existence of subgroups on a block—based on 
social distance between residents—affect neighborhood satisfaction and failed to find any 
effects.  I tested this in several manners.  When estimating a model including both the 
average social distance in a block as well as the variance in block social distance (as this 
latter measure is designed to capture the degree of clustering in a block), I found minimal 
effects.  This measure had no effect on neighborhood satisfaction and only a modest positive 
effect on perceived physical disorder.  The weakness of this finding, along with the fact that 
the presence of groups is least theoretically likely to affect perceived disorder, diminishes the 
significance of these results.  Additionally, models testing more directly for the presence of 
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groups found no effects:  a model including the size of the largest group in the neighborhood 
showed no significant effects for any of these outcome measures, suggesting that the 
presence of a large group of residents more similar to each other has no effect on these 
neighborhood constructs.  Since simply measuring the size of the group does not take into 
account the closeness within the group, I also estimated a model including the average 
distance within each of the two groups, as well as the average social distance across the two 
groups.  Thus this model not only takes into account the closeness within each of the two 
groups, but also takes into account how much difference there is between the two groups.  
Nonetheless, this model showed no significant effects for any of the neighborhood-level 
constructs.   
 
Conclusion  
While numerous studies have looked at the determinants of greater reported 
neighborhood satisfaction by residents, they generally adopt one of two strategies:  1) a 
national sample of households, or 2) a sample of households nested in neighborhoods from a 
single city.  National studies of households are limited in that they implicitly assume that the 
respondent provides an error-free assessment of the neighborhood, and also in that they are 
unable to disentangle household-level effects from neighborhood-level effects.  Samples of 
neighborhoods from a single city are limited in that they often lack statistical power due to 
having a small number of neighborhoods, and also in that results from such studies may not 
be generalizable to other cities if the city has unique characteristics affecting the nature of the 
analyzed relationship.  This study using a national sample of households nested in blocks has 
overcome these limitations.  This sample design also allowed me to address four other key 
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limitations of prior work:  1) I have theoretically taken into account the household’s degree 
of fit with the neighborhood and shown that past research failing to take this into account 
obtains confounded results.  2) I have shown that taking into account the household’s degree 
of fit with the neighborhood suggests the possible importance of social distance—as 
measured along various social categories—for fostering satisfaction.  While past studies have 
focused simply on racial/ethnic difference, I have shown that measuring distance along a 
number of categories simultaneously is important, and has different implications whether 
measured as an individual-level construct or as a neighborhood-level measure.  3) I have 
exploited this nested design to test whether crime and disorder show neighborhood-level 
effects on reported satisfaction; while past studies have found such an individual-level 
relationship, recent critiques have suggested that such findings may simply be capturing 
psychological effects (Taylor 2001).  4) I have exploited this nested design to test whether 
the crime and disorder of neighborhoods can help explain compositional effects of 
neighborhood demographics on reported satisfaction.  I next elaborate on each of these 
issues.   
My sample design allowed me to take into account an important, but often 
overlooked, characteristic of neighborhood satisfaction:  the household’s degree of fit with 
the neighborhood.  While the residential mobility literature explicitly considers the 
household’s degree of fit based on life course stage, the neighborhood satisfaction literature 
has paid less attention to this issue.  Failing to take this complication into account poses 
problems for studies wishing to simply compare the quality of neighborhoods across 
neighborhoods based on survey responses of households.  Thus, samples of households (as 
opposed to samples of neighborhoods) that ask the household to rate their neighborhood are 
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obtaining a confounded response:  both the degree to which the neighborhood is more 
desirable than others, but also the degree to which the particular household fits with the 
neighborhood.  Relatedly, if certain types of households systematically report lower 
satisfaction with the neighborhood than their neighbors, this will confound attempts to 
compare neighborhoods across neighborhoods.  One consequence of my approach parsing 
apart individual-level perceptions of neighborhood satisfaction and aggregate-level measures 
is that I have been able to detect the expected effect where those with greater SES are able to 
obtain access to more desirable neighborhoods.  This highlights a weakness of past studies 
conceptualizing neighborhood satisfaction as an individual level construct:  for instance, 
some studies have failed to find significant effects on neighborhood satisfaction for education 
(Adams 1992) and income (Bolan 1997; Jagun, Brown, Milburn, and Gary 1990; McHugh, 
Gober, and Reid 1990), or even counter-intuitive negative effects for education (Jagun, 
Brown, Milburn, and Gary 1990).  A possible explanation for these previous surprising 
results comes from this study’s findings that the effects of SES differ depending on whether 
they are measured at the individual level or aggregate level:  at the individual level, those 
with higher levels of education are less satisfied than their neighbors, but at the aggregate 
level, neighborhoods with higher levels of average education are more satisfied.  This 
individual-level finding for education, along with that for racial/ethnic groups, was consistent 
with the social injustice model’s prediction that the higher expectations of those with higher 
SES or from dominant racial/ethnic groups will make them less satisfied with the 
neighborhood than their neighbors.   
Overlooking the theoretical importance of the degree of fit of the household with the 
neighborhood has obscured a potentially fruitful avenue of research for neighborhood 
             67
satisfaction scholars:  the effects of social distance.  My unique sample design of all eleven 
households on each of approximately 660 blocks across the U.S. has allowed me to measure 
social distance along a number of categories both at the level of the household as well as at 
the neighborhood level—as the average social distance (Blau 1977; Blau 1987; McPherson 
and Ranger-Moore 1991).  While prior studies have occasionally viewed the effects of social 
distance on neighborhood satisfaction, they have almost always focused simply on 
racial/ethnic distance.  My findings here suggest that while race/ethnicity is clearly important 
for fostering social distance, it should not blind us to other determinants of social distance 
that also have important implications for neighborhoods.  For instance, whereas my findings 
mirror those of prior research in that an individual’s distance from their neighbors based on 
race does not affect reported neighborhood satisfaction (Harris 2001; Stipak and Hensler 
1983), I did find significant effects when measuring social distance along a number of 
categories simultaneously.  In particular, individuals more socially distant from their 
neighbors—as measured simultaneously along the determinants of race/ethnicity, income, 
life course, and social background— tend to perceive more undesirable neighbors and 
physical disorder, which then reduces their reported satisfaction.  This is consistent with the 
notion that such households perceive a less good ‘fit’ with the neighborhood than their 
neighbors.   
On the other hand, it appears that compositional effects for social distance are more 
pronounced when measuring distance simply along race/ethnicity.  Thus, neighborhoods with 
greater racial/ethnic heterogeneity reported less satisfaction.  While this finding mirrors past 
research (Adams 1992; Connerly and Marans 1985; Harris 2001), I have extended this by 
testing why such a relationship occurs.  The findings here suggest that racial/ethnic 
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heterogeneity does not reduce satisfaction simply because it is inherently undesirable, but 
rather because it increases neighborhood crime and disorder.  Indeed, the effect of ethnic 
heterogeneity on neighborhood satisfaction was entirely mediated by crime and physical and 
social disorder.  My total social distance measure only affected the common perception of 
crime on the block, and did so in a nonlinear fashion.  While blocks with no social distance 
or a high degree of social distance reported higher perception of crime, blocks with a modest 
amount of social distance reported the least amount of crime.  If moderate amounts of social 
distance reduce the number of strong ties but increase the number of weak ties, this would 
produce this result consistent with the observation of scholars that bridging ties are most 
important for reducing neighborhood crime (Bellair 1997; Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Putnam 
2000).  While speculative, given the lack of network data in these analyses, this poses a 
potential avenue for future research.  
My nested data has allowed me to test whether the relationship between 
crime/disorder and neighborhood satisfaction is simply a psychological one (Taylor 2001), or 
whether neighborhood-level effects are indeed present.  The findings here showed that there 
are indeed significant effects of neighborhood-level measures of crime, physical disorder, 
and social disorder upon neighborhood satisfaction.  And while this sample showed that there 
are additional individual-level effects in which a resident who perceives more crime and 
disorder than their neighbors also is less satisfied than their neighbors, the neighborhood-
level effects are non-trivial.  My structural equations modeling strategy allowed me to 
compare the size of these various effects:  as described above, a conservative estimate 
suggests that the neighborhood can explain 41 percent of the relationship between perceived 
crime and neighborhood satisfaction, and 26 and 53 percent of the relationship for social and 
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physical disorder, respectively.  The fact that the neighborhood effect is strongest for the 
assessment of physical disorder is unsurprising given that this construct is more tangible than 
are social disorder or crime (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and 
Earls 1997).   
While recent studies using data with households nested in neighborhoods finding 
relationships between aggregate demographic characteristics and neighborhood satisfaction 
are often left to speculate on the causes of these relationships, I have suggested that building 
on the insights of the social disorganization model is instructive for explaining some of these 
relationships.  While past studies have considered the role of social disorganization in 
fostering neighborhood satisfaction, they have been limited in that they 1) generally have 
only used individual-level assessments of crime and disorder to test their effect on 
neighborhood satisfaction (Adams 1992; Davis and Fine-Davis 1981; Parkes, Kearns, and 
Atkinson 2002; Woldoff 2002); 2) they have failed to test whether this crime and disorder 
plays a role in mediating the relationship between neighborhood demographic composition 
and neighborhood satisfaction.  My findings here suggest that crime and disorder play an 
important role:  they entirely mediated the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on satisfaction, they 
explained 50 percent of the relationship for measures of crowding, average income, and 
percent married, and they explained about 1/3 of the effect for percent African-American and 
percent with children.   
In addition, my strategy of disentangling household- and neighborhood-level effects 
also allowed testing the hypotheses of two key neighborhood theories:  the systemic theory 
and the community of limited liability theory.  Similar to Sampson’s (1991) findings of a 
sample from England, I found no individual-level effect for length of residence upon 
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satisfaction, but that neighborhoods with greater stability report more satisfaction and less 
social disorder.  While consistent with the systemic model, a more thorough test would be 
necessary to determine if the causal direction does not run in the opposite direction:  greater 
neighborhood satisfaction leads to more stability.  I also found mixed results for the 
community of limited liability theory.  The strongest evidence was found for the economic 
investment of homeownership, as owners report more satisfaction and perceive less crime in 
the neighborhood.  There was also an aggregate effect, as blocks with a higher proportion of 
homeowners reported greater overall satisfaction and less perceived crime.  However, there 
was little evidence that the social investment of children increases satisfaction, either for 
individual households, or as an aggregate effect for neighborhoods.   
 While this study has provided important new insights to the literature on 
neighborhood satisfaction, certain limitations need to be acknowledged.  First, a key 
challenge to neighborhood studies is the possibility of selection effects:  certain types of 
people may choose to move to more desirable neighborhoods.  The cross-sectional analyses 
presented here cannot take this into account.  While a fixed effects strategy is one possible 
way to address this issue, such a strategy throws away considerable amounts of information 
and thus has low statistical power, requiring rather large sample sizes to detect effects.  
Given that this study lacked the power necessary to detect effects using a fixed effects 
strategy, despite the very large sample size by neighborhood studies standards, suggests a 
large hurdle indeed for future work.  Second, while I have suggested and shown that crime 
and disorder are important mechanisms that partially explain the relationship between certain 
aggregate demographic characteristics and overall desirability of the neighborhood, other 
mechanisms are certainly likely, and will require consideration in future work.   For instance, 
             71
the prevalence of theoretical models implicating the role of neighborhood networks as a 
possible mediator of various demographic characteristics suggests a fruitful direction for 
future work, though this is yet another approach that is data intensive if approached in a 
quantitative fashion.  An alternative strategy would be for qualitative studies to explore 
possible network mechanisms, providing more guidance to the collection of network data for 
quantitative studies.   
 Nonetheless, this study provides guidance to the neighborhood satisfaction literature 
by disentangling individual- and neighborhood-level effects.  Taking these different effects 
into account can guide future theoretical work attempting to understand the genesis of 
satisfaction with the neighborhood, and how that might change over time.  This study has 
also highlighted the important role crime and disorder plays in this neighborhood 
satisfaction, and the need to take into explicit into the determinants of neighborhood crime 
and disorder when attempting to understand neighborhood desirability.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 2.3.  Summary statistics for variables used in analyses.  American Housing 
Survey national sample, special non-rural neighborhood sub-sample, 1985, 1989, 1993 
Mean SD
Block-level measures
Proportion African-American 0.139 0.273
Proportion Latino 0.083 0.174
Proportion other race 0.026 0.066
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.220 0.223
Average Education 12.830 1.857
Average Income 3.252 1.801
Average length of residence (logged) 1.880 0.625
Proportion married 0.507 0.242
Proportion with children 0.584 0.507
Proportion owners 0.573 0.357
Average persons per room (logged) 0.491 0.158
Proportion vacant units 0.073 0.144
Average distance in the neighborhood 0.465 0.079
Average variance of distance in the neighborhood 0.038 0.014
Average distance in biggest group 0.376 0.080
Average distance in smallest group 0.418 0.095
Average distance across groups 0.589 0.112
Household-level measures
Neighborhood satisfaction 7.840 2.159
Perceived crime 0.323 0.488
Social disorder 0.166 0.345
Physical disorder 0.069 0.223
Female 0.561 0.474
Age 48.749 17.444
African-American 0.139 0.346
Latino 0.085 0.278
Average Education 12.838 3.103
Average Income 3.258 2.926
Average length of residence (logged) 1.879 1.169
First year in residence 0.155 0.362
Married 0.508 0.500
Divorced 0.187 0.390
Have Children 0.316 0.450
Home owner 0.574 0.482
Average persons per room (logged) 0.491 0.292
Total social distance 0.462 0.109
Social distance by race 0.231 0.300
N= 26,499 households in 2,409 block time points
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Table 2.4.  Assessing the reliability of neighborhood constructs of the American 
Housing Survey (AHS) non-rural neighborhood subsample of the national sample using 
confirmatory factor analysis models, 1985, 89, 93  
Indicator
CFA Models Chi Sq df* p-value CFI TLI RMSEA R-squares
Crime 62.1 57 0.300 0.999 0.999 0.006 0.295
Social disorder 81.2 63 0.061 0.972 0.972 0.011 0.165
Physical disorder 59.7 57 0.379 0.992 0.992 0.004 0.219
Neighborhood satisfaction 77.9 84 0.749 1 1.001 0 0.251
* Degrees of freedom are estimated when using weighted least squares with mean and variance 
adjusted estimation for crime, social disorder, and physical disorder models
N= 26,499 households in 2,409 block time points
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Table 2.5.  Full structural equation model with neighborhood satisfaction as outcome.  
Using social disorder, physical disorder and crime at household and block level as 
mediators.  Including household- and block-level demographic and social distance 
measures.  American Housing Survey special non-rural neighborhood sub-sample, 
1985, 1989, 1993 
 
Individual outcome and measures Indirect Total
% 
mediated
Female 0.168 ** 0.018 ** 0.016 ** 0.019 ** -0.057 0.112 -50.9%
(5.71) (2.76) (3.25) (5.99)
Age 0.008 ** -0.002 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 ** 0.004 0.013 33.1%
(8.18) -(8.84) -(5.91) -(3.25)
African-American 0.294 ** -0.093 ** -0.049 ** -0.005  0.158 0.451 34.9%
(4.05) -(5.36) -(4.36) -(0.70)
Latino 0.394 ** -0.098 ** -0.059 ** -0.013 † 0.185 0.579 31.9%
(6.50) -(6.93) -(5.30) -(1.76)
Education -0.026 ** 0.008 ** 0.003 ** 0.003 ** -0.014 -0.040 35.0%
-(4.79) (5.10) (3.48) (4.14)
Income 0.003  0.004 * 0.000  0.001  -0.004 -0.001
(0.52) (2.33) (0.01) (1.37)
Length of residence (logged) -0.039 * 0.032 ** 0.012 ** 0.011 ** -0.055 -0.094 58.6%
-(2.02) (6.62) (3.51) (4.78)
First year in residence -0.060  -0.042 ** -0.015 † 0.000  0.060 0.000
-(1.40) -(3.01) -(1.80) -(0.07)
Married 0.022  0.014 † 0.014 * 0.013 ** -0.046 -0.024 100.0%
(0.44) (1.72) (2.43) (2.96)
Divorced -0.100 * 0.026 * 0.010  -0.001  -0.036 -0.136 26.4%
-(2.10) (2.41) (1.54) -(0.21)
Persons per room (logged) 0.016  -0.008  -0.002  -0.025 ** 0.035 0.051 68.0%
(0.27) -(0.50) -(0.16) -(3.25)
Presence of children 0.000  0.016  0.007  -0.007  -0.018 -0.018 99.2%
(0.00) (1.57) (0.99) -(1.60)
Home owner 0.059  -0.024 * 0.004  0.025 ** -0.008 0.051
(1.30) -(2.05) (0.53) (4.77)
Perceived crime -0.899 **
-(31.02)
Perceived social disorder -1.418 **
-(38.95)
Perceived physical disorder -0.952 **
-(16.33)
Social distance -0.321 † 0.094 † 0.126 ** 0.054 * -0.316 -0.637 49.6%
-(1.65) (1.67) (3.17) (2.47)
(continued)
Neighborhood satisfaction: 
indirect and total effect
Neighborhood 
satisfaction: 
direct effect
Perceived 
crime
Perceived 
social 
disorder
Perceived 
physical 
disorder
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Neighborhood outcome and measures Indirect Total
% 
mediated
Perceived crime -0.554 **
-(3.76)
Perceived social disorder -1.165 **
-(2.58)
Perceived physical disorder -2.815 **
-(3.59)
Percent African-American -0.369 ** 0.273 ** 0.030 † 0.009  -0.211 -0.580 36.4%
-(3.35) (8.96) (1.70) (0.79)
Percent Latino -0.512 ** 0.188 ** -0.062 * -0.003  -0.024 -0.536 4.5%
-(3.45) (4.52) -(2.35) -(0.16)
Percent other race -0.623  -0.075  -0.219 ** -0.056  0.454 -0.169
-(1.24) -(0.68) -(3.77) -(1.26)
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.090  0.113 ** 0.083 ** 0.036 * -0.260 -0.170 100.0%
(0.53) (3.24) (3.95) (2.50)
Average Education 0.077 ** 0.004  -0.004  -0.001  0.006 0.083 7.3%
(5.03) (0.98) -(1.56) -(0.72)
Average Income 0.041 * -0.003  -0.011 ** -0.010 ** 0.042 0.082 50.4%
(2.27) -(0.66) -(3.60) -(4.83)
Average length of residence (logged) 0.123 ** -0.016  -0.019 * -0.002  0.036 0.158 22.5%
(2.80) -(1.34) -(2.45) -(0.36)
Percent married 0.270 * -0.189 ** -0.070 ** -0.030 * 0.272 0.542 50.1%
(2.19) -(5.14) -(3.00) -(2.07)
Percent with children -0.197 ** 0.023  0.035 ** 0.015 ** -0.095 -0.292 32.6%
-(3.94) (1.58) (4.40) (2.65)
Percent owners 0.206 * -0.063 * 0.004  -0.003  0.038 0.244 15.7%
(2.07) -(2.09) (0.22) -(0.26)
Average persons per room (logged) -0.326 † 0.143 * 0.102 ** 0.068 ** -0.390 -0.715 54.5%
-(1.65) (2.49) (3.03) (3.03)
Percent vacant units 0.307 † 0.139 ** 0.075 ** 0.053 ** -0.313 -0.005
(1.74) (3.32) (2.93) (2.77)
Average social distance -0.283  -2.116 ** 0.030  0.042  1.019 0.736
-(0.82) -(3.97) (0.50) (1.07)
Average social distance squared 2.405 ** -1.332 -1.332
(4.15)
Indicator for 1985 0.109 * -0.026 * -0.014 † 0.002  
(2.42) -(2.01) -(1.96) (0.30)
Indicator for 1989 -0.011  -0.010  -0.016 * 0.003  
-(0.23) -(0.84) -(2.21) (0.58)
R-square (individual construct) 0.378 0.222 0.092 0.079
R-square (neighborhood construct) 0.703 0.416 0.364 0.344
Average model fit over five imputations: chi square = 9502.3 on 8333 df, RMSEA = .008, TLI = .989, IFI = .996, CFI = .996, using a maximum likelihood 
estimator
Neighborhood 
satisfaction: 
direct effect
Perceived 
crime
Perceived 
social 
disorder
Perceived 
physical 
disorder
Neighborhood satisfaction: 
indirect and total effect
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  N = 26,499 households in 2,409 block time points.  T-value in parenthesis
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Figure 2.1   Theoretical determinants of social distance 
Race
Upbringing
Life course
Class Social
Distance
Neighborhood
satisfaction
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Figure 2.3a.  Hypothetical neighborhood with equal social distance among residents 
 
Figure 2.3b.  Hypothetical neighborhood with variance in social distance among 
residents (cliques) 
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Figure 2.4.  Interpreting household and neighborhood-level effects 
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Figure 2.5.  Effect of block social distance on block perceived crime from full structural 
equation model simultaneously estimating both household and block effects 
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III. Fight or Flight?  Household Mobility Decisions, Neighborhood Transformation, and 
Crime 
 
Urban neighborhoods and their transformation have been a bedrock concern of 
sociology extending back at least to Simmel (1971), Wirth (1956a; 1956b), and Park and 
Burgess (1921).  Neighborhoods differ on characteristics that most would consider inherently 
desirable, such as the presence of certain amenities (such as quality schools), the amount of 
crime, or the existence of positive relations among the residents.  Furthermore, the quality of 
such neighborhoods is important for the investment they represent to many homeowners for 
whom the value of their home represents much of their net worth.  Because of this 
importance of neighborhoods, there naturally is interest in how neighborhoods change over 
time.  Two broad perspectives focus on neighborhood change.  One emphasizes the 
importance of residential mobility decisions for creating racial/ethnic and economic 
transformation of neighborhoods, while the other emphasizes the importance of resident 
decisions to affect the level of crime through such civic activism as providing informal social 
control.   
The first perspective focusing on neighborhood transformation is the residential 
segregation literature, and gives primacy to the study of household residential mobility 
decisions (Frey and Farley 1996; Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1994; South and Crowder 
1997a; South and Crowder 1997b; Van Valey, Roof, and Wilcox 1977).  In this view, 
whether or not households choose to leave a neighborhood is of importance.  This residential 
segregation literature focuses on whether household residential mobility decisions lead to a 
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residential transformation in such important neighborhood structural characteristics as 
racial/ethnic composition and economic resources (Jargowsky 1996; Massey and Denton 
1987; Massey and Fong 1990).  This transformation of individual neighborhoods then has 
implications for the larger question of the racial/ethnic residential segregation within larger 
communities and its relationship to “white flight” (Frey 1979; Krysan 2002; Marshall 1979; 
Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1994).  An important implication for such transformed 
neighborhoods that end up with the most “truly disadvantaged” based on race and income is 
that they likely will experience such negative consequences such as higher rates of crime 
(Peterson and Krivo 1993; Wilson 1987).   
The second perspective focusing on neighborhood transformation is the social 
disorganization model of Park and Burgess (1921) in criminology, which largely disregards 
residential mobility decisions while focusing on whether or not residents will engage in civic 
activism to combat crime.  The social disorganization model provides a causal mechanism 
for why three key structural characteristics—poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential 
stability—should increase crime.  In this model, these three characteristics increase the 
physical and social disorganization of neighborhoods, reducing the interaction among 
residents and hence reducing the willingness to engage in various guardianship activities that 
might reduce the rate of neighborhood crime (Park and Burgess 1921; Sampson and Groves 
1989; Shaw and McKay 1942).  As a result, this inhibits the ability of a community “to 
realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls” (Sampson 
and Groves 1989).  While key work in this field by Sampson and colleagues explicitly 
focused on measuring the mechanisms of social disorganization in neighborhoods in London 
(Sampson and Groves 1989) and Chicago (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999), these and most 
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other studies in this perspective use cross-sectional data (Bellair 1997; Bellair 2000; 
Hirschfield and Bowers 1997; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; 
Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000; Veysey and Messner 1999; Warner 2003; Warner and 
Pierce 1993).  One implication of the recent development of this theory generally employing 
cross-sectional studies is that less attention is paid to the possibility that higher rates of crime 
might increase residential mobility.   
I suggest that these two perspectives on neighborhoods have complementary aspects 
that can be fruitfully combined.  Whereas the residential mobility literature largely focuses 
on whether households move or stay in a neighborhood in response to structural conditions, it 
can be extended to take into account the possibility that households mobility decisions may 
also depend on the level of crime in the neighborhood (Liska and Bellair 1995; Liska, Logan, 
and Bellair 1998; Marshall 1979).  This mobility option can then be linked to the social 
disorganization model’s focus on whether or not households provide informal social control 
to reduce crime.  This suggests a need for a multilevel theoretical model that explicitly takes 
into account the actions of households, consistent with the recent call to theoretically 
integrate the interrelationship between crime and residential mobility (Liska and Bellair 
1995: 604; South and Messner 2000).  I will develop such a model in which households can 
respond to various problems in the neighborhood, such as crime, either through residential 
mobility, providing informal social control to reduce crime, or neither.   
One insight gained from employing this household level model is that to the extent 
that households adopt an exit strategy in response to the level of crime, this can help explain 
the existence of various structural characteristics of neighborhoods.  If households choose to 
leave neighborhoods when the crime rate increases, the rate of residential instability will 
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increase.  Likewise, if households of different racial/ethnic backgrounds have differential 
abilities to leave high crime areas, this will change the racial/ethnic composition of the 
neighborhood.30  And to the extent that households prefer areas with less crime, I show 
below how this can give rise to residential mobility decisions that result in high crime areas 
containing a high degree of households in poverty.  In all three instances, it is the higher level 
of crime that causes these structural characteristics, rather than a causal relationship from 
these structural characteristics to crime as postulated by the social disorganization model.   
Despite the theoretical plausibility of a reciprocal relationship between household 
residential mobility decisions and these key structural neighborhood characteristics, few 
studies have addressed these questions at any level of analysis, much less at the level of 
neighborhoods.  For instance, while some recent studies have tested for a reciprocal 
relationship between crime and informal social control (a mechanism of social 
disorganization), such studies assume that individuals only respond to crime through the 
amount of informal social control they provide and not through residential mobility decisions 
(Bellair 2000; Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, and Liu 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).  
Thus, virtually no studies have tested for a possible reciprocal relationship between crime 
and residential instability.  Likewise, few studies have tested whether crime also leads to a 
clustering of those living in poverty.  While Park and Burgess (1921) implicitly suggested an 
economic model in which households choose neighborhoods at an appropriate income level, 
this does not explicitly suggest that the rate of crime in a neighborhood causes this clustering.  
Thus, while studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) have shown that 
lower economic resources funnels residents into poor neighborhoods and limits their ability 
                                                 
30 While there is little reason to expect that households of some races “prefer” crime, this can still occur if 
households of different races have different levels of resources.  I incorporate this into the model explicitly 
down below.   
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to leave such areas (Quillian 1999; South and Crowder 1997a) these studies do not test 
whether crime is actually a key part of the causal process.  Finally, while two recent studies 
used longitudinal data to find that higher levels of crime can result in a greater concentration 
of nonwhite population in cities (Liska and Bellair 1995; Liska, Logan, and Bellair 1998), 
they failed to test these processes at the level of local neighborhoods, a more appropriate 
geographic level as described in the initial Shaw and McKay model.  One longitudinal study 
of neighborhoods in Chicago using a small number of control variables found that the 
delinquency rate in 1960 increased the number of non-whites in 1970, though this paper did 
not test a reciprocal model (Bursik 1986).   
In what follows, I develop an explicit household level theoretical model of household 
response to neighborhood problems, and suggest that it can be seen as a bridge between the 
residential segregation literature focusing on mobility decisions and the social 
disorganization literature focusing on civic participation.  This theoretical model helps to 
explain the generation of neighborhood social structural characteristics through these 
household level decisions.  One implication of this model is that a reciprocal relationship 
between crime rates and the structural characteristics of neighborhoods should exist:  while 
research has failed to explicitly test this using neighborhood-level data, I am able to do so 
here given my longitudinal sample of households nested in blocks in the United States.  
Finally, an additional advantage of my sample, given the controversy surrounding the proper 
definition of a neighborhood, is that I can test whether the ecological effects of the local 
block are most important for generating mobility decisions or crime prevention activities, or 
whether the surrounding census tract has a larger impact.   
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Household Choice Model  
I employ a household level model developed by Lyons and Lowery (1986) building 
on the insights of Hirschman’s (1970) notions of exit and voice, in which households can 
respond to neighborhood problems through four possible responses:  1) exit; 2) voice; 3) 
loyalty; 4) neglect (Lyons and Lowery 1986; Orbell and Uno 1972).  Exit is choosing to 
moving out of a neighborhood experiencing problems.  Voice entails various political 
responses, including individualistic ones such as writing to newspapers, contacting public 
officials, signing petitions or voting; it also includes collective responses, such as working 
through existing groups or forming new ones (Orbell and Uno 1972).  Loyalty implies 
remaining committed to the neighborhood:  such individuals might be less likely to notice 
issues that other residents classify as ‘problems’.  Finally, neglect would be a person noticing 
such problems but simply doing nothing about them.  I extend this model by considering 
crime as a particularly salient neighborhood problem that will engender one of these four 
responses of exit, voice, loyalty, or neglect.   
Early work in the social disorganization literature often implicitly assumed that 
households would respond to crime events with neglect.  That is, households were viewed as 
passive actors at the whims of neighborhood events.  Recent research has suggested that 
some households may respond to neighborhood problems with voice by joining 
neighborhood associations and other activity designed to combat crime (Gerson, Stueve, and 
Fischer 1977; Perkins et al. 1990; Skogan 1989; Taylor 1996).  However, work has rarely 
considered the theoretical implications if households respond to crime by choosing exit.  
Nonetheless, it is relatively uncontroversial and theoretically plausible to suspect that 
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households desire neighborhoods with less crime, and that higher rates of crime will give rise 
to greater levels of mobility.   
Thus, I utilize a simple household-level model containing few assumptions.  While 
additional preferences are clearly important for households, I suggest that adding these to this 
model would only provide nuance without changing the substantive conclusions.  First, I 
assume that a major housing preference is to live in a neighborhood with little crime.  
Second, I assume that households are homogeneous in their characteristics with two 
exceptions: 1) there are differences in economic resources; 2) there are differences in 
homeowner status.  The first assumption has face validity in that it is hard to conceive of any 
households desiring to have criminal events inflicted upon them.31  Even those who engage 
in criminal acts themselves do not wish to have others physically attack them or take their 
possessions.  In addition, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that households respond 
to crime by leaving the area:  for instance, Skogan (1990) found for 40 neighborhoods that 
crime rates cause dissatisfaction and a desire to move.  Although South and Deane (1993) 
found no effect for perceived crime, two other studies found significant effects for actual 
crime events (Cullen and Levitt 1996; Dugan 1999).  Given this initial framework, below I 
extend the model by 1) considering the possibility that a household’s race/ethnicity may limit 
their access to more desirable neighborhoods; and 2) allowing households the ability to 
change the level of crime in the neighborhood—this is a key assumption of the social 
disorganization model, and can be conceived as a form of “voice” in my schema.   
                                                 
31 There are conflicting views on this.  On the one hand, some research points out that areas with larger numbers 
of delinquents will provide larger markets encouraging the location of more criminally-minded individuals in 
such an area (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999).  However, to the extent that such an increase in the demand for 
illegal drugs or other illicit services simply increases the number of suppliers, this will not benefit any 
individual supplier.  In addition, some research suggests that even those who are criminally minded wish to 
maintain the relative safety of their own neighborhoods, and thus conduct their illegal affairs in neighboring 
communities while engaging in efforts to reduce crime in their own neighborhoods (Pattillo 1998).   
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If attainment of crime-free neighborhoods is entirely governed by a price mechanism, 
households’ level of economic resources will explain entry into low-crime neighborhoods, 
ceteris paribus.  To begin, consider a simple model represented by a 3x3 table of households 
differing by income level and neighborhoods differing by level of crime, as shown in Table 
3.1.   
In this model, the most desirable (and hence expensive) neighborhoods will be those 
with low amounts of crime.  Since all households prefer less crime, the areas with the least 
crime will be most desirable and hence have the highest rents and home values.  At 
equilibrium, households with the most resources (high-income households) will reside in low 
crime neighborhoods (cell I); those with average levels of income will reside in 
neighborhoods with average levels of crime (cell E); and low income households will reside 
in high crime neighborhoods, represented by Cell A in the table.  This implies clustering 
along the diagonal of this table.32  This distribution of households suggests a Pareto efficient 
equilibrium as none will be interested and/or able to move to a different neighborhood:  
while a low income household would prefer to live in a neighborhood with less crime (cells 
D or G), this would require displacing a higher income household who would then end up in 
the high crime neighborhood (cell B or C).33  The household with more resources is willing 
and able to pay more to live in the neighborhood with less crime, and would not be willing to 
move to a higher crime neighborhood without other compensating features.  Given this 
equilibrium, how does neighborhood change occur? 
                                                 
32 This only occurs in a perfect market-clearing instance.  There are many reasons to expect that housing 
markets do not clear readily, though the implications of this do not affect the substance of these arguments.   
 
33 Pareto efficiency occurs when it is not possible to reallocate resources such that one individual is made better 
off without making any other individual worse off.   
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 In this simple model, households will leave the neighborhood under two 
circumstances:  1) if their own income status changes or 2) if the neighborhood crime rate 
changes.34  First, consider an instance where the household’s income changes.  For a 
hypothetical household with average level income currently in an average level crime 
neighborhood (cell E), an increase in their income will move them to the off-diagonal cell 
F.35  These greater resources will allow them to look for a unit in a low-crime neighborhood, 
abandoning this mid-level crime neighborhood and moving them into cell I.36  On the other 
hand, if this household experiences a decrease in income they will become a low-income 
household living in this neighborhood with mid-level crime, or cell D.  Their lower income 
level will place economic pressure on them to leave this neighborhood for one with a lower 
rent level (and higher crime), moving them into the equilibrium position of cell A.   
 There may also be instances in which the neighborhood itself changes.  Consider the 
same hypothetical household residing in cell E:  an increase in the crime rate transforms this 
into a high crime neighborhood, moving the household to cell B.37  This higher crime rate 
                                                 
34 There are other reasons why households might leave a neighborhood, though they do not have important 
implications for the theory here.  For instance, retirees might choose to leave the neighborhood for a retirement 
community, or households might need to move due to a job change.  However, in such instances the household 
would be replaced by another of similar economic resources since there has been no fundamental change in the 
neighborhood.  Therefore, since such mobility does not change the results here, I do not consider it further.   
 
35 These income levels and rent/home values are all relative.  For instance, if the income level of all households 
increases equally, there will be no relative change, and thus no movement of households.   
 
36 Of course, this household may not be able to displace another household in existing stock, suggesting the 
stickiness of the housing market to clearing.  One solution is the creation of new housing stock, which I discuss 
below.   
 
37 Note that the cause of this exogenous shock is of considerable interest in its own right.  Building on the work 
of the social disorganization model and the routine activities theory, I would suggest a model along the lines of 
that developed by Wilcox, Land, and Hunt (2003).  In this view, crime requires the convergence of motivated 
offenders, suitable targets, and ineffective guardianship.  Thus, the change in any one of these three could lead 
to an increase in crime.  For instance, if more motivated offenders moved into the neighborhood or a nearby 
one, this could lead to a spike in crime.  Note that this wouldn’t necessarily lead to a spike:  if the neighborhood 
had potential effective guardianship that could be employed to counteract the increase in motivated offenders, 
the rate of crime would not increase.  This suggests that a “reserve supply” of effective guardianship may be 
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makes the neighborhood less desirable, producing two simultaneous outcomes.  First, the 
household will choose to leave the neighborhood and move to another cell E neighborhood.  
Second, since the initial neighborhood is now less desirable, the lower rent reflecting this will 
induce a low-income household to move into the vacated unit.  This implies that an increase 
in the crime rate can induce a change in the economic resources of the neighborhood’s 
households.  Note that this implies a causal relationship from an increase in crime to a 
change in the economic structure of a neighborhood’s households, precisely the opposite of 
theories such as social disorganization, which predict that decreasing household income in a 
neighborhood will cause an increase in crime.  This all suggests a series of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis A-1:38  If the crime rate rises in a neighborhood, rents and home values will 
decrease. 
Hypothesis HH-1:  If the crime rate rises in a neighborhood, households (especially those 
with higher income) are more likely to move out of the neighborhood.   
Hypothesis HH-2:  If the crime rate rises in a neighborhood, most households moving into 
the neighborhood will have lower income.     
Hypothesis A-2:  Combining hypotheses 1 and 2, at the aggregate level neighborhoods with 
increasing rates of crime will experience decreasing average household income.   
 On the other hand, there might be instances where the crime rate in a neighborhood 
decreases.  This would move this household with average income from cell E to cell F:  they 
are now in a more desirable neighborhood than they originally could afford.  In such an 
                                                                                                                                                       
important for a neighborhood:  as long as they area did not have many motivated offenders, the guardianship 
would be unnecessary for minimizing crime.  But its presence could help ameliorate possible spikes in crime of 
the sort I describe here.  It is possible that the presence of homeowners and their unique investment in the 
neighborhood would be particularly likely to provide such guardianship---this speculation is consistent with the 
results I obtain.  However, I do not have the data to test this question explicitly and thus leave it to future 
research.   
 
38 I use the prefix to distinguish between household level hypotheses (HH) and aggregate-level hypotheses (A).   
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instance, rents and home values will increase in the neighborhood.  If this household is 
renting, the higher rent will induce them to move out of the neighborhood and into another 
cell E neighborhood.  However, if they own their home, they will reap the benefits of this 
change by remaining in a more desirable neighborhood than they could otherwise afford.39  
Thus, we see evidence of heterogeneity in who chooses to move in response to an increase in 
crime.  Note that this leads to an asymmetric hypothesis where it is only decreasing crime 
rates that will bring about a change in the tenure status of neighborhood residents.   
Hypothesis HH-3:  If the crime rate decreases in a neighborhood, renters will be more likely 
to move out of the neighborhood.  
 
Race as a Substitute for Income 
 While the model thus far only considers a household’s income level as a constraint on 
access to desirable neighborhoods, I next take into account the possibility that access to some 
neighborhoods is circumscribed for some racial/ethnic groups, as suggested by much prior 
literature (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Kain and Quigley 1975; Rosenbaum 1994; 
South and Crowder 1997a; South and Deane 1993).40  For instance, a study using the Panel 
                                                 
39 To the extent that property taxes are based on housing values, an increase in values in a neighborhood will 
increase a household’s housing costs through this increase in taxes due to the higher value of the home.  
However, this likely would be a small amount relative to the actual home value increase, and therefore likely 
would have minimal effect on mobility decisions.  A possible exception to this would be households on a fixed 
income.  However, the push to change the structure of property taxes—such as the Prop 13 movement in 
California—can ameliorate this, as can recent developments in reverse mortgages which allow utilizing this 
increased equity to pay for the increased tax rates.   
 
40 An alternative possibility is that households simply prefer to live in areas that are ethnically homogeneous.  
However, such a simple selection model would imply no changes to the model proposed here:  An area with an 
average amount of crime and households of an average income level of one racial/ethnic group would simply 
transform into a similar such neighborhood composed of households of another racial/ethnic group.  There is no 
reason to then expect an increase in the level of crime in the neighborhood.  Thus, while Schelling-type (1978) 
tipping models are useful for explaining the ethnic transformation of a neighborhood, they have no implications 
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Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) found that among those who moved out of a poor 
neighborhood, African-Americans were less likely to move into a nonpoor tract, even 
controlling for income (South and Crowder 1997a).  African-Americans may have fewer 
neighborhoods to choose from when making a move for several reasons.  This can occur 
simply due to preferences if most African-Americans are unwilling to move into a 
neighborhood dominated by all whites (Farley, Steeh, Krysan, Jackson, and Reeves 1994).  
On the other hand, gatekeepers can have strong effects.  Considerable evidence suggests that 
real estate agents may steer potential tenants towards particular neighborhoods (La Gory and 
Pipkin 1981).  Likewise, gatekeepers can reduce access:  a phone study found that speaking 
in a black English vernacular reduced the chances of being directed to a rental unit (Fischer 
and Massey 2004).  I now briefly work through the implications of this added complexity in 
the model.   
If a racial/ethnic group is systematically denied entry to more desirable 
neighborhoods, they will be clustered in cells A, B, F, and possibly C.  That is, low-income 
members of this group will be clustered in high crime areas in cell A, as expected.  However, 
since average income members are systematically denied access to average crime 
neighborhoods, they will be clustered in the off-diagonal cell B with high crime.  And high 
income members of this group will be denied access to the low-crime neighborhoods in cell I 
and instead have to locate in the average crime neighborhoods of cell F or even the high 
crime cell C.  One implication of this is that this minority group will live in higher crime 
neighborhoods simply due to this forced location in less desirable neighborhoods.  Thus, past 
research suggesting a positive causal relationship between some racial/ethnic groups and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
for the model developed here.  Instead, my model relies on systematic restriction of access to neighborhoods for 
a particular racial/ethnic group.   
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crime rate may have the causal direction reversed (Crutchfield 1989; Gyimah-Brempong 
2001; Krivo and Peterson 1996; McNulty 2001; Ouimet 2000; Peterson, Krivo, and Harris 
2000; Roncek 1981).   
Hypothesis HH-5:  Households of minority groups are more likely to reside in high crime 
neighborhoods.   
A limitation of this hypothesis is that it is also consistent with a model where the 
presence of minority groups increases crime.  Therefore, a dynamic hypothesis is needed.  
Indeed, there are dynamic implications of this model: consider a cell E neighborhood 
occupied entirely by white households.  With a rise in the crime rate, the simpler form of this 
model predicts that lower-income whites would replace households that left the 
neighborhood, transforming this into a cell A neighborhood.  However, this added axiom 
suggests that an alternative possibility is that middle-income minority households who lack 
access to other neighborhoods will replace these households, transforming this into a cell B 
neighborhood.   
Hypothesis HH-6:  Neighborhoods with increasing crime rates will have an influx of 
minority group households (controlling for an increase in low-income households).   
 
Collective Action to Reduce Crime 
Up to this point, I have treated the level of crime in a neighborhood as exogenous to 
the model:  households simply take the level of crime as given and are unable to affect it.  
However, a key assumption of the social disorganization model is that the banding together 
of residents in a neighborhood through informal networks and voluntary organizations can 
reduce the amount of crime (Crenshaw and St. John 1989; Friedman 1998; Guest and 
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Oropesa 1984; Taub, Taylor, and Dunham 1984).  These informal networks provide 
guardianship capabilities in which criminal offenders are dissuaded by the presence of these 
“watchful eyes,” while voluntary organizations minimize crime by providing communication 
among residents, facilitating response when problems arise and by providing legitimate 
activities to otherwise potential offenders.   
Since it is always in the interest of residents to reduce the amount of crime in their 
neighborhood, the question becomes why isn’t this always done?  This is the classic 
collective action problem:  it is in the interest of all in the neighborhood to have their 
neighbors provide guardianship activities without themselves actually having to providing it 
(Olson 1971).  Note that this implies that time and effort is required to provide this informal 
social control.  This then raises the question: who will provide this guardianship?   
One answer to who will provide this guardianship is that there must at least be a 
possibility of reaping the benefits of an improving neighborhood.  This suggests that 
homeownership status may be particularly important:  while renters are generally less 
invested in the neighborhood due to their more temporary status, the fact that they cannot 
reap the economic benefits of an improving neighborhood should make them particularly 
unwilling to engage in efforts to reduce the amount of crime.  That is, any reduction in the 
neighborhood crime rate should simply translate into higher rents, inducing the household to 
leave the neighborhood for one with lower rents and the previous level of crime.41  On the 
other hand, homeowners and landlords would reap the benefits of a lowered crime rate, as it 
                                                 
41 While it is possible that increasing income levels of renters would allow them to remain in such transforming 
neighborhoods, they would still have little reason to engage in these crime deterrent behaviors.  That is, a 
dominant strategy for renters would be to simply use their higher levels of income to move to a more desirable, 
low crime, neighborhood rather than spending time and effort to reduce the rate of crime in their current 
neighborhood.  Thus, the ability to reap the benefits of such effort is key in the model.   
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increases their home value without increasing their housing costs.42  These observations are 
consistent with past research showing the importance of homeownership as a determinant of 
involvement in the neighborhood through such activity as participation in neighborhood 
associations (Oliver 1984; Taub, Surgeon, Lindholm, Otti, and Bridges 1977) and knowing 
one’s neighbors (Hunter 1975; Logan and Spitze 1994).  Consistent with this, cross-sectional 
studies have found a negative relationship between the percentage of homeowners in a 
neighborhood and the rate of crime (Chilton 1964; Gyimah-Brempong 2001; Krivo and 
Peterson 1996; Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000). 
Hypothesis A-4:  Increasing the percentage of homeowners in a higher crime neighborhood 
will decrease the crime rate. 
A second answer to who will provide this guardianship is that joining these voluntary 
organizations implies a time commitment.  Thus, when is it most cost-effective for 
households to engage in such behavior to reduce the amount of crime in the neighborhood?  
Given that associating with others is an important component of providing this public good 
of guardianship, reducing the cost of association in general enhances the ability to provide 
this public service.  If households are willing to associate with other neighbors independent 
of any provision of public safety, they will perceive lower costs for forming such 
associations to provide public safety.  To the extent that increasing length of residence 
increases the number of neighbors households know, this greater level of general association 
should ease the provision of informal social control.  Indeed, there is considerable evidence 
that length of residence is positively related to the amount of neighboring or number of 
                                                 
42 To the extent that property taxes are based on housing values, an increase in values in a neighborhood will 
increase a household’s housing costs through this increase in taxes due to the higher value of the home.  
However, this likely would be a small amount relative to the actual home value increase, and therefore likely 
would have minimal deterrent effect on a household’s decision to provide this public good of safety to the 
neighborhood.   
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neighbors known (Adams 1992; Bolan 1997; Campbell and Lee 1992; Connerly and Marans 
1985; Logan and Spitze 1994; Sampson 1988; Sampson 1991).  In addition, multilevel 
studies have found that overall residential stability in the neighborhood increases the number 
of neighbors known above and beyond this individual-level effect (Connerly and Marans 
1985; Logan and Spitze 1994; Sampson 1988; Sampson 1991).43   
Hypothesis A-5:  Areas with greater length of residence will be more willing to engage in 
guardianship behavior and hence have a lower rate of crime.   
In addition, past research has suggested that the amount of social distance between 
households reduces the possibility of association in general, and therefore should reduce the 
number of network ties and provision of social control.  While social distance can be 
measured along a number of social dimensions, research in the twentieth century has often 
focused exclusively on the dimension of racial/ethnic differences; indeed, many “social 
distance” measures are synonymous with racial/ethnic difference (Aldrich et al. 1985; 
Bogardus 1947; Jargowsky 1996; Jones 1991; Payne, York, and Fagan 1974; Rosenbaum 
1992).  A long line of research showing a strong relationship between racial/ethnic 
differences and various outcomes supports this viewpoint.  For instance, empirical evidence 
suggests that the social distance created by ethnic differences decreases the number of 
neighbors individuals know (Connerly and Marans 1985; Rountree and Warner 1999; 
Warner and Rountree 1997), neighborhood satisfaction (Adams 1992; Connerly and Marans 
1985; Harris 2001), and community attachment (Connerly and Marans 1985; Sampson 
1991).  Researchers have also consistently found a positive association between ethnic 
heterogeneity and crime rates in neighborhoods (Bellair 1997; Roncek and Maier 1991; 
                                                 
43 While one study found non-significant effects for neighborhood stability and ethnic heterogeneity on 
neighboring (Adams 1992), it is likely that such lack of findings is due to the crude construction of these 
measures (each were simple dichotomies). 
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Rountree and Warner 1999; Sampson and Groves 1989; Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000; 
Warner and Pierce 1993; Warner and Rountree 1997).44   
Hypothesis A-6:  Areas with less social distance as measured by racial/ethnic heterogeneity 
will be more willing to engage in guardianship behavior and hence have a lower rate of 
crime.   
 
Summary 
In times of neighborhood stress, households can choose different possible responses 
based on the principles of exercising “voice” or “exit” (Hirschman 1970; Lyons and Lowery 
1986).  Thus, when a neighborhood begins experiencing more crime households confront the 
following choices:  1) move away; 2) turn to informal networks and voluntary organizations 
to address problems; 3) fail to recognize the problem; 4) simply retreat from social life and 
allow the crime rate to rise.  The first choice is “exit,” the second expresses “voice,” the third 
is a form of “loyalty,” while the fourth is “neglect” (Lyons and Lowery 1986).  Note that the 
social disorganization model generally focuses on choices two and four.  The model I 
develop here suggests also considering choice one.  While some working with the social 
disorganization model have also suggested that households may choose to leave a community 
                                                 
44 I focus on these household characteristics since their predicted effect on providing informal social control is 
straightforward.  Other measures are less clear-cut.  For instance, some might argue that those with children or 
greater income would have higher opportunity costs and thus provide less informal social control.  However, a 
counter argument is that those with lower income also have fewer civic skills, and these limited skills actually 
raise their costs (Oliver 1984).  Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that those with higher income and 
education are more likely to participate in most civic activism (Miner and Tolnay 1998; Oliver 2000; Oliver 
1984).  And while the presence of children likely limits the biographical availability to volunteer time, children 
may also increase involvement by increasing parents’ interest in neighborhood safety.  Moving may be less 
desirable for such households given the evidence that mobility is related to poorer school performance of 
children.  Additionally, evidence suggests that presence of children increases the number of neighbors known, 
which should also ease participation.  These offsetting effects leave it an empirical question whether the 
presence of children increases involvement, and studies often find a null effect (Hipp 2003a; Taub et al. 1977; 
Woldoff 2002).   
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in trouble (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974), this then poses the question of what characteristics 
about a neighborhood enable it to discourage households from choosing option one.  I 
explicitly focus on this question here.   
Since the theory developed here suggests possible reciprocal relations between 
household decisions, neighborhood structure, and crime rates, longitudinal data is necessary 
for disentangling these processes illustrated in Figure 3.1.  Employing a double lagged 
model, I can 1) test whether the level of these three structural factors (residential instability, 
ethnic heterogeneity, or poverty) at time one affect the level of crime at time two; and 2) 
simultaneously test whether the level of crime at time one disproportionately affects 
residential mobility decisions at time two that then change these three structural 
characteristics.  This latter model is illustrated in Figure 3.2, and suggests that household 
mobility decisions aggregate up to the structural characteristics of neighborhoods.  Note the 
multilevel nature of this conceptual model:  while crime at one time point has an effect on 
crime at the next time point, residential stability at one time point does not directly affect 
residential stability at the next time point, but rather affects the household’s decision to move 
at the next time point.  These household decisions aggregate up to the neighborhood level of 
residential stability.  This latter model tests 1) whether crime increases residential mobility in 
general, 2) whether minority members are less likely to move, and 3) whether higher income 
households tend to be replaced by lower income ones.   
  
Data and Methods 
I utilized multilevel data for the analyses as I combined household-level data from 
three waves of the special neighborhood subsample of the national American Housing 
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Survey (AHS) with census tract contextual data from several other sources.  This survey has 
been used in other studies to view neighborhood satisfaction, residential mobility decisions 
or housing values (Kiel and Zabel 1997; Lu 1998; Lu 1999a; Lu 1999b; Marullo 1985).  A 
particularly underutilized feature of this survey is the special neighborhood subsample that 
was conducted in 1985, 1989, and 1993, and has the appealing feature that the eleven closest 
households on a block were all interviewed.  While some studies have used this special 
neighborhood sample to model household mobility decisions (Ioannides and Zabel 2002), 
virtually none have used it to create estimates of block-level crime rates.  This data set allows 
me to construct a multilevel model in which households are at level one and the block 
aggregation of household characteristics is at level two.  In addition, through special access 
to data at the Triangle Census Research Data Center I am able to place these blocks in their 
respective census tracts.  Thus, I am able to include measures aggregated to the census tract, 
and can test whether the context of the block or the tract has greater effect in my models 
rather than simply assuming that a particular geographic unit of analysis constitutes the 
‘neighborhood’.45   
Data: Dependent Variables 
Measuring Residential Mobility 
 The AHS sampling strategy follows housing units over time, so measuring residential 
mobility is straightforward.46  I am able to determine whether the people in the household 
                                                 
45 There are too few tracts containing multiple blocks to treat the census tract as an additional level in a 
traditional multilevel framework.   
 
46 I am unable to determine if the unlikely event of all household members dying between waves.  That is, I can 
determine if one household member died and the other remained; if one household member died and the other 
then moved then I consider this a migrating household.  However, I am not able to determine if the household 
contained a single household member who died between waves, necessitating selling the property.  However, 
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moved during the four years between the two waves of the sample.47  I only classify a 
housing unit as undergoing mobility if all members of the household have left between the 
two waves.   
Measuring Crime  
 Ideally, we would like to know the actual amount of crime in a neighborhood.  
However, no perfect measure of this construct exists.  While one common research strategy 
employs official statistics of incidents reported to the police, it is often pointed out that not 
all incidents are reported to the police.  To the extent that such reporting is related to 
constructs of interest in the model, we will not obtain unbiased estimates of the determinants 
of crime.  A second approach uses victimization surveys.  While appealing, this approach is 
limited in that such data also have recall response biases present (Gove, Hughes, and 
Geerken 1985), and the relative rarity of experiencing such events requires extensive samples 
to get reasonable estimates of crime rates in smaller units of analyses such as blocks or 
neighborhoods.  A third approach is to use the assessments of the amount of crime in the 
neighborhood by residents on the block.  While relying on the crime assessment of any single 
respondent would contain an undesirably large amount of measurement error, utilizing the 
reports of a number of residents on the block allows constructing a more accurate measure.  
Such an approach uses the subjective assessments of crime by several AHS respondents on a 
block to construct a latent variable of common perception of crime (for an example of this 
strategy in another context, see Mroz, Bollen, Speizer, and Mancini 1999).  Sampson, 
                                                                                                                                                       
these are likely rare events that will not affect the analyses.  Given that such households tend to be characterized 
by older members, I am able to take this possibility into account by controlling for age of household members.   
 
47 Note that a limitation common to many residential mobility studies is that I do not know whether the 
household migrated away and then returned.  Thus, this measure relatively underestimates overall residential 
mobility.  However, my theoretical interest is only in households that choose to essentially “abandon” the 
neighborhood.  Those who leave and come back within five years are not “abandoning” the neighborhood and 
are also not changing the social structure of the neighborhood, and hence are not of theoretical concern to me.   
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Raudenbush and Earls (1997) adopted a similar approach in their study of perceived crime in 
Chicago.   
The AHS asks respondents a series of three questions about the neighborhood (as 
defined by the respondent):  is crime a problem, is it so much of a problem that it’s a bother, 
and is it such a bother that the respondent wishes to move.  I combine these responses into a 
four point response where the respondent either replies “no” to all questions, replies “yes” to 
one, “yes” to two, or “yes” to all three.  The equation with the latent common perception of 
crime as a predictor is: 
(1)    yik = Λ1ηk + εik 
where yik is the combined four-point response in the AHS regarding the level of crime 
reported by the i-th respondent of M respondents in the k-th block, ηk is the latent variable of 
common perception of crime in the block, Λ1 measures the impact of perceived crime on the 
respondent’s report of crime (since the ordering of respondents in neighborhoods is random, 
these λ’s are constrained equal), and εik is a disturbance term (the variances of the ε’s can 
also be constrained equal).  To handle the ordinal nature of this measure, I created a 
polychoric correlation matrix and estimated the model using maximum likelihood in the 
structural equation modeling software Mplus 3.0.  This assumes that these ordinal measures 
have unobserved continuous measures underlying them that are normally distributed.  Such 
an approach is analogous to simultaneously estimating each individual yik as an ordered 
probit equation.  I can assess the reliability of these individual reports by viewing the R2’s for 
each of these equations.   
 While my measure of subjective crime is conceptually distinct from measures of 
official crime rates, I did test its relationship with official crime reports on selected 
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metropolitan samples of the AHS for which I had official crime data.48  In these models in 
which I used the measure of official crime in a census tract to predict the amount of 
perceived crime in the census tract, I found that this perceived crime is most closely related 
to violent crime.  That is, measures of aggravated assault or a sum of all violent crimes 
consistently explained about 50 percent of the variance in this neighborhood measure of 
perceived crime.  It is notable that such property crimes as burglary and larceny showed very 
little relationship with this latent variable of common perception of crime, reinforcing that it 
is largely capturing the effect of violent crime.   
 Finally, I take into account the possibility of systematic bias in responses to the crime 
question.  That is, certain types of people may answer this question differently.  I account for 
this by allowing several demographic measures to have a direct effect on the amount of crime 
perceived by the respondent.  The model then becomes:   
(2)     yik = ληk + ΓXik + εik 
where the previous model has been augmented by X, a matrix of exogenous predictors with 
values for each individual ik of Ik individuals in block k, and Γ which shows the effect of 
these predictors on the subjective assessment.  This model is also estimated using Mplus 3.0.  
The model is identified since the latent variable component has more than three indicators, 
while the component adding the demographic predictors is exactly identified if the 
parameters are allowed to vary over time points.  I gain additional degrees of freedom by 
constraining these effects over time points since there is no reason to expect them to change, 
and because these additional restrictions showed to decrement in fit.  I find that in my 
sample, net of the latent variable, “common perception of crime,” homeowners, those who 
                                                 
48 The results of this analysis are suppressed, awaiting Census Bureau permission to report results.  The analysis 
was conducted on several metropolitan areas in the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s.   
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are older, and those who have moved into the unit in the last year all perceive less crime in 
the neighborhood.  On the other hand, those with more education and those with greater 
length of residence perceive more crime in the block.  Note that these residents are all 
assessing the level of crime while living on the exact same block, and yet perceiving 
differing levels of crime.49  Taking these perceptual differences into account allows me to 
obtain a more accurate measure of the level of crime in the neighborhood:  failing to do so, I 
might mistakenly attribute a lower level of crime to, for instance, a neighborhood with many 
older households and homeowners when in fact the differences were simply due to 
perceptual differences on the part of the respondents.  These effects are incorporated into my 
full models below.   
 
Data: Independent Variables 
Crime Model 
 My key neighborhood variables are constructed in two manners.  The block-level 
variables are constructed by summing the characteristics of interest of AHS respondents on 
the block, while the tract-level measures are taken from aggregate census data.  I measured 
neighborhood residential instability as the logged average length of residence (reverse coded 
by subtracting from 4).50  To capture the effect of homeownership, I include a measure of the 
proportion homeowners.   
                                                 
49 Note that this could occur for many reasons:  it is possible that some types of people just perceive more 
crime.  It is also possible that some people take into account a larger geographic area when assessing this 
question, and therefore this colors their response.  It is not my interest to adjudicate these reasons here, but 
rather I am simply interested in taking this bias into account in my analyses.   
 
50 I first tested measuring this construct as a latent variable with two indicators:  1) the proportion of residents 
who have moved into the neighborhood during the last four years (since that is the time period between survey 
waves), and 2) the logged average length of residence.  In a model estimating this residential instability latent 
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 Since the social disorganization model suggests that interaction will be reduced when 
individuals differ based on racial/ethnic differences, I used a single measure of ethnic 
heterogeneity to parsimoniously capture this effect.  The ethnic heterogeneity (EH) in a 
neighborhood k is represented by an identity based on a Herfindahl index (Gibbs and Martin 
1962: 670) of four racial/ethnic groupings51, and takes the following form:   
(3)      EHk = ∑
=
−
Jj
jG
1
21  
where G represents the proportion of the population of ethnic group j out of J ethnic groups.   
Subtracting from 1 makes this a measure of heterogeneity.  Alternatively, I could include a 
measure of the percent of each racial/ethnic group and its squared term to capture these 
nonlinear effects:  however, given that I have no theoretical reason to expect that the actual 
proportions of each group matter beyond their relative proportion as captured by the 
Herfindahl index, I adopt this more parsimonious measure.  In this sample of four 
racial/ethnic groups, this variable can range from 0 to .75.   
 Finally, since the social disorganization model suggests that neighborhoods with a 
greater percentage of residents in poverty will have greater levels of crime due to their 
inability to obtain resources from the larger community, I included a measure of the percent 
of the block or tract with income at or below 125% of the federal poverty level.  I calculated 
                                                                                                                                                       
variable at the two time points (and allowing the two time points to covary), I found that the R2 for the logged 
average length of residence variable was essentially 1.  This suggests this variable is a nearly perfect measure of 
this construct, which makes intuitive sense since one would expect residential stability to be some mathematical 
function of the average length of residence in the neighborhood (in this case, the mathematical function is a 
natural log transformation).  Therefore I use it alone in the analysis since models including this latent variable 
had estimation difficulties.   
 
51 These groups are white, African-American, Latino, and other races. 
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this based on household income and the age and number of residents in the household, based 
on federal guidelines for each of the sample years.52   
 I included several additional measures to minimize the possibility of spurious results.  
To capture socio-economic status, I followed past convention in measuring education as the 
percentage in the block or tract with at least a bachelor’s degree.  Since youth are more likely 
to be involved in delinquent activity, I included a measure of the percentage of the population 
between 15 and 29 years of age.  To capture the effect of broken families that might reduce 
oversight capability, I included a measure of the percentage of families that are single parent 
households.53  To capture crowding, I included a measure of the percentage of households 
living in crowded conditions (defined as having more than one person per room).  Finally, I 
included a measure of the proportion of housing units that are occupied.   
Residential mobility Model 
 In the model predicting residential mobility of individual households, I included 
measures at both the household level and the neighborhood level.  I included a number of 
household-level controls that past studies have shown are important for mobility decisions.  
These variables view three key perspectives in predicting mobility decisions.  First is the 
notion that life course dictates decisions to move (McAuley and Nutty 1982; Rossi 1955).  I 
accounted for this by including measures of the age of the household head, the presence of 
                                                 
52 This information was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau website.  For instance, information on poverty 
thresholds for 1985 can be obtained at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh85.html.  
 
53 Similar to the footnote above for the residential instability measure, I tested a latent variable model for broken 
families in the neighborhood with two indicators at each of the two time points:  1) the percentage of families 
that are divorced, and 2) the percentage of families that are single parent households.  While showing good fit, 
in these models the R2 for the percent single parent families variable was essentially 1.  This suggests this 
measure is accurately capturing this construct, which makes intuitive sense theorists have hypothesized that it is 
the lack of parent figures that is important for the construct of broken households (and thus the information 
provided by the percent divorced variable is not necessary).  Therefore I use this observed measure of single 
parent families rather than the latent variable in these analyses.   
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children at various ages (0 to 5, 6 to 12, and 13 to 18), marital status, and persons per room in 
the household (presuming this increases the desire to move).  Second, is the notion that sunk 
costs in a housing unit will affect decisions to move (Rossi 1955).  I accounted for this by 
including measures of length of residence and whether or not the household owns the home.  
Third, while Speare (1974) suggested that dissatisfaction will lead to mobility decisions, 
more recent work argues that one must have the resources to act upon such desires (Landale 
and Guest 1985).  To measure the existence of opportunities, I included measures of 
household income, education level of the head of household, an indicator of whether the 
household is in poverty, and the race of the household (white, African-American, Latino, and 
other).54  
 I also included several neighborhood-level predictors in the residential mobility 
model. Since the presence of nearby vacant units may make a neighborhood less desirable 
and thus increase mobility, I included the percentage of vacant units.  Since the presence of 
over-crowding may also make a neighborhood less desirable, I included the percentage of 
households living in crowded conditions—following convention I measured this as 
households in which the ratio of persons to rooms was greater than one.  The presence of 
homeowners may indicate a degree of stability in the area and hence be desirable, so I 
included the percentage homeowners.  Likewise, the three key predictors of crime:  poverty 
ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability may affect mobility decisions, so I included 
the three measures of these constructs defined above.  Finally, since these blocks are a 
random sample of urban areas in the United States, I take into account the different 
characteristics of the metro area in which the block is located with a measure of percent 
                                                 
54 There are too few Asian-Americans in this AHS sample to perform meaningful analyses.  Therefore, they are 
included in the ‘other’ category.   
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urban in the county.55  I list the summary statistics of the variables used in the analyses in 
Table 3.2.56   
 
Methodology 
 My key focus is on estimating the reciprocal relationship between the crime rate and 
residential mobility decisions.  Given that the relationship between changing crime rates and 
mobility decisions are probably not instantaneous, a lag model is appropriate.  Thus, the 
model specifies that the crime rate at time one causes mobility within the next four years, 
while residential instability, ethnic heterogeneity, and poverty at time one affect the crime 
rate four years later.   
 This implies a model with two equations.  First, there are several determinants of the 
individual household’s decision to leave a neighborhood:  
(4)    yik t+1 = Βηk t + ΓXikt + ΩZkt + εikt 
where I am modeling the probability that the dichotomous measure yik t+1 equals 1 for a 
household choosing to move at the next time point versus not choosing to move,  ηk t is the 
crime rate at time t while the Β matrix contains its effect on the residential mobility decision, 
Xikt is a matrix of individual-level predictors for individual i at time point t whose effect on 
moving is contained in the vector of Γ parameters, and Zkt is a matrix of measures for 
neighborhood k at time point t whose effect on moving is contained in the Ω vector.  To 
                                                 
55 The Census Bureau defines urban areas as a central city and its surrounding urban fringe that together have a 
population of at least 50,000 with a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile (Hadden and 
Leger 1990).   
 
56 Research has also found that the recent occurrence of certain events has a strong impact on mobility 
decisions.  In particular, a recent change in marital status or in employment status affects mobility decisions.  
However, since these events have a fairly quick effect on mobility decisions, I am unable to take these into 
account here due to the length of time between survey waves.   
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handle the dichotomous nature of yik, and the ordinal nature of the crime measure, I created a 
polychoric correlation matrix and simultaneously estimated the full model using maximum 
likelihood in the structural equation modeling software Mplus 3.0.  To take into account the 
clustering of respondents on blocks, I used the Huber-White correction for the standard 
errors.57  I also allowed for autocorrelation between the disturbances of this residential 
mobility equation over time periods.   
 For the second equation, the crime rate in a community is a function of residential 
stability, ethnic heterogeneity, and poverty as well as several other factors:   
(5)    ηk t+1 = Κk + β1Skt + β2EHkt + β3Pkt + ΓXkt + ζkt 
where ηk t+1 is the crime rate in neighborhood k at time point t+1,58 Κk is an intercept term, β1 
is the effect of the residential stability at time t (Skt) on the crime rate, β2 is the effect of 
ethnic heterogeneity at time t (EHkt) on the crime rate, β3 is the effect of poverty (Pkt) at time t 
on the crime rate, Γ is a vector of parameters showing the effects of various measures in the 
Xkt matrix for neighborhood k at time point t, and ζk is a disturbance term for each 
neighborhood.  In this model, β1, β2 and β3 are the crucial tests of the social disorganization 
theory, which predicts that each will have a positive effect on the crime rate in the future.  
Note that this equation is at the level of neighborhoods.  In the full model I allow for 
autocorrelation of these disturbances (ζkt) over time periods.  I also freely estimate the 
correlation between the disturbances of the crime equation (ζkt) and the residential mobility 
                                                 
57 Correcting the standard errors resulted in only minor differences since there is little evidence of clustering for 
this outcome.  For instance, while the intra-class correlation for a model treating the outcome as continuous and 
not including any covariates is .12, this falls to .02 when including the full model specification.   
 
58 In my first sub-sample, this is measured as the crime rate in the tract reported by the local police department.  
In the second sub-sample, this is either the crime rate in the tract or else the crime rate for the entire city.  In the 
third sub-sample, this is the latent variable of perceived crime constructed from AHS respondents.   
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equation (εikt) at the same time point, in case omitted variables from each of these equations 
induce such a correlation.   
 Finally, to determine who is moving into a neighborhood I tested additional models 
on a subsample of the housing units that changed occupants between survey waves.  Observe 
that neighborhood change can occur in two fashions:  1) the household itself can change, or 
2) the household moves out and is replaced by one with different characteristics.59  That is, 
even if a household moves little neighborhood change will occur if one similar on all 
characteristics replaces it.  In such an instance, the only structural change in the 
neighborhood would be the increase in the residential instability measure due to this new 
household.  While the previous residential mobility model explores the characteristics of 
households that choose to leave a neighborhood, these models then ask whether they are 
replaced by households that differ along three key dimensions:  race, poverty status, and 
ownership status.  Change in these characteristics in this second step of the process is 
necessary to effect change in the neighborhood’s structural characteristics.  Thus, in these 
models I am not interested in the effect crime has on households currently living in the 
neighborhood, but rather am interested in the characteristics of households that choose to 
move into the neighborhood.  The outcome is an indicator of the new household’s 
characteristics at the second time point:  for instance, in the model testing for an influx of 
poverty households, the outcome measure is an indicator of whether or not the new residents 
are now in poverty.  This equation is: 
(6)    yik t+1 = βyyik t + Βηk t + βyηηk tyik t + ηk t + ΓXikt + ΩZkt + εikt 
                                                 
59 A separate question would focus on #1: whether the rate of crime affects the change in a household.  In this 
instance, it is possible that higher rates of crime affect whether the household falls into poverty or becomes an 
owner while staying in the same residence.  While interesting, this question is beyond the scope of this research 
project.    
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where all terms are as defined previously, yik t is the characteristic of interest at the current 
time point that has a βy effect on the construct at the next time point, and ηk tyik t is the 
interaction of crime and y at the current time point which has a βyη effect on y at the next time 
point.60  These models were also estimated in Mplus 3.0 using the polychoric correlation 
matrix, and I again accounted for clustering using robust standard errors.   
 
Results of structural equation models 
Neighborhood level model of crime 
 While the full model simultaneously takes into account the reciprocal effects of 
household migration decisions and crime rates, I begin by focusing on the equation with 
neighborhood perceived crime as an outcome.  This equation mirrors past literature in 
focusing on the effects of neighborhood structural characteristics on crime rates.  However, 
an important difference is the dynamic nature of this model:  here I am looking at the 
relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics at one point in time and the level 
of perceived crime four years later, controlling for neighborhood perceived crime at the first 
time point.  Thus, I am using a requirement of temporal precedence for determining causal 
relationships.  Note also that in this model I am taking into account the possible bias of these 
household responses:  though not a primary concern of the analyses, Table 3.3 presents the 
coefficients for the effects of the household’s characteristics on their perception of crime.  
For instance, the positive coefficient for length of residence in this model shows that those 
                                                 
60 Since crime is a latent variable, I accomplish this by adopting the Kenny and Judd (1984) approach of 
creating a new latent variable whose indicators are products of the race of the household and the reported level 
of crime.  That is, for each of the eleven households on the block, I create a new measure that multiplies the 
dichotomous measure of the household’s race by their report of the level of crime.  Each of these eleven 
variables are used as indicators of the latent variable representing this interaction of crime and race.  While this 
approach can create additional non-normality through the interaction of a continuous measure and a 
dichotomous one, I use robust standard errors in making inferences.   
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who have lived longer in their unit perceive more crime than their neighbors when viewing 
the same block.   
 In the equation in model 1 of Table 3.4, there is no evidence that residential stability 
has a positive effect on perceived crime.  Thus, there is no evidence here for hypothesis A-5 
that increased stability in a neighborhood will increase contact among neighbors and thus 
reduce crime.  This is the case regardless of whether residential instability is measured at the 
level of the block or the census tract.  In fact, residential instability when measured at the 
block level actually has a modest, though unexpected, negative relationship with perceived 
crime four years later.  On the other hand, in support of hypothesis A-4, we see that the 
percentage of homeowners on the block has a strong negative effect on the amount of 
neighborhood perceived crime four years later.  A one standard deviation increase in the 
percentage homeowners in a block results in an expected .145 standard deviation decrease in 
perceived neighborhood crime four years later.   
It is informative to note the differing effects of these two measures, especially given 
that researchers commonly employ exploratory factor analysis and create a factor labeled 
“residential stability” that combines the percentage of new households reverse coded and the 
percentage of home owners (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Peterson, Krivo, 
and Harris 2000; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).  
This sample makes clear that such an approach can obscure the unique effects these two 
measures may have on crime.  While past research has shown that home owners and longer 
term residents are more likely to know their neighbors (see, for instance Adams 1992; Logan 
and Spitze 1994; Sampson 1988; Sampson 1991), and thus plausibly should reduce the rate 
of crime through various social control mechanisms, it appears that, consistent with the 
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model I have proposed, the instrumental interests homeownership uniquely engenders may 
be particularly important for fostering an attachment to the local block that results in crime 
reducing activity.61  It is interesting to note that this effect appears to be particularly 
localized, as a model using the percent homeowners in the tract did not show a significant 
effect.  This suggests that this mechanism requires that these owners are geographically close 
enough to watch out for each other.   
In this same model we also see strong evidence that the level of ethnic heterogeneity 
in a neighborhood leads to higher rates of crime four years later.  This is consistent with 
hypothesis A-6 that increased social distance between residents will reduce interaction and 
hence reduce the ability and willingness to engage in crime deterrent behavior.  In contrast 
with the effect of homeownership, which worked at the geographical micro scale of the 
block, ethnic heterogeneity has an even stronger effect on perceived neighborhood crime four 
years later when it is measured at the level of the census tract.  That is, while ethnic 
heterogeneity on the local block apparently affects interaction, increased ethnic heterogeneity 
in the larger surrounding area has an even stronger effect, suggesting that the importance of 
such potential ties is not limited to the local block.  This points out the limitation of research 
measuring ethnic heterogeneity as a linear effect of race (see, for instance Crutchfield 1989; 
Krivo and Peterson 1996; Peterson, Krivo, and Harris 2000; Roncek 1981).  The same 
limitation occurs in research utilizing an exploratory factor strategy and including the 
                                                 
61 On the other hand, it is interesting to note that most of these studies only include one of these measures in 
their models.  And studies that do include both frequently find one or both are insignificant (see, for instance 
Campbell and Lee 1992; Hunter 1975; Woldoff 2002) 
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percentage nonwhite linearly in a factor solution labeled “disadvantage” (see, for instance 
Bellair 2000; Lipton and Gruenewald 2002).62   
Rather than including a factor score of disadvantage, I have included the third major 
construct of the social disorganization model as a single measure of poverty, and I find that 
this parsimonious measure has a strong positive effect on neighborhood perceived crime four 
years later.  Thus, while a long line of literature has shown a positive contemporaneous 
relationship between poverty and crime, we see evidence of temporal precedence in which 
higher levels of poverty lead to higher block-level perceived crime four years later.  This is 
consistent with the social disorganization perspective that such neighborhoods lack the 
resources and the ability to obtain resources from the larger community to combat crime.  It 
is also notable that while the percentage of broken families is often included in factor scores 
of disadvantage, the measure of percent single parent familes is not significant in these 
longitudinal models.63  Additionally, in subsidiary analyses I estimated models in which I 
included a factor score combining measures commonly used in measures of disadvantage:  
the percent in poverty, median income, percent with a bachelor’s degree, percent divorced 
families, and percent single parent families.  The results with this measure were essentially 
identical to those for poverty in Table 3.4, suggesting that the key construct being tapped in 
this factor is poverty whereas the other measures appear to add little important information 
for predicting crime rates.   
  
                                                 
62 While including the percent non-white nonlinearly is a reasonable approximation, it is still preferable to use 
the ethnic heterogeneity measure that I use here since there is reason to suspect that heterogeneity among non-
white groups will have a similar inhibiting effect on interaction and hence crime.   
 
63 This result also highlights the importance of performing longitudinal tests.  In subsidiary analyses I estimated 
the crime equation as a cross-sectional model and found that both poverty and percent divorced were positively 
associated with contemporaneous crime.  The longitudinal analyses highlights that poverty is more important 
for generating long-term effects on crime.   
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Household level model of residential mobility 
 Given the evidence that certain structural characteristics appear to lead to higher 
perceived crime four years later, I next turn to my household level model of residential 
mobility which attempts to explain the generation of these structural characteristics.  I begin 
by asking whether there is evidence in this sample that households indeed prefer to avoid 
neighborhoods with more crime.  The full simultaneous model shows evidence consistent 
with this intuitive notion:  in model 2 of Table 3.4 we see that higher rates of crime increase 
the probability of moving.  For instance, while the overall probability of moving in this 
sample is .388, a one-unit increase in the common perception of crime increases this 
probability to .425, a 9.5 percent increase.     
Note that this effect of crime on mobility is net of several other measures commonly 
associated with mobility decisions.  Consistent with past studies, we see that the household 
measures of homeownership and greater length of residence are associated with reduced 
likelihood of residential mobility, while those in more crowded conditions or with children 
less than school age are more likely to move.  There are also ecological effects present in this 
model:  blocks with a greater number of vacant units or with greater residential mobility in 
the previous time period increase the likelihood of the household moving by the next period.  
Thus, instability has a reinforcing effect upon itself.   
Recall that an implication of this desire to avoid neighborhoods with crime is that an 
increase in the rate of crime should result in a decrease in home values and rents.  I test this 
in subsidiary analysis with a fixed effects model in which I cluster at the block level and 
view the relationship between the change in perceived crime and logged average rent or 
logged average home values over a four-year period.  This model thus takes into account 
unchanging unobserved characteristics of the blocks, and the logged measures allow 
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interpreting the results as elasticities.  In simple models without any additional controls, in 
support of hypothesis A-1 I find that a one unit increase in the common perception of crime 
results in a $12,500 decrease in the value of homes and a $52 decrease in the level of rents.  
These changes are about 13 percent of the mean values of these two outcome measures, and 
are consistent with the intuitive notion that households prefer neighborhoods with less crime, 
and thus the reduced demand for housing units in such neighborhoods will lower the rent 
asked.   
Who moves out? 
Given this evidence that households prefer to avoid neighborhoods with higher rates 
of crime, I next ask whether certain characteristics of households explains who will move 
out.  I first test whether those with fewer economic resources are less likely to migrate from a 
high crime neighborhood by modifying the main model to include an interaction between the 
crime rate and household level of poverty.  Recall that hypothesis HH-1 proposes that those 
with less income or in poverty will be least likely to move out of a high crime neighborhood.  
There was no support for this hypothesis, as the nonsignificant interaction term in model 1 in 
Table 3.5 illustrates that crime has an equally positive effect on mobility decisions for 
households in this sample regardless of their economic resources.   
My household level model also suggests that owners and renters will respond 
differently to crime.  While hypothesis HH-3 suggests that renters are more likely to leave 
the neighborhood if crime decreases, this was not supported in the data.  Including an 
interaction between ownership status and the amount of neighborhood perceived crime in 
model 2 in Table 3.5 showed no significant effects:  ownership status does not differentiate 
households in their desire to leave neighborhoods with higher rates of crime.  To test the 
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asymmetry of this hypothesis, I also estimated models in which I included either 1) an 
indicator of whether or not crime had decreased in the previous period of time, or 2) an 
interaction between this indicator of a decrease in crime and the actual change in crime.  
Neither of these models found any support for this hypothesis (results not shown). 
 I next tested whether nonwhite households have constraints on their mobility 
decisions that inhibit their ability to leave high crime neighborhoods.  It is clear in simple 
cross-sectional t-tests that non-whites live in neighborhoods with greater levels of perceived 
crime:  in support of hypothesis HH-5, in the first two waves of this sample the average level 
of crime reported by whites based on this four-point scale is .46, while Latino and other race 
households report .71 and African-American households report .84.64  But why is this the 
case?  If it is indeed through mobility decisions, there are two possible ways this could occur:  
1) non-whites could be less sensitive than whites in choosing to leave neighborhoods with 
higher rates of crime, or 2) non-whites could be less sensitive than whites in choosing to 
move into neighborhoods with higher rates of crime.  I tested the first possibility by including 
an interaction term between the race of the household and the perceived level of crime in the 
neighborhood.  As seen in models 3 and 4 in Table 3.5, I find no evidence that whites or 
African-Americans respond to crime any differently than others when it comes to mobility 
decisions.  The insignificant interaction effects in these models suggest that all households 
prefer to leave neighborhoods with higher rates of crime.  This suggests that potential 
discrimination is not limiting the ability of minority households to leave high crime 
neighborhoods.   
 
                                                 
64 The differences between whites and all other groups are all significant at p < .01. 
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Who moves in? 
Although I found no evidence that the racial/ethnic composition or the level of 
economic resources of the household affect who is most likely to leave the neighborhood, I 
next asked about the characteristics of those who are moving into the neighborhood.  I tested 
this by estimating a model on the subsample of households that experienced a change in 
residents between the two waves.  As can be seen in model 1 in Table 3.6, while hypothesis 
HH-2 suggested a transition in housing occupants from non-poverty to poverty status would 
be more likely in high crime neighborhoods, the effect in this model is indeed positive, but 
not significant, when controlling for the other effects in this model.  We do see a strong stasis 
effect in which blocks with lower average income and higher levels of poverty increase the 
likelihood that the new household will be in poverty.  Model 2 performs a similar estimation, 
but tests whether the new household will be a homeowner.  This model also shows a strong 
stasis effect where the ownership status of a housing unit tends to remain unchanged when a 
change in residents occurs, and that blocks with a higher proportion of homeowners greatly 
increase the likelihood that the new occupants will be owners.  But whereas crime indeed has 
a negative effect on the likelihood that the new occupants will be owners, the effect is not 
significant in this model.   
On the other hand, we do see evidence that the level of crime plays an important role 
in the racial/ethnic transition of neighborhoods.  Model 3 in Table 3.6 shows that, among the 
subsample of housing units in which a change in residents occurred, the presence of crime 
has a negative effect on the probability of the household being white at the second time point.  
Note that this effect occurs even controlling for the strong stasis effect of white households 
being more likely to move into housing units occupied by a white household and into blocks 
with a higher proportion of white residents.  We see that the likelihood the new household 
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will be white drops considerably as the proportion of various other races in the block 
increases.  For instance, in a unit in which the household was white at the previous time point 
and all the other variables were at their mean values, a ten percentage point increase in 
African-Americans in the block (with a similar reduction in whites) reduces the predicted 
probability that the new household will be white from .78 to .73.  A similar effect is seen as 
the proportion Latino or other races increases.  The effect of the race of the previous 
residents in the unit is even stronger:  if the previous residents were African-American 
instead of white, the predicted probability of the new household being white drops from .78 
to .25.  Despite these strong same-race preferences, this model shows that the presence of 
crime has an independent effect:  a one-unit increase in the common perception of crime 
reduces the predicted probability that the new household will be white, on average, from .78 
to .71.  This reflects the desire, and perhaps ability, of whites to avoid high crime 
neighborhoods.   
But shouldn’t other racial/ethnic groups also prefer to avoid high crime 
neighborhoods?  In an analogous model in which the outcome is an indicator of whether the 
household at time two was African-American I find very different effects, as seen in model 4 
in Table 3.6.  We again see strong racial/ethnic stasis effects in this model:  in a unit in which 
the household was African-American at the previous time point and all the other variables 
were at their mean values, a ten percentage point increase in whites in the block (with a 
similar reduction in African-Americans) reduces the predicted probability that the new 
household will be African-American from .33 to .25.  And if the previous household was 
white instead of African-American the predicted probability that the new household will be 
African-American becomes very slight (.04).  Nonetheless, we again see that crime 
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influences decisions on where to move.  A one-unit increase in neighborhood common 
perception of crime increases the predicted probability that the new household will be 
African-American from .33 to .42 (a 27 percent increase).   
The story is the same for Latinos, the other minority group tested.  While Latinos are 
most likely to move into units and blocks populated by other Latinos, they are also more 
likely to move into neighborhoods with a higher common perception of crime, as seen in 
model 5 of Table 3.6.  The predicted probability that the new household will be Latino if the 
previous household was Latino and all other variables are at their mean value, is .087, but 
this increases to .119 for a one-unit increase in the common perception of crime (a 37 percent 
increase).  Thus, we see striking evidence here that rather than shunning high crime areas as 
whites do, Latinos and African-Americans are being funneled into neighborhoods that have 
higher rates of perceived crime.  This is consistent with hypothesis HH-6 that neighborhoods 
with greater levels of crime will see an influx of minority group households, even controlling 
for income level.   
 
Conclusion 
I have emphasized here the need to conceive of crime and mobility decisions in a 
dynamic fashion.  My findings suggest that past studies failing to take into account the 
possibility that households can respond to crime in various fashions are failing to capture this 
dynamic process.  Specifically, I proposed a household-level model to explain the mobility 
decisions of households and showed how it is related to the structural characteristics of 
neighborhoods that are hypothesized to cause crime.  I have suggested that utilizing the 
accounting framework of Lyons and Lowry (1986) provides insight into the four choices 
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households face in a neighborhood when confronted by a neighborhood problem such as 
crime.  Households can either exit, or else express voice, loyalty, or neglect (EVLN).  
Understanding when households will respond to crime with each of these expressions is a 
useful avenue for future research.   
The data I have employed here were particularly suited to the tests I wished to 
perform.  By using a longitudinal dataset of blocks nested in tracts, I have been able to avoid 
the problems of cross-sectional studies by imposing a criterion of temporal precedence on 
factors of crime.  This more stringent test is more appropriate, especially given some of the 
reciprocal relationships I have proposed.  In addition, I have been able to relax the 
assumption of a single geographic measure of neighborhoods, and tested the effects of my 
structural characteristics when measured at both the block level and the census tract level.   
While past research in the social disorganization model has suggested that residential 
stability has a causal effect on crime, my theoretical model and my empirical results show 
that this is a more nuanced relationship than previously conceptualized.  Specifically, I 
showed that households are more likely to choose to move out of a neighborhood if it is 
characterized by higher rates of crime.  This has important implications for past studies 
testing a cross-sectional relationship between residential stability and crime:  the results here 
suggest that at least some of this relationship travels from crime to residential stability.  This 
suggests that past studies using cross-sectional neighborhood data finding the expected 
positive relationship between crime and residential instability may have mistakenly attributed 
all of the causal direction from instability to crime (Heitgerd and Robert J. Bursik 1987; 
McNulty and Holloway 2000; Warner and Pierce 1993; Warner and Rountree 1997).  In 
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addition, my more stringent test of the residential stability hypothesis employing longitudinal 
data found no relationship between it and perceived crime four years later.   
These results also highlight that residential stability and homeownership are distinct 
constructs.  While studies frequently combine these two constructs into a single factor 
(Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Peterson, Krivo, and Harris 2000; Sampson and 
Raudenbush 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997), my findings suggest the 
importance of distinguishing between them.  The sunk costs and instrumental interests 
engendered by homeownership likely reduce the willingness to move at the first sign of 
trouble in the neighborhood.  Indeed, my findings echoed those of past research that 
homeowners are less willing to move in general.  In addition, given that the EVLN model 
predicts that homeowners are more likely to respond to neighborhood problems with voice—
indeed, other evidence suggests that homeowners are more willing to join neighborhood 
associations when a neighborhood experiences problems such as crime (Gerson, Stueve, and 
Fischer 1977; Perkins et al. 1990; Skogan 1989; Taylor 1996)—it is not surprising that I 
found no evidence that homeowners are any more likely than renters to leave a neighborhood 
with higher rates of crime.  This suggests that the instrumental interests of owners may make 
them more willing to engage in crime reducing behavior when confronted with problems 
rather than moving at the first sign of difficulty.  Consistent with this, I found that the 
presence of homeowners on a block has a particularly strong inhibiting effect on perceived 
crime four years later.   
It is interesting to note that the relationship I found between the presence of 
homeowners at one point in time and perceived crime four years later was a particularly 
localized one as it worked most strongly at the level of the block.  This is consistent with the 
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notion that these households are willing to provide watchful eyes on the street for their fellow 
neighbors.  It is also interesting to speculate to what degree this ties in with the larger social 
movement literature:  Chwe (1999) built a model in which collective action behavior was 
most likely to occur when individuals knew the attitudes of their neighbors and hence how 
they would behave.  That is, one is most likely to provide the public good when one knows 
that one’s neighbor also plans to participate.  To the extent that homeowners are acutely 
aware of the feelings and attitudes of their closest neighbors, this suggests that such a process 
may also be at work here.  This is clearly speculative, but suggests a possible avenue for 
future research.   
I also found that the relationship between race and crime is more nuanced than 
commonly hypothesized.  First, I found evidence that crime can change the racial/ethnic 
composition of a neighborhood.  This does not occur in my sample because whites are any 
more likely to leave a high crime neighborhood than members of other racial/ethnic group, 
but rather because whites are less likely to move into neighborhoods with higher rates of 
crime.  Thus, just as the transition in businesses in racially changing neighborhoods occurs 
not because white owners leave faster but because white owners stop coming in (Aldrich 
1975), it appears that white homeowners don’t leave high crime areas any faster but that 
white homeowners stop entering the neighborhood.  Analogously, I found that Latinos and 
African-Americans are more likely to move into neighborhoods with higher rates of crime.  
These findings are consistent with the notion that these minority groups face more constraints 
in the housing market:  indeed, consistent with this hypothesis I found that whites are more 
likely to move in general than nonwhites, mirroring the findings in older waves of this same 
dataset (South and Deane 1993).  Again, this has important implications for studies viewing 
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the cross-sectional relationship between racial/ethnic composition and crime rates:  if crime 
can cause a change in the racial/ethnic composition, then clearly at least some of this 
relationship runs in a causal direction contra to past theoretical models.  Additionally, I 
showed that past studies testing a linear relationship between racial/ethnic composition and 
crime may have been mis-specified:  I found in this sample that it is more accurate to 
characterize this relationship as one between ethnic heterogeneity at one point in time and 
perceived crime four years later.  These results are consistent with the theoretical model I 
have developed here in which the social distance between racial/ethnic groups limits 
interaction in general, and thus raises the cost of informal and formal organization of crime 
prevention activities.  This effect was particularly robust, regardless of whether I measured 
ethnic heterogeneity at the local block level or at the level of the census tract.  Given the 
nonlinear relationship of race and crime in this study, this also calls into question the strategy 
of including a linear measure of race in a factor labeled disadvantage (see, for instance 
Kubrin and Herting 2003; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Nielsen and Martinez 
2003; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).   
 This paper has illustrated the advantage of theoretically integrating the criminology 
literature, the civic activism literature, and the residential segregation literature on residential 
mobility.  Understanding when households will respond to neighborhood problems either 
through residential mobility decisions or through civic activism aimed at improving the 
neighborhood is crucial.  I have highlighted that the outcome of these decisions are the 
neighborhood structural characteristics criminologists focus on when explaining the 
existence of crime in neighborhoods.  This approach requires an explicitly multilevel and 
dynamic model, and highlights that viewing household decisions divorced from the 
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geographic context in which those decisions are made will provide a limited perspective.  
Perhaps even more importantly, failing to take into account these household decisions in 
response to such ecological conditions blunts our awareness of neighborhood transformation 
and the genesis of the neighborhood structural characteristics that many theoretical models 
take as given.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1.  Theoretical model of households differing by three income levels and 
neighborhoods differing by three levels of crime 
 Low income Average income High income 
High crime A B C 
Average crime D E F 
Low crime G H I 
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Table 3.2.  Summary statistics, American Housing Survey (AHS) national non-rural 
neighbors sub-sample, 1985, 1989, 1993 
Block level measures Mean SD Min Max
Proportion Aged 15-29 0.237 0.153 0 1
Proportion with children 0-12 years old 0.533 0.470 0 1
Proportion new households in last four years 0.483 0.249 0 1
Average length of residence, logged 1.786 0.622 0 3.77
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.167 0.200 0 0.74
Proportion in crowded conditions 0.196 0.207 0 1
Proportion divorced 0.142 0.131 0 0.9
Proportion single parent households 0.059 0.104 0 0.82
Average education level (years) 12.703 2.008 3.89 17.64
Proportion home owners 0.535 0.358 0 1
Proportion below 125% of poverty rate 0.203 0.224 0 1
Proportion vacant units in block 0.074 0.147 0 1
Percent white 0.777 0.332 0 1
Percent African-American 0.130 0.282 0 1
Percent Latino 0.081 0.183 0 1
Percent other race 0.006 0.032 0 0.80
Household-level measures
Moved between waves 0.394 0.489 0 1
Age 48.173 17.204 16 102.6
White 0.659 0.474 0 1
African-American 0.104 0.306 0 1
Latino 0.065 0.246 0 1
Other race 0.004 0.061 0 1
Married 0.448 0.495 0 1
Divorced 0.138 0.345 0 1
Single 0.131 0.337 0 1
Widowed 0.113 0.316 0 1
Children less than 5 years old 0.143 0.351 0 1
Children 6-12 years old 0.156 0.363 0 1
Children 13-18 years old 0.145 0.352 0 1
Education 12.703 3.381 0 18
Income at or below 125% of poverty 0.203 0.402 0 1
Income  (in 10,000's of dollars) 3.045 2.726 -1 40
Owner 0.531 0.496 0 1
Persons per room 0.485 0.289 0.07 5
Length of residence (logged) 1.820 1.163 0 4.52
First year in residence 0.169 0.375 0 1
Female 0.293 0.452 0 1
Perceived crime 0.546 0.915 0 3
Perceived crime, logged 0.305 0.474 0 1.39
N = 7,174 households in 649 blocks
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Table 3.3.  Household-level perception of crime from full structural equation model 
estimating longitudinal cross-lag models of neighborhood crime and household mobility 
using the AHS national non-rural neighbors sample, 1985, 1989, 1993 
Age -0.003 **
-(10.850)
African-American -0.063 **
-(3.630)
Education 0.010 **
(8.310)
Owner -0.025 **
-(2.630)
Length of residence 0.034 **
(7.750)
First year in residence -0.037 **
-(3.160)
Female 0.018 **
(2.750)
R 2 0.25
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail 
test).  N = 7,144 households in 646 blocks.  T-value in parenthesis
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Table 3.4.  Longitudinal structural equation cross-lag models with dual outcomes of 
neighborhood crime and household mobility, using the AHS national non-rural 
neighbors sub-sample, 1985, 1989, 1993 
 
Crime at previous time point 0.7652 ** 0.0954 *
(0.0514) (0.0393)
Residential instability -0.0840 † 0.1760 **
(0.0429) (0.0656)
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.2328 * -0.0036  
(0.1022) (0.1264)
Proportion below 125% of poverty rate 0.3820 ** -0.2132  
(0.1361) (0.1304)
Proportion home owners -0.2206 † 0.0538  
(0.1156) (0.1929)
Proportion in crowded conditions 0.2812  -0.2902  
(0.2555) (0.3173)
Proportion vacant units in block -0.3408 † 0.3712 *
(0.1837) (0.1713)
Proportion Aged 15-29 0.0796  
(0.1353)
Proportion with children 0-12 years old -0.0012  0.1092  
(0.1014) (0.1130)
Single parent female HH's 0.1820  
(0.1735)
Proportion with high education 0.0048  
(0.0192)
(continued)
Common 
perception of 
crime
Moved out of 
unit
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Household-level measures
Age 0.0006  
(0.0012)
African-American -0.2224 *
(0.1019)
Latino -0.1762 *
(0.0791)
Other race -0.7836 **
(0.2254)
Divorced 0.2484 **
(0.0620)
Single 0.1638 **
(0.0593)
Widowed 0.3154 **
(0.0683)
Children less than 5 years old 0.1306 **
(0.0362)
Children 6-12 years old 0.0306  
(0.0365)
Children 13-18 years old 0.0110  
(0.0375)
Education 0.0046  
(0.0088)
Household income 0.0016  
(0.0132)
Owner -0.5086 **
(0.0582)
Persons per room (logged) 0.2936 **
(0.0870)
Length of residence (logged) -0.2076 **
(0.0243)
1985 R 2 0.53 0.23
1989 R 2 0.57 0.23
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  N = 7,144 
households in 646 blocks.  Standard errors in parenthesis
Average model fit over five imputations: chi square = 800.4 on 328 df, RMSEA = 
.014, CFI = .991, TLI = .991, using a weighted least squares with mean and variance 
adjusted estimator
Common 
perception of 
crime
Moved out of 
unit
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Table 3.5.  Structural equation models of the effect of block perceived crime on 
residential mobility out of the housing unit by households of various characteristics, 
AHS national non-rural neighbors sub-sample, 1985, 1989, 1993 
 
Block level measures
Crime at previous time point 0.276 ** 0.297 * 0.281  0.228 *
(2.76) (2.11) (1.45) (2.15)
Poverty household x crime -0.023  
-(0.20)
Owner household x crime 0.087  
(0.48)
White household x crime 0.055  
(0.26)
African-American household x crime 0.222  
(1.01)
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  N = 7,637 households in 721 blocks.  T-value in 
parenthesis.  Maximum likelihood estimation used.
Models include all covariates included in mobility model in Table 3.
Outcome: 
move out of 
unit, white 
household
Outcome: 
move out of 
unit, black 
household
Outcome: 
move out of 
unit, owner 
household
Outcome: 
move out of 
unit, poverty 
household
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Table 3.6.  Structural equation models predicting the characteristics of the new 
household in the housing unit, using the sub-sample of households that underwent 
residential mobility, AHS national non-rural neighbors sub-sample, 1985, 1989, 1993 
 
Block level measures
Crime at previous time point 0.0726  -0.0788  -0.2160 ** 0.2330 ** 0.1796 *
(0.0682) (0.0703) (0.0636) (0.0770) (0.0798)
Proportion new households -0.0754  0.0204  -0.1042  0.2222  -0.0716  
(0.1458) (0.1794) (0.1355) (0.2064) (0.2220)
Average household income -0.1714 **
(0.0326)
Proportion below 125% of poverty rate 0.9920 ** -0.2386  -0.0740  0.2360  -0.2658  
(0.1876) (0.1949) (0.1874) (0.1989) (0.2041)
Proportion vacant units -0.3154  0.3712  0.0894  0.0206  -0.8980 **
(0.2423) (0.2961) (0.2163) (0.2285) (0.3400)
Proportion African-American 0.1670  0.0172  -1.6750 ** -2.7872 **
(0.1311) (0.2142) (0.1807) (0.3605)
Proportion white -2.3008 ** -1.7926 **
(0.1531) (0.2463)
Proportion Latino 0.2228  0.1962  -1.8768 ** -2.6334 **
(0.1737) (0.2269) (0.2440) (0.2923)
Proportion other race 0.0944  0.9062 † -3.2340 ** -5.4858 ** -5.4436 **
(0.4397) (0.5249) (0.6276) (0.5804) (0.8766)
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.0094  -0.4368 † -0.1748  0.3660  1.5304 **
(0.1509) (0.2299) (0.1801) (0.2237) (0.2631)
Proportion home owners 0.0738  1.4746 ** 0.0376  -0.0702  -0.2466  
(0.1261) (0.1507) (0.1285) (0.1984) (0.1623)
Proportion in crowded conditions -0.2136  -0.0410  -0.8028 † -0.5722  -0.1418  
(0.5311) (0.4318) (0.4100) (0.5306) (0.4883)
Proportion with children 0.1858 ** -0.0602  0.0394  -0.0626  -0.0086  
(0.0571) (0.0626) (0.0563) (0.0838) (0.0835)
(continued)
Poverty 
household in 
next wave
Owner 
household in 
next wave
White 
household in 
next wave
Black 
household in 
next wave
Latino 
household in 
next wave
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Household level measures
Age 0.0004  0.0042 * 0.0048 † -0.0042  -0.0060 †
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0031)
African-American 0.0512  -0.2596 † -1.4380 ** -0.4914 **
(0.0855) (0.1510) (0.0907) (0.1543)
White -1.3250 ** -0.4006 **
(0.0851) (0.0861)
Latino 0.0140  -0.0120  -1.0980 ** -1.3496 **
(0.1075) (0.1153) (0.0842) (0.1619)
Other race 0.0472  -0.1872  -0.2408  -0.8180 * -0.0380  
(0.2768) (0.2318) (0.2605) (0.3882) (0.3822)
Divorced 0.0350  -0.0456  0.0192  0.0382  -0.1392  
(0.0674) (0.0770) (0.0661) (0.0819) (0.0952)
Single -0.0332  -0.1472 † 0.0196  0.0164  -0.1280  
(0.0729) (0.0777) (0.0640) (0.0831) (0.0895)
Widowed -0.0872  -0.0932  -0.0380  0.0028  0.0830  
(0.0986) (0.0923) (0.0938) (0.1296) (0.1498)
Presence of children 0-5 years old 0.0382  0.0732  0.0314  0.0704  0.0732  
(0.0400) (0.0525) (0.0472) (0.0630) (0.0635)
Presence of children 6-12 years old 0.1062 ** 0.0768 † 0.0220  0.0780  0.0484  
(0.0370) (0.0455) (0.0443) (0.0602) (0.0524)
Presence of children 13-18 years old 0.0844 † 0.1136 * 0.0586  0.0164  0.0704  
(0.0493) (0.0549) (0.0570) (0.0689) (0.0571)
Education -0.0278 ** 0.0092  0.0138  -0.0080  -0.0232 *
(0.0083) (0.0124) (0.0107) (0.0151) (0.0115)
Household income -0.0566 ** 0.0248 * 0.0002  -0.0070  -0.0156  
(0.0179) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0208) (0.0187)
Income at or below 125% of poverty -0.0858  
(0.0542)
Home owner -0.4090 ** 1.7238 ** 0.0640  -0.0806  0.0522  
(0.0769) (0.0797) (0.0823) (0.1103) (0.0996)
Persons per room (logged) -0.0418  -0.1734  -0.3102 ** -0.2214  -0.0464  
(0.0958) (0.1253) (0.1109) (0.1669) (0.1500)
Length of residence (logged) -0.0298  -0.0510  -0.0886 ** 0.1042 ** 0.0026  
(0.0269) (0.0380) (0.0255) (0.0349) (0.0379)
Black 
household in 
next wave
Latino 
household in 
next wave
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 6,073 households, 743 blocks.  
Maximum likelihood estimation used.
Poverty 
household in 
next wave
Owner 
household in 
next wave
White 
household in 
next wave
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Figure 3.1.  Three time points- crime and mobility cross-lagged model 
crime1 crime3crime2
res stability1 res stability3res stability2
 
 
 
 
 
  134
Figure 3.2.  Three time points- crime and mobility two-level cross-lagged model 
 
 
 
 
crime1
move2_3
crime3crime2
res stability1 res stability3res stability2
move1_2
Notes:
Level 1: household; level 2: neighborhood (i.e., tract, block, etc.)
move: (level 1) whether the respondent moved in the two time points (1/0)
crime: (level 2) measured per capita
res stability:  (level 2) residential stability in the neighborhood. Past research measures either as:
1) average length of residence
2) % who have lived longer than 5 years in the neighborhood
 
 
 
 
 
IV.  Inequality, Race, and Place:  Does the distribution of race and class within 
neighborhoods affect crime rates? 
 
Scholars and the general public both have an acute interest in understanding why 
some neighborhoods have more crime and disorder than others.  A common theme emerging 
from research studying this question is that the composition of households in a neighborhood 
plays an important role.  In particular, theories suggest that two bedrock concepts of 
sociology—race and class—play a particularly important role, both in how they are 
distributed across neighborhoods as well as within neighborhoods.  Most research has 
focused on testing whether the distribution of race and class across neighborhoods affects 
crime rates.  Specifically, studies have tested how the distribution of economic resources 
across neighborhoods, as measured by income or poverty, or the distribution of racial/ethnic 
minority members across neighborhoods, as measured by the percent nonwhite, etc., affects 
neighborhood crime rates.  Research has paid less attention to whether the distribution of 
racial/ethnic groups within neighborhoods affects crime, and almost completely neglected the 
question of whether the distribution of economic resources in neighborhoods affects crime.   
Considering the distribution of race and class within neighborhoods suggests focusing 
on the racial/ethnic heterogeneity and the income inequality of neighborhoods, and how they 
affect the amount of crime.  The lack of neighborhood-level research on this topic is 
surprising given that there is no shortage of theoretical reasons why we should expect such a 
relationship.  At least six key theories propose various relationships between ethnic 
heterogeneity or inequality and crime:  relative deprivation theory, social disorganization 
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theory, social distance theory, consolidated inequality theory, group threat theory, and 
routine activities theory.  Despite this plethora of theories, there are few empirical tests of 
them using neighborhood-level data.  In part, this is due to the difficulty of obtaining such 
data.   
As a result, the wave of research testing the importance of inequality and its 
interaction with racial/ethnic composition in the 1980’s and early 1990’s used data 
aggregated to units much larger than neighborhoods:  generally, SMSA’s, counties, or large 
cities (often greater than 100,000 population).  While some found the expected positive 
relationship between inequality and crime (Balkwell 1990; Harer and Steffensmeier 1992; 
Kovandzic, Vieratis, and Yeisley 1998; Ousey 1999), others only found it for certain crime 
types or units of analysis (Blau and Blau 1982; Land, McCall, and Cohen 1990; Simpson 
1985), while yet others found no significant relationship (Chamlin and Cochran 1997; 
Kposowa, Breault, and Harrison 1995).  Likewise, studies testing for possible interaction 
effects between ethnic heterogeneity and inequality using large units of analysis have had 
mixed results, with some suggesting that inequality between races increases crime rates (Blau 
and Blau 1982; Blau and Golden 1986; Golden and Messner 1987), others did not find any 
effects Simpson, 1985 #5029.  An alternative strategy proposed for the problem was to focus 
on race-disaggregated crime types—though still using large units of analysis—and studies 
adopting this approach found that inequality within race was a stronger predictor of crime 
types (Harer and Steffensmeier 1992; Shihadeh and Ousey 1996).  However, given that the 
mechanisms explaining the relationship between race and class distributions and crime rates 
require interaction among residents, measuring the distribution of race and class for such a 
large unit of analysis does not capture the construct of interest.  For instance, two cities with 
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equal amounts of ethnic heterogeneity can have neighborhoods that look considerably 
different depending on the distribution of the population in the community:  the community 
with a high degree of ethnic segregation will have neighborhoods that are very homogeneous 
with one racial/ethnic group dominating (and thus the ethnic heterogeneity occurs across 
neighborhoods), while the community with minimal segregation will have a high degree of 
ethnic heterogeneity within the neighborhoods (and little difference in ethnic heterogeneity 
across neighborhoods).65  I therefore suggest that a more appropriate solution to the problem 
is to use smaller units of analysis more closely approximating neighborhoods to test these 
theories.   
While the lack of empirical tests of these theories using neighborhood-level data is in 
part due to the difficulty of collecting neighborhood-level crime data, testing these theories 
present additional challenges: 1) some of these theories make similar predictions about 
expected empirical relationships (e.g., both social distance and relative deprivation theory 
expect to see a positive relationship between general inequality and crime rates), and 2) some 
also make predictions regarding interactions of ethnic heterogeneity and inequality (e.g., 
consolidated inequality predicts that inequality across racial/ethnic groups will increase 
crime, while relative deprivation predicts that inequality within racial/ethnic groups will 
increase crime).  Regarding the first challenge, a study testing one of these theories and 
finding the expected relationship would not be able to discern whether the theory of choice 
                                                 
65 An additional issue for studies measuring these structural characteristics at the level of larger communities is 
the high degree of collinearity between many of measures induced by such aggregation, making estimation of 
their separately effects difficult (Land, McCall, and Cohen 1990).  Despite the conceptual need to tease apart 
the effects of these different constructs, it is simply not statistically feasible at such high levels of aggregation 
(Land, McCall, and Cohen 1990).  For instance, it is difficult to parse out the affects of black inequality and 
poverty rates due to their high correlation rate in samples of highly aggregated units:  a study of SMSA’s in 
1980 found a .80 correlation (Harer and Steffensmeier 1992).   
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truly explained the relationship, or whether another was responsible.  This points out a need 
to either explicitly test the mechanisms, or to simultaneously consider various theories.   
Regarding the second challenge, given the conceptual and statistical interdependence 
between ethnic heterogeneity, general inequality, inequality within racial/ethnic groups, and 
inequality across racial/ethnic groups, testing only one of these relationships without taking 
into account the others raises the possibility of obtaining spurious results.  For instance, I am 
aware of only two studies that have tested the relationship between neighborhood inequality 
and crime rates:  one study using 100 Seattle census tracts in 1980 found a positive 
relationship between inequality and murder rates, but failed to find significant relationships 
with violent crime, assault, robbery, or rape (Crutchfield 1989).  A second study using just 26 
New York neighborhoods in 1981 failed to find a significant relationship with homicide 
(Messner and Tardiff 1986).  However, given that neither of these studies simultaneously 
tested the effects of ethnic heterogeneity, the low statistical power of these tests due to 
sample size, and the limited ability to generalize the results due to focusing on just a single 
city at a single point in time leaves this question unanswered.  And while numerous studies 
have tested the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and neighborhood crime rates using 
cross-sectional data (Bellair 1997; Roncek and Maier 1991; Rountree and Warner 1999; 
Sampson and Groves 1989; Warner and Pierce 1993; Warner and Rountree 1997) their 
failure to take into account possible effects of inequality may have produced confounded 
effects.  Importantly, I am aware of no studies that have tested for inequality within 
racial/ethnic groups or inequality across racial/ethnic groups using data for small units of 
analysis.   
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In the next section I first briefly introduce the competing theories being considered 
here.  I then consider for each of the inequality and ethnic heterogeneity constructs how the 
mechanisms proposed by each of these theoretical models sometimes give rise to different 
predictions when using data measured at the neighborhood level.  I follow that by describing 
the data I will use in the tests.  I then present results:  first for cross-sectional models, to 
compare the results to those using a strategy commonly employed when studying 
neighborhood-level crime, then using fixed effects models that take into account the change 
in neighborhoods.  I conclude by summarizing the results and pointing out implications.   
 
Theories of the relationship between inequality, ethnic heterogeneity and crime rates 
I begin by considering the posited mechanisms of inequality and ethnic heterogeneity 
for six key theoretical models.  Table 4.1 lists the theories, showing which constructs they are 
hypothesized to affect, and the geographic level at which they should work.  The relative 
deprivation model, sometimes referred to as reference group theory (Jasso 1980; Merton 
1968), posits that perceived social inequality gives rise to deviant behavior on the part of 
individuals.  That is, individuals compare themselves to others in their “reference group” and 
respond with deviant behavior if they feel they have an inequitable economic share.  The 
social disorganization model refers to the ability of a neighborhood to have common values 
that enable maintaining effective social control (Janowitz 1975; Reiss 1951: 196; Sampson 
and Groves 1989: 777).  In this model, social networks, voluntary organizations, and 
institutions within a community help maintain the social order (Sampson and Groves 1989; 
Shaw and McKay 1942).  Third, the social distance model (Blau 1977; Blau 1987; 
McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Simmel 1955) 
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focuses on explaining social interactions among individuals.  In this model, the social 
statuses individuals have create social distance between individuals that then affects 
interactions.  Thus, it focuses on explaining who interacts, whereas the social disorganization 
model focuses on the consequences of those interactions for neighborhood crime rates.   
 
 
Table 4.1.   
 Geographic level of hypothesized construct 
Theory General inequality 
Ethnic 
heterogeneity 
Inequality 
between 
races 
Inequality 
within race 
Relative Deprivation Unspecified   Unspecified 
Social Disorganization Neighborhood Neighborhood   
Social Distance Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood  
Consolidated 
Inequality 
  Nearby1  
Group Threat   Nearby1  
Routine Activities Nearby    
1 This only is posited to affect violent crime.   
The fourth model I consider is the consolidated inequality model (Blau and Blau 
1982), which is a variant of the relative deprivation model in which the combination of 
economic inequality and the ascribed status of race gives rise to particularly strong feelings 
of injustice and hence a violent deviant response.  Thus, it focuses on inequality across races.  
The group threat model also focuses on inequality across races; however, it posits that when 
the economic differences between two groups narrow members of the dominant group will 
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respond through violent behavior (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996).  Finally, the 
routine activities theory posits that a combination of potential targets, motivated offenders 
and the absence of guardians combine to increase the amount of crime in a neighborhood 
(Cohen and Felson 1979).  Thus, inequality will increase potential targets and motivated 
offenders, leading to higher rates of crime.  In summary, we see the considerable overlap in 
the predictions of these theories provide a challenge for disentangling these processes.  I next 
explore in detail the posited mechanisms for each of the measures of inequality or 
heterogeneity.   
Relative Inequality  
Several of the theoretical models considered here posit that income inequality in the 
larger community will increase the rate of crime.  However, they differ in how this inequality 
might affect crime when viewing smaller neighborhoods within the larger community.  For 
instance, the social distance model (Blau 1977; Blau 1987) suggests that inequality reduces 
the amount of contact among neighbors, which should lead to more crime if this inhibits the 
ability of the neighborhood to respond in a collective fashion to crime and disorder.  This 
suggests that the mechanism of inequality works at the geographic level of neighborhoods.   
While the social disorganization model posits that anything reducing relations 
between neighbors will increase the crime rate, studies have rarely considered the effect of 
relative inequality.  While the model suggests three key structural characteristics of 
neighborhoods lead to more crime—ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability, and 
poverty—only the first two are posited to affect crime by reducing interaction.  The social 
disorganization model argues that areas with high rates of poverty will have higher crime 
rates due to their inability to obtain resources from the city to combat crime (Shaw and 
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McKay 1942; Taylor 1996).  However, high poverty in a neighborhood implies less social 
distance (in the extreme case, everyone has equally few economic resources).  Nonetheless, if 
the social distance model is correct in assuming that inequality will reduce interaction, the 
social disorganization model would conclude this should increase crime.  The fact that the 
social disorganization model implies that both poverty and inequality will increase crime 
rates may explain why the few studies in the social disorganization literature that measure 
inequality generally collapse it into an index of “general economic distress” along with other 
measures including poverty.  Nonetheless, since these two measures posit different 
mechanisms for increasing crime, an appropriate approach would test whether they indeed 
both increase crime rates.  Thus, although the social disorganization model is ambivalent on 
the possible effects of inequality, if they do exist they will work at the geographic level of the 
neighborhood.   
The relative deprivation model (or reference group model) (Jasso 1980; Merton 1968) 
posits that individuals compare their economic position with others, and those feeling 
deprived will respond by committing crimes.  While the notion of distributive justice dates 
back at least to Aristotle (1946), Hyman (1942) first coined 'reference group' theory (Merton 
1968: 329-30).  In the relative deprivation model, individuals compare themselves with 
others similar to themselves socially when making these comparisons (Davis 1963).66  Note 
that a challenge to the relative deprivation literature in general is determining what 
constitutes an appropriate reference group.  In the context of this study, the appropriate 
reference group may be co-residents of one’s neighborhood given that some work suggests 
that reference groups are limited to those one comes into contact with (Alwin 1987; 
                                                 
66 A variant of this model is a dynamic one proposed by Kovandzic, et al (1998) in which inequality has a 
stronger effect at times when it spikes upward, as the differences become more salient.  I do not test this more 
elaborate theory here given the limited time frame of my data.   
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Crutchfield 1989; Homans 1974).  This implies crime rates will be higher in neighborhoods 
with more inequality (similar to the social distance and social disorganization models).  On 
the other hand, it is possible that members of the larger community serve as the reference 
group:  if the media is important for creating a reference group for viewing inequality, then 
relative inequality at the community level will be most appropriate.67  This implies that 
communities with greater amounts of inequality will have higher crime rates in 
neighborhoods containing larger numbers of low-income households.68  This criminal 
response might either be through property crimes aimed at “equalizing” the perceived 
injustice, or through violent crimes enacted through frustration.    
Finally, the routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) suggests that high rates 
of inequality will increase crime rates by providing a large supply of potential offenders (the 
poor) and suitable targets (the wealthy).  The geographical location of inequality in this 
model is intermediate:  while it need not be limited to the local neighborhood, it should be 
within the distance offenders are willing to travel and thus relatively contiguous 
neighborhoods.  Studies have suggested a distance decay function explains how far 
perpetrators will travel (Rengert, Piquero, and Jones 1999), and one study found an average 
distance between 1 and 2.5 miles, depending on the crime type (Pyle 1974).  In summary, all 
four of these theories posit a positive relationship between neighborhood-level inequality and 
neighborhood-level crime rates, suggesting that neighborhood level data is the proper unit of 
analysis.   
                                                 
67 If the media is truly national, then it would be inequality at the nation level that would be most appropriate.  
While this may have an effect on national crime rates, given that it is a constant value for all cities in a nation, it 
cannot help explain variations in crime rates among cities, much less neighborhoods within those cities.   
 
68 Thus hypothesis would require multilevel data of neighborhoods in a large number of cities.  The limited 
number of cities in my sample precludes such a test.   
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Ethnic Heterogeneity 
Analogous to the mechanisms proposed for inequality, the social distance model 
posits that higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity limit the amount of interaction between 
residents, and the social disorganization model posits that the resulting lack of ties will lead 
to higher crime rates (Bellair 1997; Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942; 
Veysey and Messner 1999; Warner and Pierce 1993; Warner and Rountree 1997).  These ties 
also should increase community attachment (Adams 1992; Connerly and Marans 1985; 
Sampson 1988; Sampson 1991), which then increases social control ability (Freudenburg 
1986).  Indeed, numerous cross-sectional studies have found that areas with higher levels of 
ethnic heterogeneity have higher crime rates (Bellair 1997; Dahlback 1998; Krivo and 
Peterson 1996; Miethe, Hughes, and McDowall 1991; Rountree and Warner 1999; Sampson 
1985; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson and Wilson; Skogan 1990; Smith and Jarjoura 
1988; Veysey and Messner 1999; Warner and Rountree 1997).  Thus, the social distance and 
social disorganization models require measuring ethnic heterogeneity at the neighborhood 
level.   
Inequality between racial/ethnic groups  
A further distinguishing characteristic of the theories considered here is that some 
suggest that measuring inequality and ethnic heterogeneity separately is not enough, and that 
the intersection of these two constructs should be considered.  For instance, inequality 
between racial/ethnic groups may affect crime rates.  In the social distance model, the 
“intersecting parameters” of these two social dimensions will increase the social distance 
between members of these groups (Blau 1977; Blau 1987).  Combined with the social 
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disorganization’s view that social interaction helps reduce crime rates, this suggests that it is 
inequality between groups within the neighborhood that will reduce interaction and lead to 
higher rates of crime.  Note that the social disorganization model does not explicitly propose 
such a hypothesis—and studies have thus not tested it—though it naturally follows if this 
social distance affects interaction in the neighborhood.   
Blau and Blau (1982) extended this notion of consolidated inequality in positing that 
an increasing amount of between-group inequality causes minority group members to feel 
disadvantaged.69  This is clearly an extension of the relative deprivation model, as members 
of the minority group view this disadvantage as illegitimate and respond with diffuse forms 
of aggression such as criminal violence given their limited ability for political action (Golden 
and Messner 1987).  Note that this model does not require that the inequality across 
racial/ethnic groups be spatially located in the neighborhood; however, for the response to be 
toward members of the dominant group it does require that such members at least be located 
in spatially contiguous neighborhoods.  An important point to highlight is that the posited 
mechanism will lead to a violent response.  Blau and Blau (1982) suggested not all inequality 
will be perceived as unjust: only when the individual perceives that their lower relative 
standing is due to their ascribed characteristics will they perceive it as unjust and respond 
violently towards those with more.  This leads to an important distinction:  whereas the social 
distance model predicts that inequality across racial/ethnic groups should increase both 
violent and property crime, the consolidated inequality theory predicts only a relationship 
with violent crime.  Studies have failed to test this possible relationship with both violent and 
property crime.   
                                                 
69 Note that this perspective is also frequently used to explain social movement outcomes and the fostering of 
group cohesion within a minority group.   
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On the other hand, the group threat literature (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 
1996; Quillian 1995) posits that it is only as inequality across ethnic groups diminishes that 
the crime rate increases.   The dominant group perceives the narrowing of the economic gap 
between the two groups as threatening, provoking a violent response.  Note that this dynamic 
model also only pertains to violent crime.  As well, this suggests a longitudinal model where 
it is the change in income level of the disadvantaged group that will be perceived as 
threatening.  This requires longitudinal data to test properly.  While this model does not 
necessarily imply that these economically improving minority members live in the same 
neighborhood as members of the dominant ethnic group, they clearly need to have at least a 
degree of spatial contiguity to allow for this hypothesized violent response.  That is, members 
of a dominant group may not be aware or concerned about minority group members in 
distant neighborhoods with similar levels of income; however, an increasing number of 
minority members nearby at a similar level of income will be perceived as threatening.   
Despite the necessity of groups’ geographical contiguity for spawning criminal 
responses to inequality across racial/ethnic groups, the numerous studies testing this 
relationship in the 1980’s used large units of analysis.  The classic study was the Blau and 
Blau (1982) study of the 125 largest SMSAs in 1970 with over 125,000 population, finding 
that SES inequality across race significantly increased the murder, robbery, and assault rates, 
while income inequality increased the murder and assault rates.  A later study showed that 
this relationship did not exist when measuring income racial inequality, and the effect for 
SES racial inequality disappeared when including a measure of the poverty rate (Golden and 
Messner 1987).  Balkwell’s (1990) solution was to construct a racial inequality measure that 
took into account the relative size of the groups by utilizing an inequality measure of Jasso 
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(1980).  While his study of 150 SMSA’s in 1980 found a strong effect with this measure 
(Balkwell 1990), it is notable that he failed to include a measure of ethnic heterogeneity.  
Given that his measure is implicitly an interaction between ethnic heterogeneity and 
inequality, this raises the possibility that his findings simply captured an ethnic heterogeneity 
effect.   
Inequality within Racial/ethnic groups 
While the relative deprivation theory posits a positive relationship between general 
inequality and crime rates, it is distinguished from the other theories here in that it also posits 
that inequality within a racial/ethnic group should increase rates of crime.  That is, a key 
perspective of the reference group literature is that individuals will only compare themselves 
with others to whom they feel similar (Merton 1968: 296).  Defining the appropriate 
reference group is a thorny issue for this literature.  While residents may compare themselves 
with all other members of their neighborhood, it is certainly plausible that individuals are 
more likely to compare themselves with others of their own racial/ethnic group when 
determining the appropriateness of their economic rewards.  This implies that large income 
disparities within a racial/ethnic group will increase the crime rate.  Note also that this does 
not imply any particular spatial location to this inequality within the ethnic group:  in one 
possible conceptualization, individuals will use other members of their group anywhere 
throughout the larger community as evidence of their own deprivation, leading to a criminal 
response.  In this instance, communities with greater amounts of inequality within race will 
have higher crime rates in neighborhoods containing larger numbers of members of that 
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group at the low end of the economic scale.70  In another possible conceptualization, if 
individuals are more likely to compare themselves to others who are similar to themselves 
and with whom they come into frequent contact (Lau 1989), inequality within an ethnicity 
within the neighborhood will increase the crime rate.   
Studies have failed to test this proposition using neighborhood level data, instead 
using larger units of analysis.  A study using national level data in the United States from 
1957-1990 found that while between-race inequality had no relationship with crime rates, 
within-race inequality was associated with increasing crime rates (LaFree and Drass 1996).  
A study using SMSA data for 1980 found that inequality within race affects white rates of 
violence, but generally has no effect for African-American crime rates (Harer and 
Steffensmeier 1992).  Finally, a study of 136 cities in 1980 only found that within race 
inequality increased black larceny and black motor vehicle theft for African-Americans, but 
had no effect for other crime types (Shihadeh and Ousey 1996).  Nonetheless, these studies 
failed to test whether it is the neighborhoods with larger numbers of low income members of 
the racial/ethnic group that are disproportionately driving the overall community crime rate, 
nor whether it is inequality within a race in the neighborhood that affects the crime rates.   
Summary 
 To test the proposed mechanisms of the theories outlined here requires data for the 
neighborhoods within communities.  While past neighborhood studies often use data only for 
a single city for such tests, I address this by using data from eleven cities.  Second, I employ 
longitudinal data in a stringent test to determine whether the change in these various 
measures of inequality and ethnic heterogeneity over the decade affect the change in crime 
                                                 
70 Again, this hypothesis requires multilevel data of crime rates in neighborhoods in a large number of cities, 
thus precluding my testing it here.   
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rates in neighborhoods.  Using fixed effects models allows me to control for unobserved, 
unchanging characteristics of the nearly 3,000 tracts in over 4,500 tract decades of my data.  
Finally, studies rarely test these various mechanisms simultaneously; again, I address this 
limitation here.  I am thus able to directly test the effects of the various forms of inequality 
and heterogeneity within neighborhoods on local crime rates.   
 
Data and Methods 
Data for analyses 
This study utilizes crime data for census tracts in eleven cities over a period of time.  
Table 4.2 presents a list of cities and the years of crime data.  An advantage of using census 
tracts is that past studies have frequently used them to proxy for neighborhoods, they contain 
a mean of about 4,300 residents in 2000 (with 95% of the tracts containing between about 
1,400 and 8,000 persons), and they were initially constructed by the Census Bureau to be 
relatively homogeneous neighborhoods (Green and Truesdell 1937; Lander 1954).  However, 
not all of my data is available for tracts.  For instance, some of the crime data is only 
available for police beats, which on occasion may partially overlap more than one census 
tract.  My measures of retail activity are aggregated to zip codes:  zip codes tend to be larger 
in size than census tracts (containing approximately 8,700 residents in 2000, with 95% of the 
zip codes containing between 115 and 36,700 persons), and therefore multiple census tracts 
can be contained within a single zip code.  Additionally, there are instances where census 
tracts lie in more than one zip code.  I describe in the appendix to this chapter how I 
combined these data into common census tract units over time.   
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Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables in the analysis measure the amount of crime in the tracts of 
the study.  I combined various types of crime into measures of violent crime (a sum of 
robbery, aggravated assault, murder) and property crime (a sum of burglary, motor vehicle 
theft, and larceny).  I also estimated models using four key types of crime separately:  
aggravated assault, murder, robbery, and burglary.  These four vary along the dimensions of 
property/violent crime and personal/public (being defined on whether the crime generally 
occurs between people who know each other or generally between strangers).  Aggravated 
assault is a violent crime that generally occurs between strangers; murder is a violent crime 
that often occurs between people who know each other; robbery is a combination of both 
violent and property crime (since it involves the threat of force, and the goal of obtaining 
something of value) that occurs between strangers (Cohen, Felson, and Land 1980); while 
burglary is a property crime that occurs between strangers.  Testing these crime types 
separately provides insight into whether these inequality and ethnic heterogeneity measures 
behave differently for these different forms of crime.  For each of these crime measures I 
calculated the number of crime events that occurred per 100,000 population and natural log 
transformed these variables to reduce the kurtosis and minimize the possibility of outliers.   
Independent Variables: inequality and heterogeneity 
 My key predictor variables are the various measures of inequality and heterogeneity 
discussed above.  These data are available from the census for decennial years:  1970, 1980, 
1990, or 2000.  I constructed a measure of the ethnic heterogeneity in the tract by using a 
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Herfindahl index (Gibbs and Martin 1962: 670) of five racial/ethnic groupings,71 which takes 
the following form:   
(1)      ∑
=
−=
J
j
jGH
1
21  
where G represents the proportion of the population of ethnic group j out of J ethnic groups.   
Subtracting from 1 makes this a measure of heterogeneity.  Thus, in the most heterogeneous 
neighborhood composed equally of five different groups this measure will have a value of 
.80 (1–(.22+.22+.22+.22+.22)=.80), whereas it will take a value of zero in a completely 
homogeneous community (1–(12+02+02+02+02)=0).   
I constructed three types of inequality measures: within-group inequality, between-
group inequality, and overall inequality.  Note that the first two approximately sum to the 
third measure, precluding simultaneously estimating these three effects.72  There are three 
general measures of inequality that have scale invariance and obey the principle of transfers 
(where transferring money from a poorer to a wealthier person always increases inequality): 
the Gini coefficient, the coefficient of variation, and the Theil measure (Allison 1978; 
Bourguignon 1979; Braun 1988).  Allison (1978) notes that these measures display different 
properties:  for instance, the coefficient of variation is best for a flat distribution since 
changes at any point in the distribution have a similar effect on the measure.  Nonetheless, 
research suggests that these measures tend to be highly correlated, and one study found that, 
with the exception of the coefficient of variation, these various measures tended to be equally 
                                                 
71 For most years, these groups are white, African-American, Latino, Asian, and other races.  Since the 1970 
data does not have information on Asians I use just the four groups for that year.   
 
72 These first two measures (inequality within and across groups) will exactly sum to total inequality if one uses 
inequality measures that are completely decomposable.  There is a considerable literature exploring such 
decomposable indices (see, for instance Bourguignon 1979; Ebert 1999; Lambert and Aronson 1993; Mills and 
Zandvakili 1997; Shorrocks 1984).   
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correlated with other socio-economic variables (Braun 1988).  I utilized the Gini coefficient 
here, given the arguments of Yitzhaki (1979) and Pedersen (2004) that the Gini coefficient 
contains the desirable property of capturing relative deprivation when measured on a 
population in which such relative comparison is appropriate.   
I calculated a measure of overall inequality in the census tract based on the Gini 
coefficient, defined as: 
(2)      
n
nix
n
G n
i i
12
12
+
−= ∑
=μ
 
where xi is the household’s value of income, μ is the mean income value, the households are 
arranged in ascending values indexed by i, up to n households in the sample.  Since the data 
is binned (as income is coded into various ranges of values), I take this into account by 
utilizing the Pareto-linear procedure (Aigner and Goldberger 1970; Kakwani and Podder 
1976), which Nielsen and Alderson (1997) adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau strategy 
(for further details of this algorithm, see Nielsen and Alderson 1997).73   
Second, I included a measure of the inequality between racial/ethnic groups.  While 
there are various ways to construct such a measure, they generally entail either calculating 
the difference between, or the ratio of, the income levels of the two groups (Golden and 
Messner 1987).  I first calculated the average family income of each racial/ethnic group, 
logged these values, and then calculated the ratio of: 1) white to African-American logged 
income, and 2) white to Latino logged income.74  Log transforming the average income 
                                                 
73 I use the prln04.exe program provided by Francois Nielsen at the following website:  
http://www.unc.edu/~nielsen/data/data.htm.   
 
74 I use average income rather than median income because of the need to collapse census tracts into common 
units over time.  Whereas it is feasible to proportion the number of members of a racial/ethnic group into two 
tracts and to proportion the total income they earned into two tracts (thus allowing calculating the average 
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before calculating this proportion reduces the possibility of outliers.  Thus, higher values 
indicate tracts in which white income is much higher than that of minority members, thus 
likely increasing perceived injustice.  While Balkwell (1990) argued that a limitation of such 
measures is their inability to take into account the relative sizes of the two racial/ethnic 
groups and created a measure multiplicatively combining the racial composition and relative 
income, I prefer a strategy that includes measures of both ethnic heterogeneity and inequality 
between racial/ethnic groups, as well as a term measuring their interaction.   
Third, I included a measure of within-group inequality.  I constructed this as the 
average inequality measure of the racial/ethnic groups (weighted by the population size of 
each group).  That is, I: 1) calculated the Gini coefficient for family income for each group, 
2) multiplied each of these values by the proportion of the tract comprised by the group, 3) 
summed these values.  Note that while this measure is likely positively correlated with 
overall inequality, they differ in that overall inequality is the composed of both within-group 
and between-group inequality.  Thus, in a tract containing high within-group inequality but 
little between-group inequality, this summed measure will have a higher value than the 
overall Gini coefficient.  In contrast, in a tract with little or no within-group inequality but a 
relatively large amount of between-group inequality the overall Gini will have a higher value 
than will the within-group inequality measure.   
  
Independent variables: Spatial Clustering of Race and Class 
I also included measures of the composition of race and class in these tracts.  Since 
the social disorganization theory posits that neighborhoods with high levels of poverty will 
                                                                                                                                                       
income from these figures), simply using a weighted average of the median income values of the tracts 
collapsing into this new tract to get a new median value is not appropriate (Pastor and Scoggins 2003).   
  154
 
lack the resources to combat crime when it appears in the neighborhood (Shaw and McKay 
1942), and numerous neighborhood studies have tested this effect with cross-sectional data 
(Crutchfield, Glusker, and Bridges 1999; Krivo and Peterson 1996; McClain 1989; Warner 
and Pierce 1993; Warner and Rountree 1997), I measured the economic resources of a 
neighborhood by including: 1) the average family income in the tract, and 2) the percent of 
the population at or below 125% of the poverty rate.  Studies using data for neighborhoods 
have consistently found that the percent African-American in a neighborhood is associated 
with higher rates of violent crime but less so for property crime (Krivo and Peterson 1996; 
McNulty and Holloway 2000; Ouimet 2000), giving rise to a theory of a culture of violence 
positing that African-Americans are more prone to violence.  To capture effects of racial 
composition (beyond the effect of ethnic heterogeneity), I included the percent African-
American, percent Latino, percent Asian, and percent other races (with percent white as the 
reference category).   
Independent variables: additional controls 
Finally, I included several additional measures to minimize the possibility of spurious 
results.  Since homeowners have a greater investment in the neighborhood and hence likely 
engage in more crime-reducing behavior (see the extended argument in Chapter 2), I 
calculated the percentage of tract households who own their residence.  To test the social 
disorganization theory that residential stability increases social interaction and thus reduces 
crime, I included the average length of residence in the tract.  Since broken families are 
posited to reduce crime-inhibiting activities I calculated the proportion of divorced families 
in the tract.  Cross-sectional studies have found evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
abandoned buildings provide opportunities in the residential environment for criminal 
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behavior and hence increase crime (Krivo and Peterson 1996; Roncek 1981; Roncek and 
Maier 1991).  I thus included the percentage of residential units that are occupied.  While 
there are conflicting views whether higher unemployment increases crime by providing more 
potential offenders or decreases it by providing more guardians (since these individuals are at 
home), I test this effect here by including the percent unemployed in the tract.   
Finally since certain types of retail outlets may affect crime rates, I included two 
measures to capture this.  Numerous recent cross-sectional studies have found a positive 
relationship between the crime rate in a neighborhood and the presence of bars and liquor 
stores nearby (Alaniz, Cartmill, and Parker 1998; Gorman, Speer, Gruenewald, and Labouvie 
2001; Gyimah-Brempong 2001; Lipton and Gruenewald 2002; Nielsen and Martinez 2003; 
Ouimet 2000; Peterson, Krivo, and Harris 2000; Roncek and Maier 1991; Smith, Frazee, and 
Davison 2000).  I thus included a measure of the number of employees of bars and liquor 
stores per 10,000 population in the tract.75  I also included a measure of the number of retail 
employees per 10,000 population in the tract, though there are conflicting predictions for the 
effect of this measure.  On the one hand, the presence of retail establishments being 
patronized should increase criminal opportunities; indeed, cross-sectional studies have found 
such an effect (Ouimet 2000; Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000).  On the other hand, 
Klinenberg (2002) argued that the presence of a vibrant retail community may be a proxy for 
the social capital in a neighborhood, and hence we might expect it to reduce the rate of crime.  
                                                 
75 I used the number of employees rather than the number of establishments, since this measure likely provides a 
more accurate depiction of the impact such businesses have on the neighborhood.  That is, it is not the simple 
presence of these establishments that is posited to increase crime, but rather the number of people they attract 
(both patrons, and possible perpetrators).  Since establishments with more business will have a greater number 
of employees, the number of employees thus better captures this effect than a simple count of the number of 
establishments.   
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I am able to test these competing hypotheses here.76  The summary statistics for the variables 
used in the analyses are presented in Table 4.3.  The final column of Table 4.3 shows the 
correlation of the particular measure over the two time points—this shows how much these 
measures change over the decade.  Note that for certain measures—such as the racial/ethnic 
composition of the neighborhood and the percent homeowners—there is very little change 
over time as these correlations are over .95 between time points.  Since the fixed effects 
models only look at change within neighborhoods (rather than across neighborhoods), it is 
difficult to detect effects for measures that show so little change over time.  
 
Methodology 
 While I will begin by presenting cross-sectional models for the final year of data—
2000—to compare the results with those from the extant literature, my main analyses utilized 
fixed effects models to estimate how the change in inequality and heterogeneity in a 
neighborhood affects the change in the neighborhood’s crime rate over time.  The ten-year 
period between censuses is an appropriate time period to test these effects.  A fixed effects 
strategy allows me to take into account unchanging omitted variables with constant effects on 
the crime rate in a neighborhood (Greene 2000; Halaby 2004).  I used a structural equations 
approach utilizing a technique outlined by Allison and Bollen (1997).  In this approach, the 
omitted variables are captured in a latent variable Z.  Thus, in a model with two time points, 
the equations can be written thusly:   
(3)    yk t+1 = β1IEkt+1 + β2EHkt+1 + ΓXkt+1 + Z + ζkt+1 
    yk t = β1IEkt + β2EHkt + ΓXkt + Z + ζkt 
                                                 
76 Since both of these measures are taken from the U.S. economic census, which reports data based on zip 
codes, I needed to collapse this zip code information into census tracts.   The process used is described in the 
appendix.    
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where yk and yk t+1 measure the crime rate in neighborhood k at time points t and t+1 
respectively, β1 is the effect of inequality (IEk) at each time point on the crime rate, β2 is the 
effect of ethnic heterogeneity (EHk) at each time point on the crime rate, Γ is a vector of 
parameters showing the effects of various measures in the Xkt matrix for neighborhood k at 
each time point, the effect of the latent variable Z is constrained to unity at each time point, 
and the ζk‘s are disturbance terms for each tract at each time point.  To account for the 
possibility that this model operates differently over these cities and time points, I estimated a 
multiple-groups model in which the model is estimated separately for each city decade and 
tested the appropriateness of constraining the coefficients equal over cities and decades.  I 
describe the results of this test down below.   
Spatial effects 
 While studies using neighborhood data generally need to be concerned with spatial 
effects (that is, a systematic relationship between neighborhoods located more closely to each 
other), a fortunate byproduct of using a fixed effects model is that the spatial effects present 
when viewing these neighborhoods in a cross-sectional analysis largely disappear when 
“differencing out” the neighborhoods over time.  Consider a modified version of the fixed 
effects model presented above now altered to consider possible spatial effects.  We can 
conceptualize four types of variables in this model:   
(4)    yk t+1 = Γ1Zkt+1 + Γ2Xkt+1 + Γ3W(ZQkt+1) + Γ4W(Qkt+1) + ζkt+1 
    yk t = Γ1Zkt + Γ2Xkt + Γ3W(ZQkt) + Γ4W(Qkt) + ζkt 
where Z are unchanging variables within the neighborhood of interest, X are the time-varying 
variables of interest within the neighborhood, ZQ are unchanging spatial variables that affect 
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the neighborhood of interest from nearby neighborhoods (as determined by the weight matrix 
W), and Q are changing spatial variables that affect the focal neighborhood.  As is well-
known, assuming that Γ1 is equal at both time points results in the unchanging Z variables 
dropping out of the equation when subtracting the time t equation from the time t+1 equation.  
However, an additional benefit of this model is that if Γ3 are equal over both time points, the 
unchanging spatial effects (ZQ) will also drop out of the equation.  Thus, the only spatial 
effects of concern are changing ones (Q).  While some changing spatial effects may have an 
effect on the focal neighborhood (e.g., rising crime rates in an adjacent neighborhood may 
cause a rise in crime rates in the focal neighborhood), the limited number of such possible 
effects likely explains why I found few spatial effects in my fixed effects model (see the 
technical appendix for a complete description of the tests performed and the results).  Thus, 
while the cross-sectional models I estimated showed considerable spatial effects—and I thus 
estimated the models taking this spatial lag effect into account using a two-stage least squares 
estimator—the fixed effects models showed no such problem, and I therefore estimated them 
with a maximum likelihood approach assuming independence of the errors for 
neighborhoods within a particular city.   
Assessing the Fit of the Model 
Since these models are estimated within the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
framework, I am able to assess the quality of their overall fit.  I accomplish this by 
comparing the initial covariance matrix with the model implied covariance matrix and 
assessing the degree of difference.  Thus, the hypothesis is that H0:   =  (θ), where   refers 
to the population covariance matrix and  (θ) represents the covariance matrix as a function 
of the parameters in θ (for a more complete discussion, see Bollen 1989).  Since I have a 
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sample rather than the actual population, I use S and )(
∧
∑ θ to test these hypotheses, where S is 
the sample covariance matrix and )(
∧
∑ θ represents the sample covariance matrix as a function 
of the parameters in θ.  While the test of the equality of the two covariance matrices (  = 
 (θ)) can be performed for each model, a large sample size makes it likely that there will be 
considerable power to detect even trivial differences in the model implied and sample 
covariance matrices (Bollen 1989: 268).  Therefore, in addition to the chi square test, it is 
useful to employ several other omnibus fit indices that measure the closeness of these two 
covariance matrices (Bollen and Long 1993).   
  
Results of cross-sectional and longitudinal models 
Cross-sectional models 
I first present results from cross-sectional models:  I estimated these models on the 
cities with crime data in 2000.77  While these results do not exploit the longitudinal nature of 
my data, I present them to provide a comparison with the common approach of using tracts 
from a single city at a single point in time—my sample of several cities provides a more 
powerful test than such single-city studies.  I begin by viewing the results of the baseline 
models (not including the measures of inequality) for property crime and violent crime.  
Table 4.4 presents the results for these models estimated both as OLS models ignoring the 
spatial effects, and then with two-stage least squares estimation taking these spatial effects 
into account.  The results for the economic and racial/ethnic composition of the 
neighborhood are generally consistent with past studies viewing cross-sectional effects of 
                                                 
77 I also estimated cross-sectional models using the data for the other years (1970, 1980, 1990) and found the 
results to be substantively similar.  Since the cross-sectional models are not the main focus of my analysis, I do 
not present the results of these additional models here.   
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neighborhoods.  Tracts with a higher proportion of residents in poverty have higher rates of 
both violent and property crime.  But while neighborhoods with higher levels of income are 
associated with higher levels of property crime in the OLS models, this effect disappears in 
the 2sls models correcting for spatial effects; indeed, income is negatively associated with 
violent crime in the 2sls models.  The results for the racial/ethnic composition and 
distribution are generally as expected:  consistent with past research, neighborhoods with a 
higher percent African-Americans have higher rates of violent crime (controlling for the 
other factors in the model).  Likewise, neighborhoods with a higher percentage of Latinos 
have higher rates of violent and property crime.  While there is a modest positive relationship 
between neighborhoods with more Asians and violent crime in the OLS model, this effect 
loses significance in the model taking into account spatial effects, and will change even more 
in the fixed effects results presented shortly.  Finally, consistent with the social distance 
model, we see that neighborhoods with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity have higher 
levels of both violent and property crime, even controlling for the racial composition of the 
neighborhood and these other predictors of neighborhood crime.   
The control variables generally work as expected.  Neighborhoods with a higher 
proportion of occupied units or a higher proportion of homeowners have lower rates of 
violent and property crime.  Consistent with past research, neighborhoods with more bars and 
liquor stores have higher rates of violent and property crime.  There is also evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that retail shops will increase the rate of crime in 
neighborhoods by increasing criminal opportunities.  However, a surprising finding is that 
neighborhoods with higher residential stability actually have higher rates of crime, 
inconsistent with the social disorganization view that such neighborhoods will have less 
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crime.  While there is a bivariate negative relationship between residential stability and crime 
rates, this disappears when including any of these other covariates.  This suggests a spurious 
relationship where the correlation between residential stability and both the outcome and 
some of these other measures induces this bivariate relationship.  Finally, we see minimal 
effects for neighborhoods with more broken families, suggesting that this characteristic does 
not add explanatory power beyond that of the other characteristics of the neighborhood 
included in the model.   
I next explored the question of whether neighborhoods characterized by higher rates 
of inequality—either total, within racial/ethnic groups, or between racial/ethnic groups—
have higher rates of violent or property crime.  The key finding from these cross-sectional 
models is that inequality within racial/ethnic groups is important for explaining the existence 
of higher rates of violent or property crime, even controlling for these other important 
predictors of neighborhood crime rates.  It is instructive to view model 1 of Table 4.5, which 
has added overall inequality in the neighborhood to the previous baseline models presented 
in Table 4.4.  Based on this model, one would conclude that overall inequality helps explain 
which neighborhoods will have higher rates of violent crime, even controlling for the 
economic resources of neighborhoods and their racial/ethnic composition and distribution.  
However, model 2 substitutes the measure of inequality within racial/ethnic groups for this 
overall measure of inequality and comes to a similar conclusion:  neighborhoods with higher 
rates of inequality within racial/ethnic groups have higher rates of violent crime.  To clarify 
these conflicting findings, in model 5 I included both of these measures simultaneously, and 
the conclusion for this sample is clear:  while inequality within racial/ethnic is associated 
  162
 
with greater violent crime in tracts, overall inequality shows no effect in this model (and 
actually is slightly negative).78   
These cross-sectional models show little effect for inequality across racial/ethnic 
groups.  The only effect is a negative interaction between black/white inequality and ethnic 
heterogeneity.  This finding is inconsistent with the suggestion of Balkwell (1990) that 
inequality across racial/ethnic groups will be particularly salient when a considerable number 
of these individuals are in close proximity to one another.  It is worth noting how modest 
these findings are for inequality across racial/ethnic groups, in that a different story will 
emerge when we turn to the longitudinal analyses.  Note also that the effects of racial 
composition and distribution remain relatively constant in these models including various 
types of inequality.  Thus, the social distance created by ethnic heterogeneity is consistently 
related to neighborhoods with higher rates of violent crime.    
The cross-sectional models for property crime tell a similar story as those for violent 
crime, as seen in Table 4.6.  Once again, while overall inequality plays a deceptive role in 
explaining which neighborhoods will have higher rates of property crime—as seen in model 
1—we again see that it is inequality within racial/ethnic groups that is important for 
explaining which neighborhoods will have higher rates of crime.  When both of these 
measures are included in model 5 overall inequality has no effect, becoming somewhat 
negative.  And while higher ethnic heterogeneity again is consistently associated with higher 
crime rates, these models show no effect for inequality across racial/ethnic groups.   
 
                                                 
78 Note that the degree of correlation between these two measures is reflected in the fact that the standard errors 
for these two measures when including them simultaneously in model 5 are more than doubled in size from 
models 1 and 2 when they are included separately.   
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Longitudinal models: tests 
 While these cross-sectional models adopted an estimation strategy common to studies 
of neighborhood crime, my large longitudinal sample provides the advantage of estimating 
longitudinal models.  Given that I am using data over two time periods, I first needed to 
assess whether a random effects model would be appropriate, or whether a fixed effects 
model is necessary.  To test this, I estimated models in which the latent variable Z (from 
equation 3) is constrained to have zero covariance with the predictors in the model:  this is 
identical to a random effects model, and the SEM approach adopted here allows me to use a 
chi-square test of the appropriateness of these constraints (Allison and Bollen 1997).79  I then 
estimated a classic fixed effects model, which is accomplished here by freely covarying the 
latent variable Z with the predictors.80  I found that the fixed effects models showed a much 
better fit than the random effects models.  As can be seen in Table 4.7, while these fixed 
effects models all had significant chi squares—indicating a lack of perfect fit—they all 
showed a very good approximate fit.  For instance, while values of .90 are often given as a 
criterion for satisfactory fit, the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) ranges from .94 to .97 while both 
the comparative fit index (CFI) and the incremental fit index (IFI) are nearly always one.  In 
contrast, the values of the TLI for the random effects models were just .83.  And while root 
mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) values below .05 have been suggested as a 
measure of close fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993), the random effects models are both above 
.08 whereas the fixed effects models all fall below the .05 threshold with the exception of the 
                                                 
79 It is interesting to note that these random effects models yield identical results to seemingly unrelated 
regression models in this setup.   
 
80 As Allison and Bollen (1997) point out, using this SEM technique allows relaxing the assumption that the 
effects of the observed variables are equal at both time points by estimating separate coefficients at each time 
point.  This latter model is exactly identified, and thus is the implicit comparison when assessing the fit of this 
fixed effects model.   
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aggravated assault model.  These results suggest that the fixed effects model does a 
satisfactory job of capturing this process.   
I next needed to assess whether it is appropriate to estimate a single set of coefficients 
for all of the cities in this sample, or whether this model operates differently over these cities 
and time points.  I accomplished this by estimating a multiple-groups model in which the 
model is estimated separately for each city decade.  Doing so allows me to test whether the 
coefficients are the same over the separate cities by first estimating a model in which the 
coefficients are allowed to vary over cities, and then estimating a model constraining them to 
be equal.  Constraining the coefficients to be equal over cities did not result in a reduction in 
fit as assessed by the approximate fit indices.  For instance, when estimating the initial fixed 
effects model for each of the six crime type outcomes, I found that the RMSEA and the TLI 
were always just as good in the model constraining the coefficients equal over cities and 
decades compared to the models freely estimating these coefficients, and sometimes were 
slightly improved.  While there was some variability in the parameter coefficients over cities, 
the model fit results suggest that the parsimony gained by estimating these fewer coefficients 
outweighs the moderate degree of variability in the estimated coefficients over cities and 
decades.   
Fixed effects models 
I now turn to the fixed effects models.  The results for the initial models not including 
the inequality measures differ from those for the previously presented cross-sectional models.  
Whereas the cross-sectional models showed a positive relationship between poverty and 
crime rates, in Table 4.8 we see few effects.  Increasing poverty is not associated with any 
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change in property or violent crime, controlling for these other measures and the fixed effects 
in the model, and is only positively associated with the specific crime of robbery.81   
 There are also some differences for the racial/ethnic composition and distribution 
measures.  On the one hand, we continue to see strong effects in which areas experiencing an 
increase in African-Americans see an increase in all crime types except for overall property 
crime.  Likewise, areas experiencing an increase in Latinos see an increase in all crime types 
except for aggravated assault.  And areas experiencing an increase in ethnic heterogeneity are 
generally experiencing an increase in all types of crime (significantly so for four of the six 
measures of crime), even controlling for these other important predictors of neighborhood 
crime.  On the other hand, the modest positive effects discovered for Asians in the OLS 
models do not exist here:  areas with an increasing percentage of Asians, if anything, are 
experiencing a decrease in crime.  These effects are strongest for the violent public offenses 
of aggravated assault and robbery, as well as for burglary.    
 The effects for the control variables are generally modest, but a couple of findings are 
worth noting.  First, we see that increasing residential stability is significantly associated with 
increases in violent crime and the individual types of violent crime:  robbery, aggravated 
assault, and murder.  This is particularly strong evidence that residential stability does not 
have the hypothesized reducing effect on crime rates.82  Second, it is notable that whereas the 
cross-sectional models showed that areas with more retail shops or bars and liquor stores had 
                                                 
81 The high R-squares in these models are notable.  In part, these are due to the fixed effects included in the 
model.  These also explain why few spatial effects were found in these models:  there is simply little additional 
variance to be explained, once taking into account these observed predictors as well as the unobserved fixed 
effects for the neighborhoods.   
 
82 To assess whether this may be simply capturing an effect of the “newness” of the neighborhood, I also tested 
a model in which I included the average age of the buildings in the tract.  In models both with and without the 
residential instability measure, the measure of the average age of the buildings actually had a negative effect on 
crime.   Importantly, the effect of the residential instability measure remained unchanged in these subsidiary 
analyses.   
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higher rates of all crime types, these effects largely disappear when controlling for the 
unobserved unchanging characteristics of these neighborhoods.  Thus, we only see evidence 
that an increase in retail shops will lead to an increase in overall property crime and burglary, 
and that an increase in bars/liquor stores will lead to an increase in robberies, murder and 
burglary.  These findings make intuitive sense from a routine activities perspective, as retail 
shops likely provide more opportunities for larcenies—a component of the overall property 
crime measure—and bars/liquor stores provide additional opportunities for robberies and 
murders.   
 I next turn to the theoretically important question of the role of increasing inequality 
and heterogeneity for increasing crime rates.  In these fixed effects models for violent crime 
in Table 4.9, the story now is one where inequality across racial/ethnic groups is most 
important for fostering violent crime.  Whereas there is only modest evidence that increasing 
overall inequality is associated with increasing violent crime (as seen in model 1), tracts 
experiencing an increase in inequality between African-Americans and whites experience an 
increase in violent crime, controlling for these important predictors of neighborhood crime.  
This is consistent both with the consolidated inequality model that inequality across 
racial/ethnic groups will lead to a violent response, and with the social distance model that 
social distance will increase crime through reduced social interaction and hence reduced 
social control.  The effect for Latino/white inequality is also positive, though not significant 
here.  Indeed, this effect for inequality across racial/ethnic groups is a powerful one that 
remains in models 6 and 7 when including the other measures of inequality.  Thus, model 6 
shows that areas with increasing overall inequality, and increasing black/white inequality 
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have increasing levels of violent crime, controlling for these other important predictors of 
crime.   
 In these violent crime models we also see that inequality between racial/ethnic groups 
considerably diminishes the main effect of racial/ethnic heterogeneity.  Thus, it is not simply 
difference in racial/ethnic groups that leads to more violent crime, but an accompanying 
income difference between them.  Nonetheless, model 4 highlights an unexpected negative 
interaction effect between ethnic heterogeneity and black/white inequality.  Probing this 
interaction in Figure 4.1 illustrates that neighborhoods increasing in ethnic heterogeneity 
(one standard deviation above the mean in this Figure) are experiencing increasing violent 
crime rate regardless of how black/white inequality is changing, as seen on the right hand 
side of Figure 4.1.  On the other hand, neighborhoods experiencing increasing ethnic 
homogeneity (the left-hand side of this figure) will experience a particularly low increase in 
violent crime (or even decrease) if it is accompanied by a reduction in black/white inequality.  
But if this increasing homogeneity is accompanied by increasing black/white inequality, the 
negative impact on violent crime is essentially eliminated.   
 The story for property crime is generally similar.  The models in Table 4.10 highlight 
that increasing overall inequality and inequality within racial/ethnic groups is not related to 
increasing levels of property crime.  On the other hand, similar to the model for violent 
crime, model 3 shows that increasing inequality between minority groups and whites leads to 
increasing levels of property crime (significantly so for black/white inequality).  This effect 
remains even when including the other two measures of inequality in models 6 and 7.  It is 
important to highlight that whereas the social distance model predicts such a relationship 
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with property crime, the consolidated inequality theory predicts that this relationship will 
only be observed for violent crime.   
We again see that the main effect of ethnic heterogeneity is largely eliminated when 
taking into account the inequality between racial/ethnic groups.  We also again see a negative 
interaction between ethnic heterogeneity and black/white inequality.  Probing this interaction 
in Figure 4.2 shows a somewhat similar story to that for violent crime:  in tracts with 
increasing racial/ethnic homogeneity, property crime does not decrease if this is accompanied 
by increasing black/white inequality, as seen in the left-hand side of this Figure.  But in areas 
with increasing racial/ethnic heterogeneity, an accompanying decrease in black/white 
inequality in fact leads to a greater increase in property crime, as seen in the right-hand side 
of Figure 4.2.  This counterintuitive finding is not predicted by any of the theories considered 
here. 
 Finally, I estimated similar models for the four individual crime types: aggravated 
assault, robbery, murder, and burglary.  The pattern of results is similar, as seen in Table 
4.11.  For these four crime types, the story is the importance of the social distance created by 
ethnic heterogeneity and the inequality between racial/ethnic groups, particularly black/white 
inequality.  While the effects for Latino/white inequality are generally weaker, and only 
statistically significant for robbery, the results are very robust for increasing black/white 
inequality leading to increasing crime for three of these four crime types.  We also see a 
negative interaction between black/white inequality and ethnic heterogeneity for three of 
these crime types:  while the effect of this interaction for aggravated assault and robbery is 
similar to that of property crime plotted in Figure 4.2, the effect for burglary is slightly 
different.  As can be seen in Figure 4.3, while increasing ethnic heterogeneity has no effect 
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on burglary rates in tracts with simultaneous large increases in black/white inequality, 
increasing ethnic heterogeneity is positively associated with burglary rates in tracts with less 
change in black/white inequality and in tracts with decreasing black/white inequality.     
 
Conclusion 
Race and class are bedrock concepts in sociology, and theories suggest that their 
composition and distribution in neighborhoods will affect crime rates.  Although numerous 
studies have used cross-sectional data to look at the relationship between race and class 
compositions and neighborhood crime rates, almost no studies have tested whether the 
distribution of economic resources within neighborhoods affects the crime rate.  Studies have 
been limited to large units of analysis—such as SMSA’s or large cities—to test the 
relationship between various types of inequality and crime rates.  But given that most 
theoretical mechanisms posit that this inequality should work due to the social interaction 
among residents, this suggests that testing it at the neighborhood-level is most appropriate.  
Thus, this study fills an important lacuna.   
The few studies that have tested the relationship between the distribution of race or 
class in a neighborhood and crime rates are limited to neighborhoods within a single city at a 
single time point.  Such studies have limited generalizability since they focus on 
neighborhoods in a single city.  Additionally, the small sample size of such studies (often less 
than 100) reduces their statistical power:  it is unclear whether a null finding in such a study 
indeed represents the absence of a relationship, or simply a lack of statistical power to detect 
the relationship.  The longitudinal sample I utilized allowed me to view the change in 
neighborhoods over time, and the large sample size allowed me to take into account 
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unobserved, unchanging characteristics of neighborhoods that might otherwise confound my 
results (Halaby 2004).    
Given that at least six different theories propose that income inequality, ethnic 
heterogeneity, or some combination of these, will increase neighborhood crime rates it is 
incumbent upon researchers to simultaneously consider these inter-related constructs in tests.  
Finding a relationship for one type of inequality without testing for another form does not 
provide a strict test of such theories.  For instance, I found here in cross-sectional models that 
overall inequality was positively associated with crime rates when not including other 
measures of inequality in the model.  However, introducing inequality within racial/ethnic 
groups eliminated this positive effect, illustrating the need to simultaneously consider these 
theories.   
So what have we discovered regarding the six theories tested here?  First, we saw 
modest support for the relative deprivation theory.  As is well-known, a key task when 
operationalizing this theory is accurately defining the reference group used by the individual 
in such injustice determinations.  One approach would define the reference group as all other 
members of the neighborhood:  the results here showed modest support for such a 
specification in the fixed effects models.  A second approach would define the reference 
group as consisting of members of the neighborhood of the same racial/ethnic group as the 
individual.  The cross-sectional findings here were consistent with this specification, as 
inequality within the racial/ethnic group was associated with higher rates of violent and 
property crime.  However, these effects were generally not significant in the fixed effects 
models, suggesting caution when interpreting the results from the cross-sectional models.   
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There was also some support for the consolidated inequality theory suggesting that 
increasing inequality across racial/ethnic groups is important for increasing crime rates.  The 
fixed effects models showed that the effect for black/white inequality was particularly robust 
for nearly all types of crime.  However, the effect of Latino/white inequality only showed a 
statistically significant positive effect for robbery.  The consolidated inequality theory 
specifies that this inequality between the dominant group and the minority racial group 
provokes strong feelings of injustice, resulting in a criminal response.  However, an 
important caveat should be noted:  in the original formulation of the consolidated inequality 
model Blau and Blau (1982) suggested that this perceived injustice will lead to a violent 
response and hence an increase in violent crime rates.  Indeed, in their study they tested and 
found such a relationship when using SMSA’s as the unit of analysis.  The findings here 
were similar for the fixed effects models using census tracts as the unit of analysis.  
However, contrary to the predictions of the consolidated inequality model, we also saw that 
increasing black/white inequality led to increasing property crime.  This highlights the need 
to simultaneously test these theoretical models, since observing some relationships (e.g., a 
positive relationship between black/white inequality and violent crime rates) does not 
distinguish between competing explanations for the mechanisms underlying this relationship.   
In particular, the social distance model also predicts that inequality across 
racial/ethnic groups will lead to more violent crime.  However, the scope of the theory is 
broader than the consolidated inequality theory as it makes additional predictions.  First, the 
social distance model predicts that inequality across racial ethnic groups will affect crime not 
because of a perceived injustice, but because it will reduce social interaction that would 
otherwise allow the neighborhood to engage in crime prevention activities.  As a result, the 
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theory predicts that such neighborhoods will also have higher rates of property crime, 
precisely what was observed in this study.  The theory also predicts that the social distance 
created by ethnic heterogeneity will reduce interaction and lead to higher levels of crime.  
Indeed, ethnic heterogeneity generally showed a positive relationship with the various types 
of crime—though in some instances it worked in concert with inequality across racial/ethnic 
groups.  The one prediction that did not fare as well for the social distance model was that 
higher rates of general inequality would increase crime rates.  There was only modest support 
for this hypothesis in the fixed effects models as it was modestly positively associated with 
robbery and violent crime.  Instead, it appeared that racial/ethnic differences are most 
important, and that economic differences across these racial/ethnic differences particularly 
fostered increasing rates of crime.   
While the social disorganization theory is an important mechanism for explaining 
how the social distance model works—as it suggests that these social interactions among 
residents can help foster a watchful environment that will reduce crime—it is important to 
point out that other predictions of the social disorganization model did not fare particularly 
well.  For instance, there was virtually no evidence in this sample that higher residential 
stability leads to lower crime rates, a key prediction of the social disorganization theory.  
Instead, the cross-sectional models showed that when controlling for virtually any other 
predictors, residential stability was associated with higher rates of violent and property crime 
in neighborhoods.  And the fixed effects models also showed this to be a particularly robust 
finding:  neighborhoods that were experiencing increasing levels of instability were 
experiencing essentially no change in property crime and falling levels of the various types of 
violent crime, controlling for these other important predictors of crime.  This is a particularly 
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important failing of a component of the theory that researchers have generally tested with 
cross-sectional data.  Second, while the social disorganization theory predicts that 
neighborhoods with higher levels of poverty will have more crime since the residents will be 
unable to lobby for various forms of support from the city government, the evidence for this 
was not particularly strong.  On the one hand, the cross-sectional models showed that 
neighborhoods higher in poverty were associated with higher levels of violent and property 
crime, given the controls of the model.  On the other hand, the fixed effects models were not 
nearly as consistent:  the only statistically significant effect was that neighborhoods 
experiencing increasing poverty experienced increasing levels of robbery.  However, even 
this effect lost significance when including the measures of inequality between racial/ethnic 
groups.  Thus, the causal mechanism may be different than that specified by the social 
disorganization model.   
There was little support for the other two theories predicting a relationship between 
inequality types and crime rates.  The group threat literature predicted a negative association 
between inequality across races and crime.  That is, the dominant group would perceive a 
diminishing level of inequality across racial/ethnic groups as threatening and respond 
violently.  Instead, it appears that the economic threat to the dominant group is not an 
important dimension to measure, at least when considering the types of general crimes 
considered here.  This finding is consistent with a study viewing the causes of racially 
motivated crime, which also found little effect for economic inequality between races as hate 
crimes were instead related to the influx of other racial groups into the neighborhood—
explained as a defense of territory strategy (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998).  Thus, 
increasing ethnic heterogeneity led to more hate crimes.  This highlights the possibility of 
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different mechanisms explaining the same observed relationship:  while the social distance 
model argues that ethnic heterogeneity will increase crime through reduced interaction, such 
racial/ethnic differences may provoke crime through the violent response of the dominant 
group.  This points out the need for future research to directly test these posited mechanisms.  
Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the positive relationship found here between 
increasing ethnic heterogeneity and increasing burglary and property crime rates are 
consistent with the social distance model’s prediction of reduced social interaction, and 
inconsistent with a group threat model:  the group threat literature does not hypothesize that 
the dominant group would respond to an influx of minority members by committing 
burglaries and other property crimes.   
Finally, there was only modest support for the routine activities theory’s prediction 
that general inequality would increase crime by bringing into close proximity both motivated 
offenders (those with less) and suitable targets (those with more).  There was a modest 
positive association between increasing tract inequality and increasing violent crime and 
robbery rates.  Nonetheless, it is important to point out that this theory is somewhat 
ambivalent on the degree of physical contiguity of such motivated offenders and potential 
targets.  That is, they need not reside in the same neighborhood, as long as they are within the 
typical range traveled by offenders.  One possible avenue of future research would test 
whether the presence of motivated offenders and suitable targets in adjacent neighborhoods is 
important for fostering crime.  A second possible avenue of future research would be to 
simultaneously take into account the possibility that the presence of guardians in 
neighborhoods is altering this proposed relationship (Wilcox, Land, and Hunt 2003).   
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While this study has shown the importance of measuring inequality and ethnic 
heterogeneity within neighborhoods for explaining crime rates, certain limitations should be 
acknowledged.  First, this study has not been able to measure the mechanisms posited by the 
various theories.  In part, I attempted to address this by carefully considering the predictions 
of the various theories and simultaneously measuring them.  Nonetheless, as I have 
highlighted above, there is a clear need for future research to explicitly explore certain of 
these mechanisms.  For instance, the relationship between inequality across racial/ethnic 
groups and crime rates needs to be explored more carefully:  the relationship between violent 
crime and inequality across racial/ethnic groups may be due to either the consolidated 
inequality model causing more perceived injustice, or the social distance model causing less 
social interaction.  On the other hand, the fact that only the social distance model predicted 
the relationship between property crime and inequality across racial/ethnic groups suggests 
that the mechanism suggested by this model is likely at least partially at work in these 
findings.  Second, while using eleven cities in a single study is a large advance over past 
research, it is still the case that the generalizability of the findings requires the assumption 
that these cities are at least fairly representative.  Clearly, studies using additional cities will 
be necessary to assess this.  Third, while there is a need to explore some of these theoretical 
mechanisms using multilevel data, my limited sample of cities precluded this.  For instance, 
as pointed out above, it is possible that the relative deprivation models works such that either 
general inequality or inequality within racial/ethnic groups should be measured at the level of 
the city and that it is only in neighborhoods with high concentrations of such group members 
with low income that we would see elevated rates of crime.  Testing such a hypothesis 
requires multilevel data.   
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Nonetheless, this study has provided an important test of the predictions of these six 
theories regarding possible relationships between inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, and 
neighborhood crime rates.  By using a longitudinal sample, I have been able to move beyond 
simple cross-sectional analyses.  Indeed, I showed how some of the relationships discovered 
in this data set differed whether one adopted the more common cross-sectional approach, or 
the more rigorous fixed effects approach.  By taking into account unobserved, unchanging 
characteristics of neighborhoods, I have provided a more stringent test of what effect 
changing inequality and heterogeneity means for changing neighborhood crime rates.  
Regardless of the theoretical mechanisms present, two robust effects were found:  increasing 
ethnic heterogeneity and increasing inequality between racial/ethnic groups led to increased 
crime.  Ethnic heterogeneity showed a strong positive relationship with all crime types in the 
cross-sectional models, and generally showed a positive effect on crime rates in the fixed 
effects models that was independent of the effect of black/white inequality, or else was 
observed in the absence of black/white inequality.  Thus, this study has shown that not only 
is the composition of race and class in neighborhoods important for explaining crime rates, 
but that the distribution of race and class within neighborhoods also has important effects.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.2.  Cities, years, and crime types in analyses 
 
City Years Tracts Crime types*
Baltimore 1970-1980 202 All
Baltimore 1980-1990 202 All
Baltimore 1990-2000 202 Just violent and property crime
Chicago 1970-1980 858 Just murder
Chicago 1980-1990 858 Just murder
Cleveland 1980-1990 225 Just burglary, murder, and robbery
Cleveland 1990-2000 225 All
Denver 1990-2000 187 Just burglary, violent and property crime
Indianapolis 1990-2000 146 All
Los Angeles 1990-2000 569 All
Milwaukee 1990-2000 235 All
Sacramento 1990-2000 145 All
Seattle 1970-1980 126 Not property crime
St. Louis 1970-1980 113 Not aggravated assault
Washington, D.C. 1980-1990 192 Not property crime
Washington, D.C. 1990-2000 192 Just violent and property crime
Total tract years 4677
Total unique tracts 2998
* Unless otherwise noted, crime types are: violent crime, property crime, aggravated 
assault, robbery, murder, and burglary
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Table 4.3.  Summary statistics of variables used in analyses 
 
Mean SD Min Max
Correlation 
over waves
Violent crime rate per 10,000 persons 7.0134 1.7341 0.000 12.228 0.80
Property crime rate per 10,000 persons 8.2522 1.4295 0.000 13.448 0.90
Aggravated assault rate per 10,000 persons 6.0917 1.5535 0.000 9.792 0.88
Robbery rate per 10,000 persons 5.9350 1.6058 0.000 13.442 0.59
Murder rate per 10,000 persons 1.7724 1.5788 0.000 7.160 0.58
Burglary rate per 10,000 persons 7.0743 1.4005 0.000 13.795 0.85
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.0358 0.2158 -0.300 0.478 0.84
Inequality 0.0231 0.0789 -0.420 0.580 0.65
Inequality within race 0.0276 0.1031 -0.400 0.356 0.61
Inequality between blacks/whites 0.0372 0.0779 -0.545 0.726 0.23
Inequality between Latinos/whites 0.0563 0.0739 -0.509 0.585 0.18
Owners 0.4689 0.2313 0.000 1.000 0.96
Occupied units 0.9160 0.0817 0.000 1.000 0.42
Divorced 0.4030 0.1941 0.000 1.000 0.84
At/below 125% of poverty 0.2642 0.1661 0.000 1.000 0.88
Average household income (in $10,000's) 5.0056 3.8377 0.201 36.790 0.92
Unemployment rate 0.1016 0.0778 0.000 0.967 0.60
White -0.1785 0.3494 -0.600 0.400 0.95
African-American 0.1041 0.3838 -0.270 0.730 0.96
Asian 0.0115 0.0699 -0.030 0.632 0.88
Latino 0.0418 0.2198 -0.100 0.892 0.96
Other race 0.0210 0.0227 -0.003 0.457 0.08
Average length of residence 0.1082 0.0350 0.010 0.236 0.83
Bars and liquor store employees per capita 0.0468 0.0223 0.000 0.199 0.82
Retail employees per capita 0.0604 0.0087 0.004 0.139 0.89
Sample sizes of outcomes:  violent crime = 2,880; property crime = 2,370; aggravated assault = 2,186; robbery 
= 2,524; murder = 4,240; burglary = 2,711
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Table 4.4.  Cross-sectional models predicting violent and property crime in 2000, using 
tracts in several cities (Baltimore, Cleveland, Denver, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, 
Milwaukee, Sacramento, Washington, D.C.)
Economic resources
At/below 125% of poverty 1.863 ** 1.707 ** 1.528 ** 1.194 **
(0.356) (0.390) (0.357) (0.338)
Average household income 0.009  0.021 * -0.024 * -0.013  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Racial/ethnic composition and distribution
Ethnic heterogeneity 1.281 ** 1.161 ** 0.549 ** 0.367 †
(0.182) (0.214) (0.183) (0.208)
African-American 1.183 ** 0.360 † 0.850 ** 0.274  
(0.171) (0.213) (0.151) (0.193)
Latino 1.435 ** 0.231  1.468 ** 0.409 *
(0.186) (0.217) (0.178) (0.186)
Asian 0.669 † 0.432  -0.196  -0.172  
(0.366) (0.476) (0.344) (0.459)
Other race 0.792  -1.327  -0.213  -0.274  
(1.383) (1.655) (1.249) (1.405)
Control variables
Owners -1.229 ** -1.487 ** -0.664 ** -0.739 **
(0.241) (0.246) (0.232) (0.219)
Occupied units -3.021 ** -2.670 ** -2.032 ** -2.025 **
(0.509) (0.454) (0.485) (0.410)
Divorced 0.677 † -0.324  0.091  -0.534  
(0.350) (0.436) (0.320) (0.415)
Unemployment rate -0.924 † -1.945 ** -0.768 † -1.549 **
(0.499) (0.548) (0.453) (0.455)
Average length of residence 7.509 ** 8.695 ** 4.178 ** 4.249 **
(1.409) (1.536) (1.305) (1.347)
Bars/liquor stores per capita 0.135 ** 0.118 ** 0.098 ** 0.059 *
(0.021) (0.026) (0.019) (0.026)
Retail establishments per capita 0.092 * 0.167 ** 0.070 † 0.150 **
(0.042) (0.047) (0.037) (0.042)
Rho (spatial lag) 0.562 ** 0.611 **
(0.061) (0.086)
R-square 0.57 0.40 0.66 0.57
N 5,290 4,654 5,290 4,654
OLS regression
Two-stage least squares 
regressions, taking into 
account spatial lag
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  Standard errors in 
parentheses
Violent 
crime
Property 
crime
Violent 
crime
Property 
crime
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Table 4.5.  Cross-sectional models, using two-stage least squares (2sls) estimation to 
handle spatial lag, predicting violent crime in 2000, using tracts in several cities 
(Baltimore, Cleveland, Denver, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Sacramento, 
Washington, D.C.) 
Economic resources and distribution
Inequality 1.2578 * -2.778 * 1.291 *
(0.518) (1.347) (0.516)
Inequality within race 1.7831 ** 3.772 ** 1.8057 **
(0.406) (1.076) (0.407)
Inequality between blacks/whites 0.0198  -0.081  0.0007  -0.05  
(0.231) (0.222) (0.233) (0.235)
Inequality between Latinos/whites -0.23  -0.279  -0.345  -0.323  
(0.494) (0.484) (0.474) (0.471)
Inequality between blacks/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity -1.82 **
(0.490)
Inequality between Latinos/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity -3.264  
(2.115)
At/below 125% of poverty 1.2631 ** 1.1942 ** 1.5297 ** 1.4187 ** 1.4072 ** 1.2573 ** 1.1889 **
(0.370) (0.346) (0.359) (0.353) (0.384) (0.373) (0.349)
Average household income -0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.024 * -0.025 ** -0.025 * -0.029 ** -0.029 **
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Racial/ethnic composition and distribution
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.5414 ** 0.6095 ** 0.5497 ** 0.6723 ** 0.6971 ** 0.5412 ** 0.6068 **
(0.181) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182)
African-American 0.8124 ** 0.7743 ** 0.8703 ** 0.8552 ** 0.7731 ** 0.8213 ** 0.7438 **
(0.148) (0.143) (0.227) (0.218) (0.142) (0.228) (0.223)
Latino 1.5064 ** 1.5171 ** 1.4699 ** 1.4613 ** 1.4881 ** 1.5066 ** 1.5116 **
(0.176) (0.175) (0.178) (0.179) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176)
Asian -0.199  -0.21  -0.197  0.048  -0.216  -0.202  -0.219  
(0.343) (0.343) (0.346) (0.345) (0.345) (0.344) (0.344)
Other race -0.219  -0.475  -0.225  0.3368  -0.752  -0.23  -0.492  
(1.247) (1.248) (1.249) (1.247) (1.228) (1.246) (1.247)
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  Standard errors in parentheses.  All models control for percent owners, percent 
occupied units, percent divorced, unemployment rate, average length of residence, bars/liquor stores per capita, retail establishments per capita, and 
indicator variables for each city year.  N=5,290
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Table 4.6.  Cross-sectional models, using two-stage least squares (2sls) estimation to 
handle spatial lag, predicting property crime in 2000, using tracts in several cities 
(Baltimore, Cleveland, Denver, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Sacramento, 
Washington, D.C.) 
Economic resources and distribution
Inequality 1.858 ** -2.426 * 1.882 **
(0.492) (1.078) (0.485)
Inequality within race 2.183 ** 4.009 ** 2.192 **
(0.461) (1.017) (0.453)
Inequality between blacks/whites 0.217  0.162  0.185  0.155  
(0.228) (0.230) (0.232) (0.231)
Inequality between Latinos/whites -0.225  -0.246  -0.418  -0.413  
(0.501) (0.495) (0.503) (0.500)
Inequality between blacks/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity -1.035 *
(0.465)
Inequality between Latinos/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity -1.265  
(2.249)
At/below 125% of poverty 0.784 * 0.760 * 1.202 ** 1.143 ** 0.934 ** 0.788 * 0.766 *
(0.354) (0.347) (0.339) (0.342) (0.356) (0.355) (0.348)
Average household income -0.022 * -0.022 * -0.014  -0.015  -0.017 † -0.023 * -0.022 *
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Racial/ethnic composition and distribution
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.343 † 0.413 * 0.375 † 0.430 * 0.485 * 0.349 † 0.418 *
(0.204) (0.206) (0.208) (0.213) (0.208) (0.205) (0.206)
African-American 0.211  0.180  0.447  0.446  0.185  0.365  0.312  
(0.190) (0.184) (0.298) (0.297) (0.183) (0.297) (0.291)
Latino 0.471 * 0.482 ** 0.432 * 0.430 * 0.462 * 0.491 ** 0.499 **
(0.183) (0.183) (0.191) (0.189) (0.182) (0.189) (0.188)
Asian -0.189  -0.209  -0.140  0.003  -0.216  -0.160  -0.184  
(0.458) (0.452) (0.472) (0.469) (0.448) (0.470) (0.465)
Other race -0.279  -0.484  -0.268  0.134  -0.655  -0.261  -0.466  
(1.401) (1.399) (1.394) (1.407) (1.396) (1.386) (1.385)
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  Standard errors in parentheses.  All models control for percent owners, percent 
occupied units, percent divorced, unemployment rate, average length of residence, bars/liquor stores per capita, retail establishments per capita, and 
indicator variables for each city year.  N=4,654
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Table 4.7.  Assessing the model fit for structural equation models estimated as random 
effects and fixed effects models of various types of crime over decades for several cities 
 
Chi-square df TLI IFI CFI RMSEA RNI
Random effects models
Violent crime model 1133.71 54 0.827 0.990 0.990 0.083 0.990
Property crime model 1035.47 51 0.829 0.988 0.988 0.090 0.988
Fixed effects models
Violent crime model 105.30 14 0.944 0.999 0.999 0.048 0.999
Property crime model 65.23 14 0.968 0.999 0.999 0.039 0.999
Assault model 106.07 14 0.944 0.999 0.999 0.055 0.999
Robbery model 63.52 14 0.971 0.999 0.999 0.037 0.999
Murder model 91.57 14 0.965 0.999 0.999 0.036 0.999
Burglary model 74.09 14 0.964 0.999 0.999 0.040 0.999
Note: df: degrees of freedom; TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index; IFI: Incremental Fit Index; CFI: Comparative Fit 
Index; RMSEA:  root mean squared error of approximation; RNI:  relative noncentrality index
Sample sizes of outcomes:  violent crime = 2,880; property crime = 2,370; aggravated assault = 2,186; 
robbery = 2,524; murder = 4,240; burglary = 2,711
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Table 4.8.  Fixed effects models predicting the change in various types of crime for 
several cities over various decades spanning the 1970-2000 period 
 
Economic resources
At/below 125% of poverty -0.256  0.190  0.239  0.562 * 0.354  0.144  
(0.244) (0.157) (0.238) (0.225) (0.254) (0.163)
Average household income -0.028 ** -0.015 * -0.012  -0.040 ** 0.006  -0.008  
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008)
Racial/ethnic composition and distribution
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.269  0.190 † 0.424 * 0.126  0.879 ** 0.354 **
(0.167) (0.101) (0.168) (0.160) (0.183) (0.113)
African-American 1.137 ** 0.022  0.869 ** 1.057 ** 1.434 ** 0.255 *
(0.181) (0.111) (0.188) (0.170) (0.180) (0.124)
Latino 0.617 * 0.373 * -0.120  1.171 ** 1.247 ** 0.892 **
(0.287) (0.172) (0.274) (0.280) (0.257) (0.191)
Asian -0.443  -0.299  -0.781 † -0.992 * -0.085  -0.587 †
(0.479) (0.299) (0.452) (0.467) (0.605) (0.326)
Other race 0.263  -0.467  -0.217  0.663  -0.153  -0.310  
(0.690) (0.545) (0.632) (0.667) (0.849) (0.475)
Control variables
Owners 0.348  0.382 * 0.234  0.315  -0.986 ** 0.470 *
(0.272) (0.187) (0.276) (0.261) (0.304) (0.184)
Occupied units -0.708 ** -0.135  -0.024  -0.426 † -0.634 * -0.960 **
(0.226) (0.149) (0.239) (0.229) (0.249) (0.167)
Divorced -0.363 † -0.353 ** 0.008  -0.274  0.295  -0.032  
(0.192) (0.127) (0.187) (0.182) (0.214) (0.132)
Unemployment rate 0.493 † -0.315 † -0.091  -0.061  0.630 * -0.550 **
(0.273) (0.175) (0.271) (0.254) (0.315) (0.184)
Average length of residence 2.991 ** -0.192  2.480 ** 1.800 * 4.027 ** 0.703  
(0.951) (0.617) (0.924) (0.894) (1.012) (0.645)
Bars/liquor stores per capita 0.025  0.013  0.016  0.035 † 0.043 † 0.028 *
(0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.012)
Retail establishments per capita 0.039  0.165 ** 0.067  0.072  -0.001  0.066 †
(0.050) (0.035) (0.054) (0.054) (0.074) (0.035)
R-square, second wave 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.65 0.96
R-square, first wave 0.80 0.94 0.89 0.92 0.63 0.92
N 2,880 2,370 2,186 2,524 4,240 2,711
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  Standard errors in parentheses
Murder Burglary
Aggregated crime Individual types of crime
Violent 
crime
Property 
crime
Aggravated 
assault Robbery
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Table 4.9.  Fixed effects models predicting the change in violent crime for several cities 
over various decades spanning the 1970-2000 period, comparing the effects of various 
forms of inequality and heterogeneity 
Economic resources and distribution
Inequality 0.563 † 0.471  0.675 *
(0.339) (0.402) (0.340)
Inequality within race 0.349  0.141  0.401 †
(0.238) (0.281) (0.237)
Inequality between blacks/whites 0.349 ** 0.313 ** 0.364 ** 0.349 **
(0.083) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083)
Inequality between Latinos/whites 0.181  0.162  0.161  0.181  
(0.298) (0.305) (0.297) (0.297)
Inequality between blacks/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity -0.979 *
(0.420)
Inequality between Latinos/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity 1.982  
(1.592)
At/below 125% of poverty -0.371  -0.296  -0.293  -0.323  -0.354  -0.440 † -0.349  
(0.254) (0.249) (0.244) (0.244) (0.254) (0.254) (0.248)
Average household income -0.028 ** -0.032 ** -0.043 ** -0.045 ** -0.029 ** -0.044 ** -0.047 **
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Racial/ethnic composition and distribution
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.279 † 0.293 † 0.150  0.145  0.289 † 0.150  0.169  
(0.167) (0.167) (0.169) (0.172) (0.167) (0.169) (0.169)
African-American 1.120 ** 1.088 ** 1.039 ** 1.102 ** 1.097 ** 1.042 ** 1.008 **
(0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.183) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181)
Latino 0.657 * 0.622 * 0.594 * 0.692 * 0.652 * 0.653 * 0.611 *
(0.288) (0.288) (0.286) (0.289) (0.288) (0.287) (0.287)
Asian -0.468  -0.482  -0.389  -0.228  -0.452  -0.417  -0.431  
(0.479) (0.480) (0.478) (0.482) (0.480) (0.479) (0.479)
Other race 0.194  0.162  -0.026  0.287  0.179  -0.034  -0.072  
(0.690) (0.691) (0.690) (0.701) (0.691) (0.689) (0.690)
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  Standard errors in parentheses.  All models control for percent owners, percent 
occupied units, percent divorced, unemployment rate, average length of residence, bars/liquor stores per capita, retail establishments per capita, and 
indicator variables for each city year.  N=2,880
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Table 4.10.  Fixed effects models predicting the change in property crime for several 
cities over various decades spanning the 1970-2000 period, comparing the effects of 
various forms of inequality and heterogeneity 
Economic resources and distribution
Inequality 0.055  0.341  0.108  
(0.223) (0.278) (0.223)
Inequality within race 0.115  -0.361 † 0.13  
(0.157) (0.209) (0.157)
Inequality between blacks/whites 0.15 ** 0.11 * 0.151 ** 0.142 **
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
Inequality between Latinos/whites 0.247  0.237  0.237  0.254  
(0.181) (0.187) (0.180) (0.181)
Inequality between blacks/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity -1.137 **
(0.249)
Inequality between Latinos/whites X 
ethnic heterogeneity 0.726  
(0.979)
At/below 125% of poverty 0.175  0.213  0.149  0.088  0.187  0.122  0.169  
(0.165) (0.161) (0.157) (0.157) (0.165) (0.165) (0.161)
Average household income -0.016 * -0.016 * -0.023 ** -0.025 ** -0.012  -0.024 ** -0.023 **
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Racial/ethnic composition and distribution
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.192 † 0.2 * 0.136  0.164  0.192 † 0.138  0.147  
(0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.103) (0.103)
African-American 0.032  0.006  -0.014  0.042  0.041  -0.003  -0.029  
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111)
Latino 0.374 * 0.356 * 0.37 * 0.499 ** 0.341 * 0.374 * 0.355 *
(0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.174) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172)
Asian -0.318  -0.336  -0.277  -0.115  -0.324  -0.292  -0.306  
(0.300) (0.298) (0.297) (0.298) (0.299) (0.298) (0.297)
Other race -0.473  -0.467  -0.606  -0.026  -0.483  -0.606  -0.596  
(0.545) (0.545) (0.545) (0.557) (0.544) (0.544) (0.545)
** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).  Standard errors in parentheses.  All models control for percent owners, percent 
occupied units, percent divorced, unemployment rate, average length of residence, bars/liquor stores per capita, retail establishments per capita, and 
indicator variables for each city year.  N=2,370
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Figure 4.3.  Effect of interaction between ethnic heterogeneity and inequality between 
African-Americans and whites from fixed effects models predicting the change in burglary 
for several cities over various decades spanning the 1970-2000 period
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V. Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation has focused on neighborhood change and the intertwining roles of 
social distance between residents, residential mobility decisions and their implications for the 
structural characteristics of neighborhoods, and crime.  The chapters in this dissertation had 
several overarching themes.   
First, these three different chapters have highlighted the importance of social distance 
(as measured by the social categories residents are part of) for neighborhoods.  Social 
distance as measured along the category of race/ethnicity was particularly important:  block-
level ethnic heterogeneity was positively related to a neighborhood’s common perception of 
crime in chapter two’s cross-sectional analysis, both block- and tract-level ethnic 
heterogeneity were positively related to a neighborhood’s common perception of crime four 
years later in the dynamic analyses of chapter three, and tract level ethnic heterogeneity was 
positively related to crime in both cross-sectional analyses and in fixed effects analyses over 
a ten-year time period in chapter four.  Thus, these results were found for a national sample 
of non-rural blocks in chapters two and three, and a sample of tracts in several metropolitan 
areas in chapter four, illustrating the robustness of these findings.  In addition, the cross-
sectional findings from chapter two suggested that the reason block-level ethnic 
heterogeneity reduces neighborhood satisfaction is entirely because it increases the crime and 
disorder of the block.   
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 These chapters also highlighted that social distance beyond simple racial/ethnic 
differences is important.  For instance, chapter two showed that social distance measured at 
the individual-level strongly affects perceived crime and disorder in blocks—but only when 
social distance is measured using a number of different constructs rather than just 
race/ethnicity.  This suggests that social distance should not be measured just along 
race/ethnicity, but also along socio-economic characteristics as well as such demographic 
characteristics as age, marital status, and presence of children.  Chapter four highlighted the 
importance of socio-economic distance, as the fixed effects models found that tracts 
experiencing increasing inequality across race/ethnicity—thus distance along both race and 
socio-economic status simultaneously—experienced increasing levels of nearly all types of 
crime.   
 But while this dissertation consistently showed that social distance has strong effects 
on neighborhood crime rates, the effects of race/ethnicity as the proportion minority 
members in the neighborhood were mixed.  On the one hand, the presence of more African-
Americans and Latinos was associated with higher rates of neighborhood perceived crime in 
the cross-sectional analyses of chapter two, and likewise for most of the crime types in the 
fixed effects analyses of chapter four.  Little effect, however, was found in chapter three for 
the dynamic analyses predicting neighborhood perceived crime four years later.  This, 
accompanied with the findings in chapter three that neighborhoods with higher perceived 
crime are more likely to see a housing unit transition to an African-American or Latino 
household, and less likely to see a transition to a white household, raises the possibility that 
at least some of this relationship between minority groups and crime is due to mobility into 
neighborhoods, rather than a causal effect from such groups to crime.   
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 While the possibility of reciprocal effects between crime and racial/ethnic 
composition poses an avenue for future research, a key theme of this dissertation was 
viewing the possibly reciprocal relationship between crime and residential instability.  While 
chapter three specifically focused on this possible reciprocal relationship, the findings from 
this dissertation were broader:  specifically, a consistent finding was the lack of importance 
of residential stability for reducing crime rates.  Instead, we frequently saw that residential 
stability was associated with higher rates of crime.  The dynamic models of chapter three 
found that residential stability actually had a modest positive effect on crime, and both the 
cross-sectional and the fixed effects models of chapter four found a positive relationship 
between residential stability and various types of crime.  These results from two very 
different data sets—one a national data set, and the other a collection of eleven different 
cities over a long period of time—pose a strong challenge to the social disorganization 
hypothesis that residential stability will reduce crime by increasing neighborhood ties.  The 
results here suggest, at minimum, a need for theorists to specify the reduced scope under 
which this relationship would operate.   
 Instead, the results here generally supported one aspect of the theoretical model I 
developed in chapter three building on the notions of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect:  the 
implication that homeownership may be important for combating crime.  While a common 
strategy of most research in the neighborhood literature is to combine the percent 
homeowners and the average length of residence in a neighborhood into a composite measure 
labeled “residential stability,” the findings from all three chapters of this dissertation point 
out that these are indeed two distinct constructs, thus highlighting the need to disentangle 
them in analyses.  Whereas I found residential stability (as measured by average length of 
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residence) often increased crime, I found that percent homeowners often decreased crime.  
The percent homeowners on the block was negatively related to the block common 
perception of crime in the cross-sectional analyses of chapter two, it was negatively related to 
block common perception of crime four years later in the dynamic analyses of chapter three, 
and the percent homeowners in the tract was negatively related to both property and violent 
crime in the cross-sectional analyses of chapter four.  The lone exception were the fixed 
effects models of chapter four—though it should be highlighted that in these models focusing 
only on change within tracts that the very high stability over time in the percent homeowners 
in tracts (a correlation of .96 over the decades) suggests there is very little power in these 
models to detect such effects since there is almost no change within a neighborhood in 
percent homeowners.  These results, along with the positive relationship between percent 
homeowners and aggregate neighborhood satisfaction in chapter two, suggest that 
homeownership may be a particularly important characteristic for understanding how 
neighborhoods evolve over time.   
Although less novel, another common theme in this dissertation was the importance 
of social disadvantage for neighborhoods and their crime rates.  Even so, measurement and 
conceptual issues surround this measure.  While neighborhood studies frequently employ the 
strategy of exploratory factor analysis to combine several variables into a measure of social 
disadvantage (i.e., percent in poverty, median income, percent with a bachelor’s degree, 
percent divorced families, and percent single parent families), I adopted the strategy of 
separately estimating the effects of these various components.  The results generally 
supported the importance of economic factors for affecting crime:  average neighborhood 
income was negatively associated with crime and disorder in the cross-sectional analyses of 
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chapter two, and had a negative effect on various types of crime in the fixed effects models 
of chapter four.  As well, the percent on the block below poverty had a positive effect on 
neighborhood perceived crime four years later in the dynamic models of chapter three, and 
was positively related to rates of various crime types in the cross-sectional analyses of 
chapter four.  In contrast to these consistent findings for economic factors, the effects for 
broken families was less clear.  While the percentage of single parent families was positively 
related to neighborhood perceived crime and disorder in the cross-sectional models of 
chapter two, no such effect was found in the dynamic models of chapter three predicting 
neighborhood perceived crime four years later, nor in the fixed effects models of chapter 
four.  These differences are obscured in studies collapsing these separate measures into a 
single measure of disadvantage.   
 
Directions for future research 
 A key direction for future research is exploring the mechanisms underlying some of 
the empirical relationships observed here.  For instance, the question of what measures to 
combine into a construct labeled “disadvantage” requires considering the how these various 
mechanisms work.  If high poverty rates increase crime because they reduce access to the 
resources that would otherwise help combat crime, while broken families increase crime 
because of a lack of parental monitoring, combining these into a single measure potentially 
obscures understanding how these processes work given the different mechanisms involved.  
This has important policy implications, as interventions aimed at providing a substitute for a 
lack of parental monitoring likely differ from interventions aimed at providing more general 
resources to a neighborhood.  Additionally, the fact that the size of the effect for poverty 
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diminished in the chapter four fixed effects models when including inequality across race 
suggests yet one more possible mechanism through which poverty might work:  instead of 
poverty increasing crime by reducing access to resources from the larger community, it may 
be that such neighborhoods simply have more inequality across race/ethnicity, and this is 
what increases crime.  However, even here the mechanism is uncertain as chapter four 
highlighted:  does inequality across race increase crime because it reduces interaction among 
residents, or because it creates a sense of unfairness and enmity, leading to a violent 
response?  Again, actually measuring these mechanisms is an important next step.  Studies 
that include a linear measure of racial composition in such measures of disadvantage may 
further confound matters:  to the extent that minority groups are hypothesized to cause more 
crime for various cultural reasons, this suggests yet one more mechanism through which such 
a composite measure of disadvantage would work.  And to the extent that crime itself causes 
racial/ethnic transformation, as suggested by this dissertation, cross-sectional studies finding 
a relationship between composite disadvantage and crime—when including racial/ethnic 
composition as a component of disadvantage—may be particularly unhelpful.   
And while this dissertation highlighted the importance of social distance for 
neighborhood crime and satisfaction—and provided various theoretical rationales for why we 
should see such a relationship—future research will need to explore more closely the actual 
mechanisms through which social distance works.  One possibility put forth here is that 
social distance works by reducing the interaction among residents—this clearly raises the 
need for studies to explore this possible mechanism.  While clearly challenging—as this 
requires collecting information on the demographic, racial/ethnic, and socio-economic 
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characteristics of residents as well as their network linkages with their neighbors—such 
analyses would provide key insight into this possible mechanism. 
Closely related to understanding the mechanisms of social distance is understanding 
the determinants of social distance.  We need to understand what causes perceived social 
distance in order to explore its effects.  This dissertation took the approach of measuring 
social distance as a single individual-level construct in which I combined several 
determinants of social distance into a single observed variable:  finding that this measure led 
to greater perception of crime and disorder in the neighborhood.  A natural next direction for 
research is to explore whether any of these determinants are particularly important for 
fostering this social distance.  That is, while past research has often simply assumed that 
distance along race/ethnicity is most important, perhaps difference along age or the presence 
of children is more important.  There are certainly important policy implications for 
understanding which determinants of social distance are most important:  an uncomfortable 
implication of these findings are that certain types of segregation may be preferable for some 
households.  Given the likely controversial nature of such an implication, understanding 
precisely what sort of social distance is problematic is particularly important.  For instance, if 
distance created by the presence or lack of children is important for creating social distance, 
this would imply that households with children would prefer to live near other households 
with children, and households without children would prefer living near like households.  
This may not be terribly surprising or controversial:  anecdotally, we know that certain 
housing developments are populated with more households containing children, whereas 
certain condominium developments are populated by young singles and couples without 
children.  Likewise, if age is particularly important for fostering social distance, this would 
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comport with the observation that retirement communities exist in most cities—a form of age 
segregation.   
But the results for the effect of racial/ethnic heterogeneity are potentially more 
troubling.  If it is indeed the case that this racial/ethnic difference reduces interaction, which 
then leads to more crime, this suggests that policy interventions might focus on bridging the 
effects this distance might otherwise have on such social interactions.  But an additional area 
of fruitful research would be to determine the effects of this racial/ethnic difference over 
time, and whether it might diminish.  This links with the contact hypothesis literature 
(Belanger and Pinard 1991; Lee, Farrell, and Link 2004; Powers and Ellison 1995; Quillian 
and Campbell 2003), which hypothesizes that prolonged periods of interaction will break 
down such social distance.  This suggests the need to model the effects of social distance in a 
neighborhood over a period of time.  And while this might imply that racial/ethnic distance 
will “cure” itself over time, the mixed results for the contact hypothesis, as well as the 
possibility that social distance might cause residents to flee a neighborhood before the 
contact hypothesis could take effect, suggest another fruitful avenue for research.   
Besides studying social distance longitudinally, future research will also want to 
study it contextually.  That is, the finding in this dissertation that inequality across 
race/ethnicities had a strong positive effect on crime in the fixed effects models suggests that 
reducing the economic inequality across race/ethnicities may be a first step towards reducing 
the effects of racial/ethnic social distance.  If this is indeed the case, various manners of 
reducing this inequality across racial/ethnic groups would be a natural point of intervention 
for policy makers.  While the distribution of income across racial/ethnic groups may 
accentuate the distance effects of race/ethnicity, another possibility worth exploring is 
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whether the aggregate level of economic resources can reduce the effect of this racial/ethnic 
social distance.  That is, the context of higher income areas may minimize the distance 
otherwise fostered by racial/ethnic difference.  This suggests an “all boats rise together” 
framework, and that any inequality would be more tolerable in an environment of greater 
wealth.  While clearly speculative, exploring such a possibility would provide one more 
possible intervention point for policy makers.   
 One surprising result of this dissertation was how little effect residential instability 
had on crime rates.  This poses a considerable challenge to the social disorganization 
theoretical model.  And while residential stability had the positive relationship with overall 
neighborhood satisfaction predicted by the systemic model (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974) in 
the cross-sectional models of chapter two, it is important to note that the causal direction of 
this relationship may in fact be reversed.  That is, to the extent that household level 
neighborhood satisfaction may be important for residential mobility decisions (Speare 1974), 
this presumed causal effect of the systemic model may be called into question.  Exploring 
this possible reciprocal relationship between neighborhood satisfaction and residential 
stability suggests another fruitful direction for future research using longitudinal data.   
 But while there was little evidence that the residential instability caused by mobility 
decisions affects crime rates, an alternative possibility suggested by these results is that the 
presence of unoccupied units caused by residential mobility decisions may be important.  
That is, when a household chooses to leave a neighborhood, there are two possible outcomes 
for the housing unit they leave:  1) they are replaced by another household, hence increasing 
the amount of residential instability; 2) they are not replaced at all, thus increasing the 
vacancy rate in the neighborhood.  And this may not be a trivial issue:  in this dissertation 
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neighborhoods with higher vacancy rates had higher levels of perceived crime and disorder 
in the cross-sectional models of chapter two, and also had a generally positive effect on 
different crime types in the fixed effects models of chapter four.  While no such effect was 
found between vacancy rates and perceived crime in the dynamic models of chapter three, 
the overall findings here nonetheless suggest that this would be a useful possible direction to 
explore.  The fact that higher vacancy rates led to greater residential instability in the 
dynamic models of chapter three also has important implications for theoretical models of 
neighborhood change:  this suggests the possibility that a household abandoning a 
neighborhood—and not replaced by another—may trigger a chain reaction where these 
higher vacancy rates cause more crime, and the crime and vacancy rates then induce more 
mobility that continues the downward cycle.  This suggests that abandoned units can have 
consequences for neighboring units.  The externalities implied by these vacant units suggest a 
possible important policy intervention point.  At a minimum, this suggests the need to further 
explore this possible interrelationship between crime, residential instability, and abandoned 
units.   
 Finally, the results of this dissertation highlighted that not only can crime rates in 
neighborhoods affect mobility decisions on the part of their residents, but also that crime 
rates affect who chooses to move into such neighborhoods.  In particular, the models from 
chapter three suggested that the common perception of neighborhood crime engenders 
racial/ethnic transformation in neighborhoods.  Whereas a household is more likely to 
become occupied by an African-American or a Latino household if it is in a block with a 
higher level of perceived crime, a household in the same block is less likely to become 
occupied by a white household.  This suggests a particularly important mechanism through 
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which neighborhood racial/ethnic transformation may occur, and highlights that the 
relationship between the racial/ethnic composition of a neighborhood and the crime rate may 
be more nuanced.  Future research will need to explore how strong this effect is, and what the 
implications are for theories proposing that higher levels of minority residents in a 
neighborhood cause greater levels of crime.   
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APPENDIX A:  Combining spatial data into common units over time 
  
For the aggregate spatial data I used, it is necessary to place the data into common 
units over time.  Since some of the data is aggregated to different units to begin with, this 
requires 1) placing the data into a common unit at a particular point in time (I used census 
tracts); and then 2) combining these census tracts over time into a common unit (I used 1990 
census tracts for the Chapter 3 analyses, and 1980 census tracts for the Chapter 1 and 2 
analyses since the American Housing Survey respondents are placed into 1980 tracts).  I use 
1990 tracts in the Chapter 3 analyses because: 1) most of my data are for the years 1990 and 
2000; 2) since more tracts in the U.S. are experiencing increasing population and hence 
splitting rather than experiencing shrinking population and hence collapsing with other tracts, 
using 1990 tracts requires fewer assumptions, as I elaborate at the end of this appendix.   
 
Placing the data into a common unit at a particular point in time  
 When collapsing data from any non-tract unit into census tracts, a distinction needs to 
be made between count data and per capita data.  Consider Figure A1, which illustrates a 
hypothetical situation in which two zip codes (or any other type of unit) overlap with six 
tracts.  Tracts 1 and 2 are both entirely contained within zip code A (containing perpendicular 
lines), while tracts 5 and 6 are both entirely contained within zip code B (containing diagonal 
lines).  Tracts 3 and 4 overlap with both zip codes.  Suppose we have count data (e.g., the 
number of retail establishments) for the zip codes.  If we assume a homogeneous condition in 
which a retail establishment is equally likely in any location of the zip code, then we can 
proportionately assign the number of retail establishments to the tract.  To do this, we 
calculate the proportion of the zip code which each tract constitutes.  Thus,  
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(1)      X X P Pi j ij jj
J
=
=
∑ ( / )1  
where Xi represents the count of the variable of interest in the tract which we are estimating, 
Xj represents the count of the variable of interest in the j=1 to J zip codes the tract lies within, 
Pij represents the population of tract i contained within zip code j, and Pj represents the 
population of zip code j (note that for certain measures it was necessary for me to substitute 
the area of the tracts and zip codes rather than the population for P).  For instance, if tract 1 
constitutes 30% of zip code A, then we multiply the number of retail establishments in zip 
code A by .3 to obtain an estimate of the number of retail establishments in tract 1.  For tract 
3, we multiply the number of retail establishments in zip code A by the proportion of zip 
code A constituted by tract 3, and sum this with number of retail establishments in zip code B 
multiplied by the proportion of zip code B constituted by tract 3.   
 The calculation is different for per capita measures, such as the number of retail 
establishments per 1,000 population.  In this instance, we calculate the proportion of the tract 
contained within each zip code: 
(2)      X
J
X P Pi j ji ij
J
=
=
∑1 1 ( / )  
where Xi represents the per capita measure of the variable of interest in the tract which we 
are estimating, Xj represents the per capita measure of the variable of interest in the j=1 to J 
zip codes the tract overlaps, Pji represents the population of zip code j contained within tract 
i, and Pi represents the population of tract i.  For instance, in Figure A1, since 100% of tract 1 
lies within zip code A it is given the same value of X as zip code A (given our homogeneity 
assumption within a zip code, we assume that the per capita rate for any variable would be 
the same for a tract lying entirely within the zip code).  On the other hand, for tract 3 we 
  204
 
would multiply the proportion of tract 3’s population in zip code A by the per capita measure 
of the variable of interest, sum this with the product of the proportion of tract 3’s population 
in zip code B and the per capita measure of the variable of interest, and divide this by 2 (that 
is, J—the number of zip codes with which tract 3 overlaps).  Thus, we compute the mean of 
the zip code values weighted by the proportion of the tract contained within each zip code.   
 I used this general procedure for each of the different aggregated units.   
 
Zip Codes into tracts 
To place 1982 and 1987 economic census data into 1980 tracts I used the Master Area 
Reference File (Census 1980).  This provides me with estimates of the population per tract 
for 1980, and I use this to weight the zip code data into tracts, as describe above.  To place 
1992 and 1997 economic census data into 1990 tracts I used the MABLE/GEOCORR 
website at the University of Missouri that places zip codes into tracts based on population 
(http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr90.shtml).   
School district data into tracts 
This school district data was taken from the Local Education Agency (School 
District) Universe Survey Longitudinal Data File: 1986-1997 (Education 2001).  To place 
this data into 1980 census tracts to match with the AHS, I obtained shape files for school 
districts in 2000 from the Census Bureau website (www.census.gov), and intersected these 
with the shape files for 1980 census tracts (these shape files for 1980 census tracts were 
obtained from the Geolytics CD-ROM for 1980 census data).  Thus, I was able to determine 
the overlap in area between a given tract and a school district, and I used the amount of area 
as the weighting when using equations 1 and 2 to place the school district data into tracts.    
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Neighborhood data into tracts 
 The Baltimore crime data comes from the “Crime Changes in Baltimore, 1970-1994” 
(CCIB) study.  This study measures the amount of crime in various Baltimore neighborhoods 
over this period of time.  Thus, I needed to place this neighborhood crime data into tracts.  
Fortunately, there is considerable overlap between these neighborhoods and census tracts in 
Baltimore.  To determine the degree of overlap: 1) I obtained shape file information on the 
boundaries of neighborhoods in 1990 from the Johns Hopkins website 
(http://webapps.jhu.edu/census/); 2) I then visually reconciled this listing of neighborhoods 
with a hard copy map of the neighborhoods used in the CCIB study (contained in Taylor, 
Brower, and Drain 1979).  It was necessary for me to collapse a few of the neighborhoods in 
the CCIB study to match them up with the neighborhoods mapped in 1990.  Once reconciling 
the neighborhoods over time, I was then able to use ArcView to determine the degree of 
overlap between neighborhoods and tracts based on area, and used equations 1 and 2 above 
to place the crime data into tracts.   
 
Combining these census tracts into a common unit over time  
 The second issue is taking into account tracts that change boundaries over time.  
Tracts generally change in one of two ways:  1) those experiencing population increases will 
split over time into multiple tracts; 2) those experiencing population decreases will 
consolidate over time into fewer tracts.83  Consider the top panel of Figure A2, which 
illustrates situation 1:  tract A at time one has split into two tracts (A1 and A2) at time two.  
Also consider the bottom panel of Figure A2, which illustrates situation 2:  Tracts A and B at 
                                                 
83 To place year 2000 tracts into 1990 tracts, I used the Census Tract Relationship File (Census 2000).  To place 
1980 tracts into 1990 tracts, I used the TIGER/Census Tract Comparability File (Census 1990).  To place 1970 
tracts in 1980 tracts, I used the 1980-1970 tract comparability file (Census 1987).   
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time one have collapsed into tract 1 at time two.  Suppose we want to use the common 
geography over time of tracts at the first time point.  Of course, since the time one data are 
already in the correct tracts we need not adjust these data at all.  However, we must adjust the 
time two data.  To calculate the value of a count variable at time 2, we sum the values of the 
tracts at time two by the proportion of the tract in the full tract at time one: 
(3)      X X P Pi j j jij
J
=
=
∑ ( / )1  
where Xi represents the count of the variable of interest at time two in the time one tract 
boundaries which we are estimating of the i-th tract at time one, Xj represents the count of 
the variable of interest in the j=1 to J tracts at time two lying within the time one boundary, Pj 
represents the population of the time two tract j, and Pji represents the population of tract j 
contained within tract i at time one.  Thus, we are weighting by the proportion of the time 
two tract lying within the time one tract.  For instance, in the top panel of Figure A2, since 
100% of tract A1 and A2 lie within tract A at time one, they are weighted at one, thus a 
simple sum of their values of X gives the total of X in tract “A” at time two (the hypothetical 
tract we are constructing).  In the bottom panel of Figure A2, we must split the time two tract 
1 into tracts “A” and “B”:  we do this by multiplying X (the value in tract 1) by the 
proportion of the population constituted by the two tracts at time one.  Suppose that at time 
one, 30% of the time two tract lay within tract A and 70% lay within tract B.  We then 
multiply X by each of these proportions to get the values for tracts “A” and “B” at time two.   
 Again, things are slightly different when dealing with per capita variables rather than 
counts, as we must again take a mean value:   
(4)      X
J
X P Pi j j ijj
J
=
=
∑1 1 ( / )  
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where Xi represents the per capita value of the variable of interest at time two in the time one 
tract boundaries which we are estimating of the i-th tract at time one, Xj represents the per 
capita value of the variable of interest in the j=1 to J tracts at time two lying within the time 
one boundary, Pj represents the population of the time two tract j, Pij represents the 
population of tract j in the time one (i) boundaries, and we now are taking the mean value of 
the per capita variable (since we are dividing by J).  Thus, in the top panel of Figure A2, to 
calculate the value of tract “A” at time two we weight the per capita values of tracts 1 and 2 
by the proportion of the tract “A” population they represent at time two.  The per capita value 
of tract A1 is weighted by the proportion of the population in tract “A” it represents, and 
likewise for tract A2.  In the bottom panel of Figure A2, we must split the time two tract 1 
into tracts “A” and “B”:  since we assume homogeneity within this area, each tract receives 
the same per capita value.    
 While the assumption of homogeneity is certainly not ideal, lacking additional 
information on these tracts I have little choice.  Nonetheless, there is reason to suspect that 
this is a fairly reasonable assumption, given that there is considerable evidence of spatial 
contiguity of many demographic variables in cities.  I tested this by viewing the data used in 
my chapter 4 analyses, finding considerable spatial autocorrelation for these measures.  For 
instance, I calculated the Moran’s I statistic for several of the variables in 2000 for four 
different cities in the sample:  Baltimore, Cleveland, Denver, and Milwaukee.  The lowest 
Moran’s I values were for percent occupied units variable, with values of .363, .331, and .266 
for the cumulative distance bands of 2/3 mile, 1 1/3 mile, and 2 miles respectively.84  The 
                                                 
84 Moran’s I statistics generally range from –1 to +1, and are somewhat analogous to correlation coefficients.  
The band size groups together tracts based within that particular distance, and then compares the covariation 
within these bands to the overall covariation in the sample.  Intuitively, when more similar tracts are located 
close together, the covariation within these bands of tracts will be higher than the overall covariation.   
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average income variable had similar values (.413, .337, .249), suggesting a fair degree of 
clustering even for these measures.  And the other measures showed even stronger spatial 
correlation, with percent owners (.604, .469, .384), bars/liquor stores employees per capita 
(.638, .562, .422), and retail shop employees (.605, .482, .328) showing similar degrees of 
spatial autocorrelation.  And the percent African-American variable showed the strongest 
degree of autocorrelation (.79, .695, .565).  This suggests considerable geographic contiguity 
for these measures, suggesting that the homogeneity assumption is not too unreasonable.   
 Second, there is considerable consistency over time in these measures for tracts that 
do not change boundaries.  For instance, the summary statistics shown in Table 4.3 for 
chapter 4 show that the correlations over the decade for many of these measures range from 
.60 to .95.  While not evidence of homogeneity geographically, this does attest to the general 
stability of these measures.  This is useful given that the sources of data do not always come 
from the same year:  this temporal stability suggests that being off a couple years likely does 
not cause many problems.   
 Finally, given that nearly all of the variables I use in the analyses are per capita 
measures, I point out an implication of my decision to place the data into 1990 tracts.  As 
noted above, most of my data are for the years 1990 and 2000.  If I had instead chosen to 
place the data into year 2000 tracts, I would need to adopt this homogeneity assumption of 
the 1990 tract for a particular variable in any tract that split during this time period when 
apportioning it to the various new tracts.  However, by using 1990 tracts, I am instead 
combining the various year 2000 tracts together—this gives me an accurate estimate of the 
variable without having to assume homogeneity (a downside is that this approach results in 
fewer tracts, but the size of my sample allows me to adopt this strategy).   
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Figure A1.  Collapsing other geographic units into tracts 
1
2
3
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Figure A2.  Tracts changing over time 
A1 A2
A1 B1
Case 1:  Tract A at time one has split into
two tracts (A1 and A2) at time two
Case 2:  Tracts A and B at time one have
collapsed into tract 1 at time two
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APPENDIX B:  Detecting spatial effects in models, and estimation of spatial effects 
models 
  
 A complication for analyses of neighborhoods in cities is that neighborhoods are 
adjacent to one another.  This raises the possibility of spatial autocorrelation or spatial lag.  
Morenoff et al (2001) posit three theoretical reasons for spatial effects: 1) there is an inexact 
correspondence between neighborhood boundaries of census geography and the ecological 
properties that shape social interaction; 2) offenders are disproportionately involved in 
delinquent acts near their homes; 3) interpersonal crimes are based on social interaction and 
thus subject to diffusion processes.  Indeed, past studies have found spatial effects for race 
when employing such data:  a study of 74 local community areas in Chicago found a spatial 
effect where “if one area increases its nonwhite composition, adjoining areas are also likely 
to” (Heitgerd and Robert J. Bursik 1987).  Another study found that integrated 
neighborhoods primarily function as border zones separating more segregated areas (Kenyon 
1976).  Other studies have shown a spatial effect for crime rates between neighborhoods 
(Kubrin and Herting 2003; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Nielsen and Martinez 
2003; Roncek and Maier 1991; Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000).   
 The first issue for assessing possible spatial effects is determining what constitutes 
“close” neighborhoods (or any other unit of analysis in a spatial model).  This choice is not 
straightforward, and evidence suggests that this decision can have serious ramifications for 
estimates (Anselin 1988; Anselin 2002; Florax and Rey 1995; Leenders 2002).  There are 
two dominant approaches.  The first is based on contiguity, and determines closeness based 
on sharing a border.  Researchers adopting such an approach will sometimes simply count 
the neighborhoods that share a border with the neighborhood of interest, or sometimes they 
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will weight the adjacent neighborhoods based on the proportion of the border they share with 
the focal neighborhood.  Researchers adopting the second dominant approach utilize some 
type of distance decay function in measuring the distance of surrounding neighborhoods from 
the focal neighborhood.  Most commonly, they will calculate the inverse distance of the other 
neighborhoods from the focal neighborhood, and generally employ a particular cutoff point 
at which the weight is given a value of zero.  This resulting weight matrix (W) is usually then 
row-standardized (that is, the distance of the nearby neighborhoods from the focal 
neighborhood sums to one).  In this study, I adopted the latter approach, employing a 
distance decay function with a cutoff at two miles (beyond which the neighborhoods have a 
value of zero in the W matrix).  Given that past studies have suggested a distance decay 
function for offenders (Rengert, Piquero, and Jones 1999), with an average distance traveled 
between 1 to 2.5 miles (Pyle 1974), this seems a reasonable choice for a weight matrix.   
 Given a W matrix indicating “close” neighborhoods, we can then specify either a 
spatial autocorrelation or a spatial lag model.  A spatial autocorrelation (or spatial error) 
model can be specified as: 
Y = XΒ + ε 
where ε = λWε + μ, Y is a vector of the outcome measure, X is a matrix of predictors that 
have Β effect on y, λ represents the spatial autoregressive parameter, and μ is a vector of 
homoskedastic and uncorrelated errors.   
 Alternatively, we can specify a spatial lag model: 
Y = ρWY + XΒ + μ 
where ρ represents the spatial autoregressive parameter, WY represents the spatially lagged 
dependent variable, and all other terms are as defined before.   
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Detection of spatial autocorrelation or spatial lag in models 
 Considerable recent work has been done on the question of detecting the presence of 
spatial autocorrelation (λ in the above equations) or spatial lag (ρ in the above equations) in 
models.  This endeavor is challenging, given the possible confounding of the other effect 
when testing one effect.  For instance, the most common approach uses the Lagrange 
Multiplier.  In this approach the standard ordinary least squares model is estimated (assuming 
that λ and ρ are zero), and diagnostics are then performed on these residuals (Anselin 1988; 
Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon 1996; Anselin and Florax 1995).  However, when testing λ 
= 0, such tests will respond to nonzero ρ.  Conversely, Lagrange Multiplier tests of ρ = 0 will 
respond to nonzero λ.  This raised a need for tests that are robust to such confounding effects, 
and Anselin et. al. (1996) devised such “robust” LM tests, as they referred to them.  Monte 
Carlo simulations suggested that these robust LM tests perform reasonably well (for details 
on this test procedure and the simulation results, see Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon 1996).   
 Thus a problem I encountered when performing these tests is my large sample size.  
In the fixed effects models looking at change in neighborhoods I had between 2,000 and 
3,000 cases.  In the cross-sectional models, I had 5,000 cases.  Since the spatial tests require 
the use of the X matrix, which grows exponentially with sample size, this poses memory 
problems.  I therefore took the approach of performing the tests for each city separately 
(since there would be no spatial effects across cities).  As noted in chapter four, there is 
much less reason to expect spatial effects in the fixed effects model, since taking into account 
unchanging characteristics of the tract also takes into account unchanging spatial effects.  In 
support of this, there seems to be considerable evidence of spatial lag effects in the cross-
sectional data, but little evidence of spatial error or spatial lag effects for the fixed effects 
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model for violent crime, as presented in Table A1.  This table presents the results of the 
robust LM tests for both spatial correlation and spatial lag(Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon 
1996).  The general pattern shows that spatial lag is much more of a threat in these data than 
spatial error, as the effects for spatial lag are nearly always stronger.  Note that for the fixed 
effects models, only three cities show appreciable evidence of spatial lag effects (Milwaukee 
in 1990-2000, and Seattle and Baltimore from 1970-80).  Two other cities are just barely 
significant for a spatial lag effect.  Thus, in most of these cities there is no evidence of spatial 
lag effects when taking into account the unobserved fixed effects of these tracts.  In sharp 
contrast, for the cross-sectional models, 10 of the 12 cities show significant evidence of 
spatial lag effects, and often very strong evidence.  The spatial effects for property crime 
show a similar pattern, though the spatial effects are weaker for this type of crime.  For 
property crime, just one city shows appreciable evidence of a spatial lag effect (Baltimore 
from 1990-2000), and two others are marginally significant.  Again, there is much stronger 
evidence for a spatial lag effect in the cross-sectional model, as 6 of the 9 cities show 
considerable spatial effects.   
 As a further diagnostic, I also estimated maximum likelihood models for each city 
taking into account spatial lag, and compared these results to OLS models ignoring this 
possible spatial effect.  In the cross-sectional models for violent crime, the average bias of 
coefficients was 21.0% (as measured by the absolute difference of the two coefficients 
divided by the coefficient from the OLS model, and taking an average over all significant 
coefficients), and the typical coefficient was overestimated in the OLS models by 31.0% (as 
measured by dividing the coefficient from the OLS model by the coefficient from the spatial 
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lag model, and taking an average over all significant coefficients).85  In contrast, there was 
much less evidence of bias present in the fixed effects models for violent crime, as the 
significant coefficients had an average bias of just 3.7%, and the average coefficient 
overestimate in the models without spatial effects was just 2.4%.  The pattern of stronger 
spatial effects for the cross-sectional models was again evident when using property crime as 
the outcome, as the cross-sectional models showed average bias of 10.5% and on average 
overestimated coefficients by 4.5%.  These numbers were again smaller for the fixed effects 
models, with average bias of just 2.8%, and overestimating coefficients by just 1.8% when 
failing to take into account possible spatial effects.  Again, this highlights that taking into 
account the unobserved fixed effects of tracts largely eliminates spatial effects.   
  
Estimation of models with spatial autocorrelation or spatial lag 
 While there are various strategies for estimating models with spatial autocorrelation 
and spatial lag, many of these are not explicitly tailored to multivariate modeling.  A 
common approach is a maximum likelihood strategy to handle various types of spatial 
heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and lag (Anselin 1988).  However, such an approach is 
computationally intensive, and is difficult to apply to multivariate analysis.  It is particularly 
unwieldy for a sample the size of the one here.  An alternative strategy utilizes the two-stage 
least squares approach suggested by Anselin (1988) and modified by Land and Deane (1992).  
Land and Deane (1992: 221) suggest that this 2SLS strategy is “much more computationally 
efficient than the ML estimator and yields numerical estimates of comparable statistical 
efficiency.”  They argue that their approach will perform relatively well in large samples 
                                                 
85 I only compare significant coefficients for this contrast----very small insignificant coefficients can show very 
high proportional variability simply because they are estimated so close to zero.   
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when good exogenous identifying variables are available, and showed in a particular example 
that the estimates obtained both through 2SLS and ML were very similar.  
 The key for any two-stage least squares approach is obtaining appropriate 
instrumental variables.  That is, the researcher needs to find variables that are uncorrelated 
with the disturbance term in the equation of interest, but nonetheless correlated with the 
endogenous variable.  In this instance, the endogenous variable is the spatially lagged y-
variable for neighboring tracts to the tract of interest.  There are at least three different two-
stage least squares approaches to handling spatial lag effects.  In these models, y* represents 
the value of y in the nearby neighborhoods.  The 2SLS approach estimates y *
∧
 in a first 
stage, and then includes this estimate in the final model.  As mentioned above, various W 
matrices can be created.   
One approach was proposed by Anselin (1988), and entails first estimating y *
∧
 by 
regressing y on all of the x-variables in the model.  This estimate of y *
∧
 is then multiplied by 
W to create y **
∧
 (I denote this new estimate with double-asterisks).  This y **
∧
 is then 
included in the structural model of interest.  Note that pre-multiplying y *
∧
 by W provides the 
identification for this model; this is because this W varies across observations, breaking the 
otherwise perfect collinearity between X and the instruments.   
A second approach was proposed by Anselin (1988) and Land and Deane (1992) and 
entails first creating a new variable, Wy*, by multiplying the amount of crime in a tract by its 
distance from the tract of interest.  Land and Deane (1992) motivated this by comparison to 
the population potential model (Duncan, Cuzzort, and Duncan 1963).  In this approach, the 
researcher first creates a W matrix of the distances of all the tracts in the city from one 
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another.  Then an estimate of W y *
∧
 is created by regressing Wy* on all of the x-variables in 
the model plus some additional exogenous predictors not in the model (these “instruments” 
provide the identification for the model).   This y *
∧
 is then included in the structural model.  
A challenge for this approach is finding suitable instruments.   
 A third approach entails multiplying the matrix of X variables by the weight matrix 
(W) to create WX variables; these WX variables are then used as the instruments in the first 
stage equation predicting Wy*.  This approach was suggested by Anselin (1995), and 
employed by Morenoff (2003) in a study of Chicago neighborhoods.  Note that this approach 
assumes that whereas the value of X in a neighboring tract has a direct effect on that tract’s 
crime, it has no direct effect on the crime rate in the tract of interest.  Indeed, this is how the 
initial model is specified (of course, the value of X in these neighboring tracts would have an 
indirect effect on the Y in the tract of interest, but this does not disqualify them as 
instruments since they do not have a posited direct effect).   
I adopted the third 2SLS approach in this study for the cross-sectional models.  This 
estimator for the cross-sectional models was generally well-behaved:  for instance, in the 
violent crime model the R-square for the first stage regression was .68, suggesting that I am 
getting a rather reasonable estimate of the y *
∧
  that I am including in the structural model.  In 
the property crime model, the first stage R-square was .66.  Also important is that these 
instruments help to uniquely explain this y *
∧
  from the X variables in the structural equation:  
I tested for collinearity by regressing this y *
∧
 on the X variables in the structural equation 
and found an R-square of .89 in the violent crime model and .92 in the property crime model.  
While relatively high as both are near the suggested cutoff of values of .90, they suggest a 
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decent job of creating an independent estimate of the spatial effects.  It is also instructive to 
contrast these results when estimating a spatial 2SLS for the fixed effects model (which show 
little spatial effects), as the collinearity of the y *
∧
  with the predictors in the model is much 
higher:  .96 in both the violent crime and property crime models.   
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Table A1.  Tests for spatial error and spatial lag in two types of models:  fixed effects 
models for change in the decade, and OLS models for a single point in time.  Models for 
two outcomes:  violent crime and property crime 
 
City Years Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value
Violent crime models
Denver 1990-2000 0.032 0.859 0.424 0.515 2.400 0.121 25.565 0.000
Milwaukee 1990-2000 8.764 0.003 17.047 0.000 12.926 0.000 29.091 0.000
Sacramento 1990-2000 1.009 0.315 0.163 0.687 0.356 0.551 64.157 0.000
Indianapolis 1990-2000 1.990 0.158 3.028 0.082 5.290 0.021 8.525 0.004
Cleveland 1990-2000 4.201 0.040 4.155 0.042 0.354 0.552 0.371 0.542
Washington 1990-2000 0.024 0.878 0.092 0.762 9.444 0.002 25.195 0.000
Baltimore 1990-2000 3.285 0.070 4.724 0.030 3.263 0.071 16.552 0.000
Washington 1980-1990 0.729 0.393 1.786 0.181 9.521 0.002 60.198 0.000
Baltimore 1980-1990 2.768 0.096 1.803 0.179 9.991 0.002 18.118 0.000
Seattle 1970-1980 7.807 0.005 8.876 0.003 1.844 0.174 1.867 0.172
St. Louis 1970-1980 3.508 0.061 1.875 0.171 2.253 0.133 19.013 0.000
Baltimore 1970-1980 7.922 0.005 9.443 0.002 3.154 0.076 16.968 0.000
Property crime models
Denver 1990-2000 0.589 0.443 0.043 0.836 3.016 0.082 12.833 0.000
Milwaukee 1990-2000 1.528 0.216 2.524 0.112 8.837 0.003 11.933 0.001
Sacramento 1990-2000 0.258 0.612 0.546 0.460 0.000 0.994 59.197 0.000
Indianapolis 1990-2000 2.540 0.011 1.078 0.299 4.209 0.040 6.736 0.009
Cleveland 1990-2000 3.639 0.056 4.205 0.040 0.094 0.759 0.064 0.800
Baltimore 1990-2000 13.487 0.000 14.377 0.000 3.346 0.067 21.707 0.000
Baltimore 1980-1990 0.013 0.910 0.000 0.988 4.944 0.026 9.837 0.002
St. Louis 1970-1980 3.027 0.082 4.079 0.043 0.401 0.527 0.167 0.683
Baltimore 1970-1980 0.753 0.386 1.473 0.225 3.298 0.069 2.836 0.092
Note: All tests are chi-square distributed with 1 degree of freedom
Cross-sectional OLS modelsFixed effects models
Robust LM test for 
spatial error
Robust LM test for 
spatial lag
Robust LM test for 
spatial error
Robust LM test for 
spatial lag
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